European Aviation Safety Agency — Rulemaking Directorate

Notice of Proposed Amendment 2013-14

Safety Key Performance Indicators (SKPIs) (ATM performance IR)

RMT.0518 — 24/07/2013

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) addresses amendment to Decision 2011/017/R of the Executive Director of the European Aviation Safety Agency of 16th December 2011 on acceptable means of compliance and guidance material to Section 2 of Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 laying down a performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1216/2011 'Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) for the implementation and measurement of safety KPIs (ATM performance IR)'.

The specific objective is to refine the safety key performance indicators, based on the experience of the first reference period (RP1) and to provide additional guidance to the Member States for the development of their Performance Plans for the second reference period (RP2).

This NPA proposes some changes to the AMC/GM for the safety key performance indicators already implemented in RP1 and additional guidance for RP2 performance plans development.

The proposed changes are expected to provide also more clarity and to reduce the burden to the stakeholders when measuring and verifying the safety key performance indicators (KPIs).

Applicability		Process map	
Affected regulations and decisions:	ED Decision 2011/017/R	Concept Paper:	No
Affected stakeholders:	Member States, their Competent Authorities in ATM/ANS and ANSPs	Terms of Reference:	23/04/2013
Driver/origin:	Commission Regulation (EU) No 390/2013	Rulemaking group:	Yes
Reference:		RIA type:	None
		Technical consultation during NPA drafting:	No
		Duration of NPA consultation:	6 weeks
		Review group:	Yes
		Focussed consultation:	No
		Publication date of the Opinion:	NA
		Publication date of the Decision:	2013/Q4

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1. Procedural information

1.1. The rule development procedure

The European Aviation Safety Agency (hereinafter referred to as the 'Agency') developed this Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) in line with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008[1] (hereinafter referred to as the 'Basic Regulation'), the Rulemaking Procedure[2] and with Regulation (EC) No 390/2013[3] (hereinafter referred to as the performance regulation).

This rulemaking activity is included in the Agency's Rulemaking Programme 2013-2015 under RMT.0518 [4].

The text of this NPA has been developed by the Agency based on the input of the Rulemaking Group RMT.0518 'Development of AMC/GM for safety key performance indicators (ATM performance IR) for reference period 2',. It is hereby submitted for consultation of all interested parties[5].

As it is clearly stated in the ToR, this NPA will be followed by another one which is planned to be published by the end of 2013 and which will develop AMC/GM for the newly introduced performance indicators by the performance regulation for the second reference period.

This NPA was developed with the support of EUROCONTROL in accordance with its working arrangements with the Agency and in cooperation with the Performance Review Unit.

1.2. The structure of this NPA and related documents

Chapter 1 (Procedural information) of this NPA contains the procedural information related to this task. Chapter 2 (Explanatory note) explains the core technical content. Chapter 3 (Proposed amendments) contains the proposed text for the new requirements. Chapter 4 explains why Regulatory Impact Assessment was not provided for this particular task.

1.3. How to comment on this NPA

Please submit your comments using the automated **Comment-Response Tool (CRT)** available at **http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/**[6].

Since the proposed amendment does not introduce many novelties, **a consultation period of six weeks** is considered to be sufficient for the stakeholders for providing comments.

The deadline for submission of comments is 5 September 2013.

1.4. The next steps in the procedure

Following the closing of the NPA public consultation period, the Agency will review all comments.

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1 Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 6/2013 of 8 January 2013 (OJ L 4, 9.1.2013, p. 34).

2 The Agency is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of the Basic Regulation. Such process has been adopted by the Agency's Management Board and is referred to as the 'Rulemaking Procedure'. See Management Board Decision concerning the procedure to be applied by the Agency for the issuing of Opinions, Certification Specifications and Guidance Material (Rulemaking Procedure), EASA MB Decision No 01-2012 of 13 March 2012.

3 OJ L121, 9.5.2013.

4 http://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/terms-of-reference-and-group-composition.php.

5 In accordance with Article 52 of the Basic Regulation and Articles 5(3) and 6 of the Rulemaking Procedure.

6 In case of technical problems, please contact the CRT webmaster (crt@easa.europa.eu).

The outcome of the NPA public consultation will be reflected in the respective Comment-Response Document (CRD).

The Agency will publish the CRD together with the ED Decision.

The Decision containing Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) will be published by the Agency taking into account the input provided by the stakeholders during the consultation period.

2. Explanatory Note

The purpose of this Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) is to propose amendment to Decision No 2011/017/R of the Executive Director of the European Aviation Safety Agency of 16th December 2011 on acceptable means of compliance and guidance material to Section 2 of Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010[7] laying down a performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1216/2011 'Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material for the implementation and measurement of safety KPIs (ATM performance IR)'

Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 should be repealed by Commission Regulation (EU) 390/2013[8] (hereinafter referred to as the 'performance scheme Regulation') with effect of 1 January 2015.

The performance scheme Regulation for air navigation services and network functions implements Article 11 of the Regulation (EC) No 549/2004[9] of the European Parliament and of the Council (framework Regulation). Section 2 of Annex I of the performance scheme Regulation sets out the SKPIs for local[10] target setting and Section 1 of Annex I establishes the SKPIs with EU wide safety performance targets.

In order to facilitate implementation and measurement of the safety (key) performance indicators, the Agency, in consultation with the Performance Review Body, is tasked by Article 9 of performance scheme Regulation to adopt acceptable means of compliance and guidance material in accordance with the procedure established under Article 52 of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, before the beginning of the second reference period. The work of the rulemaking group was supported by EUROCONTROL in accordance with the working arrangements with EASA.

To facilitate the implementation of the performance scheme by the regulated stakeholders, the Agency's intent is to publish two NPAs.

The current NPA proposes to update the SKPIs where necessary and to provide additional guidance for better and easier implementation. This NPA should also facilitate the target setting process at local level and is providing new guidance material for description of interdependences of the other performance areas with safety. The relevant EASA Executive Director Decision is expected to be adopted before the end of 2013.

Stakeholders are invited to comment on the possibility the applicability date of EASA Executive Director Decision to be the beginning of the third year of the first reference period (1th January 2014) or the beginning of the second reference period (1th January 2015).

The second NPA shall propose additional AMC/GM for newly introduced safety performance indicators applicable for the second reference period.

2.1. Overview of the issues to be addressed

With regard to the Safety Key Performance Indicators (SKPI) and Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs), there are certain new performance requirements introduced by Regulation (EU) 390/2013

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7 Commission Regulation (EC) No 691/2010 of 29 July 2010 laying down a performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions and amending Regulation (EC) No 2096/2005 laying down common requirements for the provisions of air navigation services (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1216/2011 (OJ L 310, 25.11.2011, p. 3).

8 OJ L 128, 9.5.2013, p. 1.

9 OJ L 96, 31.3.2004, p. 1.

10 Section 2 of Annex II to the performance scheme regulation specifies that 'For the purpose of these indicators, local means at functional airspace block level with an indication for monitoring purposes of the contribution at national level.'

for the second reference period (RP2) compared to the first reference period (RP1)[11]. During the first reference period, there are no EU wide safety performance targets. However, Member States may set targets corresponding to these Safety KPIs. A target setting process is foreseen in RP2 for the same SKPIs:

- the effectiveness of safety management (EoSM);
- the application of the severity classification below based on the Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) methodology;
- the reporting by the Member States and their air navigation service providers through a questionnaire which measures the level of presence and corresponding level of absence of just culture (JC).

For the all SKPIs (above) there needs to be a target setting process at local level and EU target setting with EU wide performance targets for the first two them.

During the first year of implementation of the performance scheme regulation in RP1 and during the 'dry run' session done with several stakeholders before RP1, the Agency together with the PRB identified that there are certain difficulties with the interpretation and consequently the measurement of SKPIs. The questionnaires were first tested within a 'dry-run' exercise during which a number of NSAs provided feedback on the content of the questionnaires. The results of the test phase were taken into account when developing the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) material as additional guidance to stakeholders. Based on the experience gained through the 1st verification exercise, as well as added input of the 'dry-run' and FAQ, a number of amendments were made at the State-level and ANSP-level questionnaires, in order to clarify the questions AMC and related GM. In particular there were some issues with the correct implementation and verification of the JC questionnaires both at State and ANSP levels. Needs for better alignment of the EoSM questionnaire with the EU legislation and some more guidance on the verification process were also identified.

2.2. Objectives

The overall objectives of the EASA system are defined in Article 2 of the Basic Regulation. This proposal will contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives by addressing the issues outlined in Chapter 2 of this NPA.

The specific objective of this proposal is to amend the SKPIs AMC/GM in order to facilitate their implementation.

2.3. Overview of the proposed amendments

GM 1 SKPI — General

Some minor editorial changes to the text are proposed together with changes of the reference to Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2011 to Commission Regulation (EU) No 390/2013.

A new definition on 'best (good) practice' is proposed in order to clarify the text in the AMC/GM where this term is used.

AMC 1 SKPI — Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — General

Minor editorial changes to improve the quality of the text.

[11] According Article 8 of performance scheme regulation 'The first reference period for the performance scheme shall cover the calendar years 2012 to 2014 inclusive. The second reference period shall cover the calendar years 2015 to 2019 inclusive.'

Appendix 1 to AMC 2 SKPI — Questionnaire for Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — State Level.

The main changes proposed to the Questionnaire are the following:

- Alignment of the term 'competent authority' through the Questionnaire. This amendment reflects better Articles 3 of Regulation No 1034/2011 and Regulation No 1035/2011. In addition to that, this amendment is required for the authority or authorities competent for the oversight in a FAB arrangement.
- Replacement of 'best practices' with 'best (good) practices'.
- The cumulative requirements 'All of initiating plus' and 'All of Planning/Initial Implementation plus' in the beginning of all answers for the levels of implementation B and C of the questionnaire have been removed respectively in order to streamline the answers in a logical manner.
- Some editorial changes and alterations to questions 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.9, 1.11, 1.15, 1.16, 2.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 4.1 and to the whole component 5, to align the terminology with the current EU legislation, are proposed. The levels of implementation thereto have been amended for better clarification.
- Question 1.2 has been amended to be in a line with the requirements stemming from Regulation No 549/2004, Article 4 and Regulation No 1034/2011, Article 12. Furthermore, the feedback received from the 'dry-run' shows that the term 'safety regularity processes' was misleading. Therefore, it has been replaced by 'the tasks assigned to the competent authorities under Regulations No 549/2004, 216/2008 and their Implementing Rules' within the answers. In addition to that, 'recognised organisations' have been replaced by 'qualified entities' to align the term with the currently in force EU legislation (e.g. Basic regulation, Regulation No 1034/2011, etc.).
- Question 1.6 has been amended to reflect the requirements laid down in Article 4 of Regulation No 549/2004 and Regulation No 805/2011 and to line up with the responsibilities stemming from 1-2 Element of SSP as required by ICAO, Annex 19. Level of implementation C thereto has been reworded to avoid duplication with the Question 1.2 and the other levels of implementation have been modified for consistency and clarity.
- Based on the feedback received from the 'dry-run', the proposed amendments to Question 1.7 aims for better alignment with the requirements stemming from Regulation No 549/2004.
- Question 1.8 is proposed to be removed to avoid overlapping with various questions as the legislation (primary and secondary) is addressed in Question 1.1 and Question 1.3. In addition to that, the procedures for the oversight of the safety requirements are covered in Question 3.1.
- Level of implementation A to Question 1.10 'competent authority' has been amended in order to specify that the entity empowered to make civil aviation safety investigations needs to be independent from ANSP, as well as the competent authority..
- To improve the clarity of Question 1.14 and the answers thereto, the necessary amendments are proposed to address properly the requirements of handling non-compliances and application of enforcement measures, including suspension, limitation and revocation of certificates/licenses stemming from regulation No 1034/2011 and regulation No 1035/2011.
- The purpose of the modifications proposed to Question 3.1 and the associated answers are to align with the requirements laid down in Regulation No 1034/2011. Furthermore, the duplications (e.g. legislation aspects which are addressed in Component 1) have been removed.
- Editorial changes to Question 3.2 have been proposed in order to address only the competent authority's responsibilities dealing with the oversight of ANSPs.

- Question 3.3 addresses the qualification of the auditors and the processes for performing audits which has also been addressed in Question 3.1. Therefore, this question has been modified to better reflect the competency of the staff involved in the safety oversight as laid down in Article 12 (3) of Regulation No 1034/2011.
- 4-2 ICAO State Safety Programme (SSP) critical element on external training, communication and dissemination of safety information requires the States to provide education and it promotes awareness of safety risks and two-way communication of safety relevant information to support, among service providers, the development of an organisational culture that fosters an effective and efficient SMS. In order to measure how effectively the State facilitates, its service providers', SMS education or training (where feasible or appropriate), Question 4.4 has been amended. The associated levels of implementation (namely B, C, D, and E) have been amended to correctly address the subject that relates to the external training, communication and dissemination of safety information.

Appendix 2 to AMC 2 SKPI — List of Weightings for Evaluation of Effectiveness of Safety Management Questionnaire — State level.

Small amendment to reflect the deletion of Question 1.8.

GM 3 SKPI – Effectiveness of Safety Management – Justifications for selected levels of implementation

New GM developed to provide some general principles in providing justifications for levels selected and an example. The intent is to facilitate the verification process.

AMC 3 SKPI — Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — ANSP level.

No changes are proposed.

Appendix 1 to AMC 3 SKPI — Questionnaire for Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — ANSP level.

The following changes are proposed:

- Replacement of 'best practices' with 'best (good) practices';
- The cumulative requirements 'All of initiating plus' and 'All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus' in the beginning of all answers B and C of the questionnaire have been removed respectively in order to streamline the answers in a logical manner.
- Editorial changes in levels of implementation B and C of question SA11-3 to better clarify the intent.

Appendix 2 to AMC 3 SKPI — List of Weightings for evaluation of Effectiveness of Safety Management Questionnaire — ANSP level.

No changes are proposed.

GM ~~3~~ 4 SKPI — Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — ANSP level — Scoring and numerical analysis.

Renumbered and some deletions are proposed, since the targeting at FAB level is established in the performance scheme regulation.

GM ~~4~~ 5 SKPI — Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — ANSP level — Verification Mechanism.

Except for the renumbering of the GM, no further changes are proposed.

Appendix 1 to GM ~~4~~ 5SKPI Verification of ANSP EoSM by NSA/competent authority

The proposal for the GM amendment is to the most extent based on the best practices prepared by CANSO. The changes proposed can be summarised as follows:

- The overall category table was added to the beginning of the guidance, with an emphasis on the fact that these categories apply throughout the questionnaire, over and above the particular answers to each question, in each category.
- The text 'All of initiating plus' and 'All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus' for respectively category B and C answers have been removed in order to streamline the answers in a logical manner.
- Additional explanations were added at the end of each question to clarify the context of terms used.
- The guidance contained a number of questions for the interview, which was a legacy from the EUROCONTROL methodology. These were considered not very useful for the verification purposes and are deleted.
- The guidance to the questions in SA1 was deemed to cause potential conflicts or even confusions between the Just Culture and Safety Culture concepts and related terms. Although these terms may be erroneously seen as similar, they are not the same and thus the difference must be well understood and observed.
- Guidance to a number of other questions was clarified. Mostly these are editorial changes to improve the language used and the comprehension of the concept.

AMC 4 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — General.

The general description of the RAT methodology has been updated to better convey the message that for the operational occurrences the severity scheme considers the occurrence's impact on the safety of the aircraft and its occupants, whilst the scheme dedicated to ATM Specific (Technical) occurrences takes into account the ANS provider's ability to provide safe ATM services.

GM ~~5~~ 6 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology for Separation Minima Infringements — General description

Scoring conventions in terms of evaluating the ATC planning, in case the initial conflict was not detected by the air traffic control staff, have been added to the methodology. Such a proposal is in accordance with the decisions taken by the RAT User Group.

The description of the scenario to be considered when evaluating severity of occurrences involving aircraft under tower control using the RAT methodology has been updated.

GM ~~8~~ 9 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — Methodology for Separation Minima Infringements — Final scores

Except for the renumbering of the GM, no further changes are proposed.

GM ~~9~~ 10 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — Methodology for Separation Minima Infringements — Reliability Factor

Except for the renumbering of the GM, no further changes are proposed.

AMC 7 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — Methodology for ATM-specific occurrences

No changes are proposed.

GM ~~10~~ 11 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — Methodology for ATM-specific occurrences.

Except for the renumbering of the GM, no further changes are proposed.

Appendix 1 to GM ~~10~~ 11 SKPI — Look-up Table for Severity Classification of ATM-specific occurrences and retrieve the predetermined severity in column 'Severity'.

The look-up table contains all the realistic combinations of the criteria described in this GM. An occurrence code is uniquely assigned to each combination. It is to be noted that, in case of combination of criteria that are not realistic, the severity is marked with an 'X' in the look-up table. In such case, the severity cannot be determined (category D). Therefore, the user should try to map a given failure to the credible combination available in the look-up table.

Given the experience acquired by the members of the RAT User Group since the start of the application of the RAT Methodology and the associated 'Look-up' table for the determination of the severity of the reported ATM Specific (Technical) Occurrences, the following updates have been proposed:

The severity of the following failure modes was reviewed: AR-AGC/101, AR-AGC/102, AR-AGC/112, AR-AGC/122, AR-AGC/130, AR-AGC/131, AR-AGC/132, AP-AGC/101, AP-AGC/102, AP-AGC/112, AP-AGC/122, AP-AGC/130, AP-AGC/131, AP-AGC/132, AD-AGC/101, AD-AGC/102, AD-AGC/112, AD-AGC/122, AD-AGC/130, AD-AGC/131 and AD-AGC/132.

Several new failure modes have been added to the 'Look-up' table: AR-ASV/013, AR-ASV/014, AR-ASV/023, AR-ASV/024, AR-ASV/033, AR-ASV/210, AP-ASV/013, AP-ASV/023, AP-ASV/024, AP-SNT/033, AP-SNT/034, AD-NAV/003, AD-NAV/103, AD-NAV/200, AD-NAV/203, AD-NAV/303, AD-NAV/403, AD-NAV/503, AD-ASV/013, AD-ASV/014, AD-ASV/023, AD-ASV/024, AD-ASV/033, AD-ASV/034, AD-SNT/033, AD-SNT/034, AR-AGC/201B, AP-AGC/201B, AD-AGC/201B, OC-AGC/201B and FI-AGC/201B.

AMC 8 SKPI — RAT methodology — Verification mechanism

Changed reference to Regulation 390/2013.

Proposed means of compliance to report to the European Central Repository and/or the Annual Summary Template Mechanism. The proposal is made for more clarity.

GM ~~11~~ 12 SKPI — Just culture — General

Except for the renumbering of the GM, no further changes are proposed.

AMC 9 SKPI — Just culture — Reporting at State level

Except for the indication that two of the questions in the Appendix are deleted, no further changes are proposed

Appendix 1 to AMC 9 SKPI — Just Culture Questionnaire — State level

Overall, the proposed changes to the State level questionnaire are minor and purposed to clarify the intention of the question in order to assist the NSAs when providing a response and the related justification.

The main change is the deletion of questions ST.P.4 and ST.L.2.

Regarding ST.P.4, the comments received during the 'dry-run' and in the responses identified that the reference to 'NSA own staff' was not clear to most States since in most cases the NSA staff will not be prosecuted for safety events as they are not operational staff. In any case, should their involvement in judicial proceedings be needed, most States would ensure legal support to staff since they act in the performance of their duties (in some cases, as civil servants). In its discussion, the Rulemaking Group agreed that the question was only relevant in the context of the ANSP level questionnaire but not at State level. As a result, the question was removed from the State level questionnaire.

Regarding ST.L.2, the feedback from the verification exercise highlighted that this question was seen as repetitious and was drafted in an unclear way. The result was that the information provided did not add new elements and, in some instances, created confusion. After discussion at the Rulemaking Group, it was agreed that this question should also be deleted.

The other changes to the State level questions, namely to ST.P.1/2/3/8/9 and ST.L.4/7/8, are of editorial nature and are based on proposals from the Rulemaking Group to improve the text of the questions in order to clarify the intention and readability of the questionnaire.

GM ~~12~~ 13 SKPI — Just culture — Reporting and Verification at State level.

Except for the renumbering of the GM and the relevant change to the Appendix when referenced, no further changes are proposed.

Appendix 1 to GM ~~12~~ 13 SKPI — Just Culture — State level — possible justification

The main aim of the proposed changes is to consolidate the text developed in the FAQ into the GM, so as to have all the relevant guidance in one document. The intention was also to provide additional examples of possible justification and evidence that could be used by States when responding to the questionnaire. Lastly, as a result of proposals from the Rulemaking Group, some minor editorial changes were also made to questions ST.L.1/2/3/5/8/9/10 and ST.L.4/5/6/7/8.

AMC 10 SKPI — Just culture — Reporting at ANSP level

No changes are proposed.

Appendix 1 to AMC 10 SKPI — Just Culture Questionnaire — ANSP level

The main proposed changes are to the text of questions ANSP.P.3 and ANSP.P.6.

Regarding ANSP.P.3, the discussion at the Rulemaking Group meeting identified that the question should be reworded in order to achieve a complete reflection of current practices at ANSP level. The original intention of the question was preserved but the question was modified in order to ensure effective feedback from ANSPs. The proposal from the Rulemaking Group to reword the question was therefore agreed.

Regarding ANSP.P.6, the Rulemaking Group also came to the conclusion that the questions needed to be reworded in order to fully achieve the intended effect in terms of feedback from the ANSPs as to their practice when dealing with actions taken following occurrences.

The other changes to the ANSP level questions, namely to ANSP.P.5/10/11, ANSP.L.2 and ANSP.O.3/4/8, are of editorial nature and are based on proposals from the Rulemaking Group to improve the text of the questions in order to clarify the intention and readability of the questionnaire

GM ~~13~~ 14 SKPI — Just culture — Reporting and Verification at ANSP level

Except for the renumbering of the GM and the relevant change to the Appendix when referenced, no further changes are proposed.

Appendix 1 to GM ~~13~~14 SKPI — Just Culture — ANSP level — possible justification

The main aim of the proposed changes is to consolidate the text developed in the FAQ in the GM, so as to have all the relevant guidance in one document. The intention was also to provide additional examples of possible justification and evidence that could be used by States when responding to the questionnaire. Lastly, as a result of proposals from the Rulemaking Group, some minor editorial changes were also made to questions ANSP.P1/6/710/12/13, ANSP.L.3 and ANSP.O.3/6/8.

GM 15 SKPI — Interdependencies — evaluation of the impact on safety of the performance plan

The purpose of this new guidance material is to describe the possible process to be applied when describing consideration of the interdependencies between key performance areas in the performance plan, including an evaluation of the impact on safety in the performance plan when complying with Article 11, 3, (e) and point 3,3 of Annex II to the performance regulation. The process is based on the high level assessment of introduced changes to the functional systems stemming from improvements in the other performance areas.

3. Proposed amendments

The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below:

(a) deleted text is marked with ~~strike through~~;

(b) new or amended text is highlighted in grey;

(c) an ellipsis (…) indicates that the remaining text is unchanged in front of or following the reflected amendment.

(d) It shall be noted that grey highlights used in the draft AMC/GM before this proposal was changed to blue in order to avoid confusions.

3.1. Draft Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material

I General

GM1 SKPI — General

A. Purpose

This Annex contains acceptable means of compliance (AMC) and guidance material (GM) for measuring the safety Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in accordance with Commission Regulation (EU) No 390/2013 ~~691/2010 as amended by Regulation (EU) 1216/2011~~ (hereafter referred to as the 'performance scheme regulation').
AMCs are non-binding standards adopted by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) (hereafter referred to as the 'Agency') to illustrate means to establish compliance with the performance scheme regulation. When this AMC is complied with, the obligations on measurement of the safety KPIs in the performance scheme regulation are considered as met.
However, the AMC contained in this Annex provide means, but not the only means of measurement of the safety KPIs. If ~~the~~ a Member State~~s~~ or ~~the~~ an Air Navigation Service Provider~~s~~ (ANSP~~s~~) wishes to use different means to measure the safety KPIs, they should inform the Agency thereof.
Member States and ANSPs should be able to demonstrate, by means of evidence, that the outcome of the application of any alternative means maintains the level of compliance with the performance scheme regulation and reaches a result that is comparable with this Annex.

B. Objective

The objective of this Annex is to establish the methodology for the measurement and verification of the following safety key performance indicators (safety KPIs) under the performance scheme regulation:

a) Effectiveness of Safety Management (EoSM) and Just Culture (JC), which should be measured through a periodic answering of the questionnaires the content of which is provided in Appendices 1 to AMC 2 SKPI, 1 to AMC 3 SKPI, 1 to AMC 9 SKPI and 1 to AMC 10 SKPI. The filled in questionnaires by the entity subject to evaluation, and distributed in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 390/2013 ~~1216/2011~~, should be verified as guided in AMC 3 and 9 SKPI.

b) Methodology for severity classification of reported safety-related occurrences. This should be done for each occurrence subject to the application of the methodology and should be verified as guided in AMC 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 SKPI.

C. Definitions and Abbreviations

Definitions

'ATM-specific occurrences' are events or situations where a providers ability to provide ATM, ATS, ASM or ATFM services is diminished or ceases ; .

'ATM/ANS system security' is a situation in which the ATM/ANS services are lost or disrupted as a result of breach of system security.

'Best (good) practice' is a method, initiative, process, approach, technique or activity that is believed to be more effective at delivering a particular outcome than other means. It implies accumulating and applying knowledge about what is working and what is not working, including lessons learned and the continuing process of learning, feedback, reflection and analysis.

'Major incident' is an incident associated with the operation of an aircraft, in which safety of aircraft may have been compromised, having led to a near collision between aircraft, with ground or obstacles (i.e., safety margins not respected which is not the result of an ATC instruction).

'Not determined'~~:~~ means that insufficient information was available to determine the risk involved or inconclusive or conflicting evidence precluded such determination.

'Occurrence with no safety effect' is an ~~incident~~ occurrence which has no safety significance.

'Reliability factor' is the level of confidence in the assessment (scoring) undertaken, based on the data available.

'Runway Incursion' is any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft.

'Safety culture' means the shared beliefs, assumptions and values of an organisation.

'Safety plan' is a high level safety issues assessment and related action plan. The safety plan is a key element of the safety programme.

'Safety programme' is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety.

'Separation minima infringement' is a situation in which prescribed separation minima were not maintained between aircraft.

'Serious incident' is an incident involving circumstances indicating that there was a high probability of an accident and is associated with the operation of an aircraft, which in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, or in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down.

'Significant incident' is an incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident, a serious or major incident could have occurred, if the risk had not been managed within safety margins, or if another aircraft had been in the vicinity.

Abbreviations

A/D MAN	Arrival/Departure Manager
AMC	Acceptable Means of Compliance
ANSP	Air Navigation Service Provider
A-SMGCS	Advanced Surface Movement Guidance & Control System
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATCO	Air Traffic Control~~ler~~ Officer
ATM	Air Traffic Management
ATS	Air Traffic Services
CA	Competent Authority

CISM	Critical Incident Stress Management
CWP	Controller Working Position
EoSM	Effectiveness of Safety Management
FAB	Functional Airspace Block
JC	Just Culture
GM	Guidance Material
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
MO	Management Objective
MTCD	Medium Term Conflict Detection
NSA	National Supervisory Authority
QMS	Quality Management System
RAT	Risk Analysis Tool
RF	Reliability Factor
RI	Runway Incursion
RP	Reference Period
SA	Study Area
SFMS	Safety Framework Maturity Survey
SI	Standardisation Inspection
SIA	civil aviation Safety Investigation Authority
SKPI	Safety Key Performance Indicator
SLA	Service Level Agreement
SMI	Separation Minima Infringement
SMS	Safety Management System
SSP	State Safety Programme
STCA	Short Term Conflict Alert
TCAS RA	Traffic Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisory

II Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI

AMC 1 SKPI — Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — General

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

The Effectiveness of Safety Management (EoSM) indicator should be measured by verified responses to questionnaires at State/competent authority and service provision level, as contained in this Annex. For each question the response should indicate the level of implementation, characterising the level of performance of the respective organisation.

EFFECTIVENESS LEVELS AND EFFECTIVENESS SCORE

When answering the questions, one of the following levels of implementation should be selected:

- Level A which is defined as 'Initiating' — processes are usually ad hoc and chaotic;

- Level B which is defined as 'Planning/Initial Implementation' — activities, processes and services are managed;
- Level C which is defined as 'Implementing' — defined and standard processes are used for managing;
- Level D which is defined as 'Managing & Measuring' — objectives are used to manage processes and performance is measured; and
- Level E which is defined as 'Continuous Improvement' — continuous improvement of processes and process performance.

An effectiveness level should be selected only if all the elements described in the questionnaire are fully observed by an ANSP or Member State/competent authority. If an ANSP or a Member State/competent authority has identified elements in various adjacent effectiveness levels, then they should take a conservative approach and select the lower effectiveness level for which all elements are covered.

Based on the responses, the following scores should be derived:

- The overall effectiveness score should be derived from the combination of the effectiveness levels selected by the relevant entity (ANSPs or Member State/competent authority) against each question with the weightings as described in Appendices 2 to AMC 2 SKPI and 2 to AMC 3 SKPI;
- An effectiveness score for each Management Objective for the State/competent authority and for each study area for the ANSP.

GM 2 SKPI — Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — General

A Management Objective (MO) has been derived for each of the elements of the ICAO State Safety Programme (SSP) and Safety Management System (SMS) as described in ICAO Annex 19 ~~Document 9859 'Safety Management Manual'~~, which is also suitable within the European regulatory framework.
For each Management Objective, a question (or questions) has been derived and the levels of effectiveness have been described.
For both State and ANSP levels, EASA and PRB will monitor the performance regarding this indicator based on the received answers and on the results of the verification process by the States/competent authority (CA) and by EASA as presented in Figure 2 in AMC 5 SKPI, section D.
The questionnaires' sole intent is to monitor the performance (effectiveness) of Member States/competent authorities and ANSPs regarding ATM/ANS safety management.
In order to facilitate this process for stakeholders, the Agency has developed an on-line tool which may be used by respondents in order to complete and submit their responses to the questionnaires.
Member States/competent authorities and ANSPs are expected to provide ~~honest~~ evidence based answers to these questionnaires. The ~~indications provided~~ response levels assessed in the completed EoSM questionnaires should be used with the sole purpose of generating recommendations and associated plans for improvement of ~~the~~ safety management. These ~~indications~~ response levels ~~are~~ should not be used to generate findings in the context of standardisation or oversight inspections/~~oversights~~ audits.
In accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 736/2006, if during ~~the~~ a standardisation inspection a finding is raised by the Standardisation Team, in relation to the NSA/CA responses to the EoSM questionnaire, corrective action by the NSA/CA is required. ~~In case~~ Further, ~~that~~ where a finding ~~proves~~ identifies that any of the questions in the EoSM questionnaire is scored higher than it should be, the score should be corrected and lowered to the appropriate level of implementation. A similar approach should be applied when the NSA/competent authorities raise findings to the ANSPs.
The outcome of standardisation inspections/oversight is not ~~supposed~~ designed to be used for corrections of the scores towards a higher level of implementation.
~~The safety key performance indicators for the Reference Period 1 (2012–2014) will be further validated and will be reviewed based on the experience with their use for the Reference Period 2.~~

AMC 2 SKPI — Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — State level

The answers to the State-level questionnaire should be used to measure the level of effectiveness in achieving the Management Objectives defined in this Annex.
For each question, States should provide to the Agency information on the level of effectiveness (or level of implementation) and evidence to justify their answer.
~~The following~~ Ssection A ,below, defines which should be the corresponding Management Objectives for each component and element of the SSP framework.
The questionnaire which should be answered by the Member States/competent authority is in Appendix 1 to AMC 2 SKPI — Questionnaire for Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — State Level.

A. Components, Elements and Management Objectives

Component 1 — State safety policy and objectives
Element 1.1 State safety legislative framework:

Management objective
1.1 — Implement the EU safety legislative and regulatory framework including, where necessary, the alignment of the national framework.

Element 1.2 State safety responsibilities and accountabilities

Management objective
1.2 — Establish national safety responsibilities and maintain the national safety plan in line with the European Aviation Safety Plan, where applicable. The national safety plan should include the state policy to ensure the necessary resources.

Element 1.3 Accident and incident investigation

Management objective
1.3a — Establish and maintain the independence of the civil aviation safety investigation authorities, including necessary resources. 1.3b — Establish means to ensure that appropriate safety measures are taken after safety recommendations have been issued by a civil aviation safety investigation authority. 1.3c — Ensure that civil aviation safety investigation authorities involve subject matter expertise from the ATM/ANS domain.

Element 1.4 Enforcement policy

Management objective
1.4 — Establish appropriate, transparent and proportionate enforcement procedures, including the suspension, limitation and revocation of licences and certificates and the application of other effective penalties.

Element 1.5 Management of related interfaces

Management objective
1.5a — Ensure adequate management of the internal interfaces within the NSA. 1.5b — Ensure adequate management of the external interfaces with relevant stakeholders.

Component 2 — Safety risk management
Element 2.1 Safety requirements for the air navigation service provider's SMS

Management objective
2.1 — Establish controls which govern how service providers' safety management systems (SMS) will identify hazards and manage safety risks.

Element 2.2 Agreement on the service provider's safety performance

Management objective
2.2 — Agree on safety performance of an individual, national or FAB service provider.

Component 3 — Safety assurance
Element 3.1 Safety oversight

Management objective
3.1a — Attribution of powers to the NSA responsible for safety oversight of air navigation service providers. 3.1b — Establishment of a national safety oversight system and programme to ensure effective monitoring of the air navigation service provider's (ANSP) compliance with the applicable regulations and monitoring of the safety oversight function.

Element 3.2 Safety data collection, analysis and exchange

Management objective
3.2 — Establishment of mechanisms to ensure the capture and storage of data on hazards and safety risks and analysis of that data at ANSP and State level as well as its dissemination and exchange.

Element 3.3 Safety-data-driven targeting of oversight of areas of greater concern or need

Management objective
3.3 — Establishment of procedures to prioritise inspections, audits and surveys towards the areas of greater safety concern or need or in accordance with the

identified safety risks.

Component 4 — Safety promotion
Element 4.1 Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information

Management objective
4.1a — Training of NSA personnel on applicable legislative and regulatory framework. 4.1b — Promotion of awareness of safety information and communication and dissemination of safety-related information amongst the aviation authorities within a State.

Element 4.2 External training, communication and dissemination of safety information

Management objective
4.2a — Education/training of ANSP personnel and air traffic controllers (ATCO) training organisations on applicable legislative and regulatory framework. 4.2b — Promotion of awareness of safety information and communication and dissemination of safety-related information with external stakeholders.

Component 5 — Safety culture
Element 5.1 Establishment and promotion of safety culture

Management objective
5.1 — Establishment and promotion of safety culture within the competent authority/NSA.

Element 5.2 Measurement and improvement of Safety Culture

Management objective
5.2 — Establishment of procedures to measure and improve safety culture within the competent authority/NSA.

B. Scoring and Numerical Analysis

When scoring the EoSM at State level, each response provided by the State or the competent authority in their questionnaire should be assigned a numerical value from 0 to 4, corresponding to levels A to E.
In addition, each question should be weighted from 0 to 1 according to its relevance to each Management Objective. The list of weighting factors for each question and MO can be found in Appendix 2 to AMC 2 SKPI — List of Weightings for Evaluation of Effectiveness of Safety Management Questionnaire — State level.
Mathematically, the effectiveness score for each Management Objective is calculated from the questionnaire responses and weighting factors as follows:

$$S_j = \frac{100 \sum_{k=1}^{n_j} r_{kj} . w_{kj}}{4 \sum_{k=1}^{n_j} w_{kj}}$$

Where:

- S_j is the effectiveness score for the State in management objective j;
- r_{kj} is the numeric value of the response of State to question k in management objective j (value 0 to 4);
- w_{kj} is the weight factor of question k to management objective j (value 0 to 1);
- n_j is the number of questions in management objective j for which non-nil responses were provided by the State.

In order to measure the effectiveness of safety management for the State, the following scores should be evaluated and monitored:

- Overall effectiveness score: the overall score for each State estimated by taking the average of the scores over all Management Objectives.
- An effectiveness score for each Management Objective: scores over each Management Objectives, calculated with the use of the weightings from Appendix 2 to AMC 2 SKPI — List of Weightings for Evaluation of Effectiveness of Safety Management Questionnaire — State level.

C. Mechanism for Verification

The results of ~~the~~ States' ~~filled in~~ questionnaires are to be verified by means of EASA standardisation inspections.
The coordination between EASA and the competent authority should be done through the national coordinator appointed by the State in accordance with Article 6 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 736/2006. The process is described in Figure 1 below.
The national coordinator should be responsible for coordination within the State authorities and for coordination with the ANSPs to provide the Agency with the responses to the questionnaires ~~(both competent authority and ANSP, aggregated where required)~~.



Figure 1 — Visualisation of the Mechanism for Verification at State level

GM 3 SKPI – Effectiveness of Safety Management – Justifications for selected levels of implementation

This GM provides some general principles for providing justifications and a worked example for the levels selected.

General Principles

It is anticipated that during a reference period there will be no changes other than clarifications, to the Effectiveness of Safety Management questionnaire. This not only enables the progress of States to be monitored during a reference period, it also means that state submissions only need to be updated within a reference period, instead of being completely revised. It should, therefore, be anticipated that for some questions (but not the whole questionnaire) the response from a state will be the same as in previous years.

The verification process performed by the Agency uses the justifications and evidence provided in the answers to the questionnaire, alongside pre-audit questionnaires, standardisation visits and information from the State NPP and USOAP audits. Where insufficient justification has been provided, the verification should rely on alternative information such as requests for clarification from the NSA point of contact. States are encouraged to provide the necessary justifications in the first instance in order to avoid wasted time and effort in responding to requests for clarification that would otherwise have been unnecessary.

Extensive justification when levels of implementation A or B are selected is not necessary, a simple statement of the fact or of when the work was, or will be, initiated is sufficient. Justifications for levels C, D, and E are required and the general principles of what formulates a good answer from the perspective of verification are shown below.

1. Justifications should be inclusive and explanatory, they should cover all relevant information and explain how the state achieved the level selected. Answers should not simply re-state the question.
2. Answers should clearly explain why a state is *at the level selected and* should avoid explaining why they are not at the level above the one selected.
3. In many of the questions, if the State selects level D or above, it must meet the requirements of both the level selected and the levels below. Where this is the case, the justification should cover all applicable levels, although a degree of consolidation is both acceptable and advisable.
4. The questionnaire often refers to 'a mechanism', however, it should be recognised that the differing organisational structures and project management styles between NSAs may mean that, instead of a single mechanism, there could be a series of processes, projects or initiatives that deliver the desired end results. Such a description of the processes, projects or initiatives and their interaction, provided that they are coordinated, is equally acceptable.
5. Justifications should contain specific information such as:
   i. Names or titles of the processes, documents, legislation or entities being described,
   ii. The job roles of the people responsible for the development, implementation or review of the item being described,
   iii. The intended purpose of the item being described
   iv. When it was developed and implemented and how often it is reviewed,
   v. An outline of the means or method used for development, implementation or review (such as meetings, project teams. etc.)

vi. The applicability of the item, for example whether it currently includes all the aspects intended or whether there are exceptions.

6. Where evidence can be easily provided, such as links to documents that are published online, these should have been provided, regardless of the language in use.
7. Where references are made to evidence in published documents, the reference should describe where the evidence can be found in the document and where the document itself can be found. For example, hyperlinks may be provided to documents published online, but where the document is very long, a reference to the chapter or page number would be helpful.
8. Where reference is made to internal documents, these should be cross-referenced with evidence from previous standardisation visits (if applicable). The reference should include sufficient detail for the verification team to be able to ask for the document, or the section of the document referred to, in a follow-up question to the state.

Example Response

An example of a well-structured answer is shown below and the principles shown are applicable to any question at any level. In the example provided, the response shows that the State has achieved all of levels C and D, and even some of level E, but because it has not achieved *all* of level E it must select level D. In the answer it can be seen that the information provided is consise but describes the processes by providing references, naming the entities or job functions responsible for the work (but not naming individuals), and by providing additional information that allows the verification team to understand the quality of the work being done.

By providing more information regarding the policy, more confidence can be placed in the answer and the verification team has a better idea of the way in which the NSA manages the policy in question. The extra information also indicates that the NSA is already moving towards achieving level E, although not all of the level E requirements are met.

The justification describes the way in which the requirements at level C are met, providing a reference and, because in this case it is available, a hyperlink to the document online. States should ensure that referenced documents really do contain the information described and that hyperlinks are correct.

Element 2.2 Agreement on the service provider's safety performance

MO2.2: Agree on safety performance of an individual, national or FAB service provider.

NSA has agreed with individual air navigation service providers on the safety performance (co the ones contained in the national performance plans).

A	Initiating	Acceptable safety levels are established through the ATM safety regulatory framework in a limited number of areas and in an ad hoc manner.	A
B	Planning/ Initial Implementation	There is a plan in place to establish and formalise acceptable safety levels for the ATM system through the ATM safety regulatory framework. Implementation activities have commenced.	B
C	Implementing	Formalised acceptable safety levels have been established for the ATM system through the implementation of the State Safety Programme.	C
D	Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** An evaluation of the acceptable safety levels is carried out on a regular basis and changes are introduced when necessary.	D
E	Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The acceptable safety level review process is proactively incorporated within the overall aviation safety system. Based on proactive recommendations, acceptable safety levels are linked to potential safety-critical hazards and events through the State Safety Programme.	E

Please provide justification for selected answer

D: The national competent authority has developed an acceptable level of safety policy document (ref ALS2, first published in July 2011) which has been promulgated externally via an ANS NOTICE (available from the NSA website at www.NSA.gov.xx/ANSNOTICE7-2011). The policy identifies a number of national level ANS safety targets. Further work is currently being undertaken by the NSA to broaden this activity to derive individual unit level safety targets for those units where the level of activity makes this approach practicable. An evaluation of safety performance is undertaken by the ANS and Safety Analysis Departments on a 6 monthly basis. In addition, prior to conducting on-site audits of major units, safety performance trends for a selected number of safety indicators is reviewed. In addition, a summary of annual national ANS safety performance is reported upon formally in the Annual Safety Oversight Report, which can be found online at www.NSA.gov.xx/AnnualSafetyOversightReport2012

By providing an example via the hyperlink, the verification team can check the quality of the work to understand how well the requirements are being met.

By providing the timescales (every six months) and the names of the departments involved, the justification describes succinctly that the evaluation is carried out on a regular basis. By describing the review process prior to major audits the justification shows that the criteria is met in more than one way, providing more confidence in the answer.

AMC 3 SKPI — Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — ANSP level

The answers to the ANSP-level questionnaire should be used to measure the level of effectiveness in achieving the management objectives defined in this AMC.
For each question, ANSPs should provide to their NSA/competent authority information on the level of effectiveness (or level of implementation) and evidence to justify its answer as indicated below.
Section A defines for each component and element of the ICAO Safety Management Framework the corresponding Management Objectives.
The questionnaire which should be answered by the ANSPs is in Appendix 1 to AMC 3 SKPI — Questionnaire for Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — ANSP level.

A. Components, Elements and Management Objectives

Component 1 — ANSP safety policy and objectives
Element 1.1 Management commitment and responsibility

Management objective
1.1 — Define the ANSPs' safety policy in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011 (Common Requirements).

Element 1.2 Safety accountabilities — Safety responsibilities

Management objective
1.2 — Define the responsibilities of all staff involved in the safety aspects of service provision and responsibility of managers for safety performance.

Element 1.3 Appointment of key safety personnel

Management objective
1.3 — Define the safety management function to be the responsible for the implementation and maintenance of SMS.

Element 1.4 Coordination of emergency response planning/contingency plan

Management objective
1.4 — Define a contingency plan properly coordinated with the Network Manager, other interfacing ANSPs, other relevant stakeholders and FABs.

Element 1.5 SMS documentation

Management objective
1.5 — Develop and maintain the relevant SMS documentation that defines the ANSP's approach to the management of safety.

Element 1.6 Management of related interfaces

Management objective
1.6a — Ensure adequate management of the internal interfaces. 1.6b — Ensure adequate management of the external interfaces which may influence directly the safety of their services.

Component 2 — Safety risk management
Element 2.1 Safety risk assessment and mitigation

Management objective
2.1 — Develop and maintain a formal process that ensures the management of safety risks.

Component 3 — Safety assurance
Element 3.1 Safety performance monitoring and measurement

Management objective
3.1 — Establish means to verify the safety performance of the ANSP and the effectiveness of safety risk management.

Element 3.2 The management of change

Management objective
3.2 — Establish a formal process to identify changes and to ensure that safety risk assessment and mitigation are systematically conducted for identified changes.

Element 3.3 Continuous improvement of the SMS

Management objective
3.3 — Establish a formal process to systematically identify safety improvements.

Element 3.4 Occurrence reporting, investigation and improvement

Management objective
3.4 — Ensure that ATM operational and/or technical occurrences are reported and those which are considered to have safety implications are investigated immediately, and any necessary corrective action is taken.

Component 4 — Safety promotion
Element 4.1 Training and education

Management objective
4.1 — Establish a safety training programme that ensures that personnel are trained and competent to perform SMS-related duties.

Element 4.2 Safety communication

Management objective
4.2 — Establish formal means for safety promotion and safety communication.

Component 5 — Safety culture
Element 5.1 Establishment and promotion of safety culture

Management objective
5.1 — Establish and promote safety culture within the ANSP.

Element 5.2 Measurement and improvement of safety culture

Management objective
5.2 — Establish procedures to measure and improve safety culture within the ANSP.

B. Mapping between Management Objectives, Study Areas and Questions

The following table contains the mapping between the Management Objectives, Study Areas and the questions:

MO	SA — Q
Safety policy and objectives	
1.1	SA2-3
1.2	SA2-1, SA2-4
1.3	SA2-2
1.4	SA4-3
1.5	SA4-1
1.6a	SA7-1
1.6b	SA7-2
Safety risk management	
2.1	SA6-1
Safety assurance	
3.1	SA9-1, SA9-2
3.2	SA6-1
3.3	SA3-1, SA3-2, SA10-1, SA11-2
3.4	SA1-3, SA8-1
Safety promotion	
4.1	SA5-1
4.2	SA4-2, SA8-2, SA8-3, SA9-3, SA11-1, SA11-3
Safety culture	
5.1	SA1-1
5.2	SA1-2

Table 1: Mapping Management Objectives to Study Area questions

SA — Q	MO
Safety culture	
SA1-1	5.1
SA1-2	5.2
SA1-3	3.4
Safety Responsibilities	
SA2-1	1.2
SA2-2	1.3
SA2-3	1.1
SA2-4	1.2
Compliance with international obligations	
SA3-1	3.3
SA3-2	3.3
Safety standards and procedures	
SA4-1	1.5
SA4-2	4.2
SA4-3	1.4
Competency	
SA5-1	4.1
Risk management	
SA6-1	2.1, 3.2
Safety interfaces	
SA7-1	1.6a
SA7-2	1.6b
Safety reporting, investigation and improvement	
SA8-1	3.4
SA8-2	4.2
SA8-3	4.2
Safety performance monitoring	
SA9-1	3.1
SA9-2	3.1
SA9-3	4.2
Operational safety surveys and SMS audits	
SA10-1	3.3
Adoption and sharing of best practises	
SA11-1	4.2
SA11-2	3.3
SA11-3	4.2

Table 2: Mapping Study Area questions to Management Objectives

Given this mapping, at any point an interpretation from Management Objective to Study Area and vice versa should be possible.

C. Scoring and Numerical Analysis

In order to be able to measure the effectiveness of safety management of the ANSP, the answers to the questions should be quantified and weighting factors which link the questions, study areas and the management objectives should be applied.
The responses provided by the ANSP on their questionnaires are assigned a numerical value from 0 to 4, corresponding to levels A to E.
In addition, each question should be weighted:

- from 0 to 5 according to its relevance to each Study Area;
- from 0 to 1 according to its relevance to each Management Objective.

The list of weighting factors for each question, Study Area and Management Objective can be found in Appendix 2 to AMC 3 SKPI — List of Weightings for evaluation of Effectiveness of Safety Management Questionnaire — ANSP level.
Mathematically, the effectiveness score is calculated from the questionnaire responses and weighting factors as follows:

$$S_j = \frac{100 \sum_{k=1}^{n_j} r_{kj} . w_{kj}}{4 \sum_{k=1}^{n_j} w_{kj}}$$

Where:

- S_j is the effectiveness score for ANSP in Study Area/Management Objective j;
- r_{kj} is the numeric value of the response of ANSP to question k in Study Area/Management Objective j;
- w_{kj} is the weight factor of question k to Study Area/Management Objective j;
- n_i is the number of questions in Study Area/Management Objective j for which non-nil responses were provided by the ANSP.

In order to measure the effectiveness of safety management for the ANSP, the following scores should be evaluated and monitored:

- Overall effectiveness score: the overall score for each ANSP estimated by taking the average score over all Study Areas, using the weighting factors in Appendix 2 to AMC 3 SKPI — List of Weightings for evaluation of Effectiveness of Safety Management Questionnaire — ANSP level, section 2.1.
- An effectiveness score for each Management Objective: scores for each management objectives calculated with the use of the weighting of questions described in Appendix 2 to AMC 3 SKPI — List of Weightings for evaluation of Effectiveness of Safety Management Questionnaire — ANSP level, section 2.2.

D. Mechanism for Verification

The verification of the ANSP questionnaires by the NSA/competent authority should take place before the questionnaires and their results are submitted to EASA. The verification mechanism is presented in Figure 2.
ANSPs should assign a focal point for the purpose of the verification process.



Figure 2 — Representation of verification mechanism of the ANSPs (normal procedure)

The competent authority/NSA may allocate the detailed verification task to a qualified entity or other entity.

GM ~~3~~ 4 SKPI — Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — ANSP level — Scoring and numerical analysis

~~HOW THE SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS CAN BE APPLIED WITHIN A FAB OR WITHIN MEMBER STATES WHEN THERE IS MORE THAN ONE ANSP TO BE MONITORED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PERFORMANCE SCHEME IN ATM~~
~~It is important to clarify the way the safety performance indicators can be applied in an environment where there is more than one ANSP at national level (certified for ATS and/or CNS provision) and for the FAB context. As required by Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 for Reference Period 1 (RP1), the safety performance indicators are to be applied for each State, competent authority and ANSP within each Member State. But there is nothing preventing Member States and ANSPs to aggregate the results for the different national ANSPs or to apply them within the FAB.~~
~~As each State and each ANSP in a FAB have different contributions to the service provided within the FAB, and therefore it is expected that they have different contributions to the respective combined KPI, weighting factors could be applied to reflect their respective contribution to the KPI. It should also be noted that States involved in a FAB may designate only one competent authority responsible for the safety oversight of all the ANSPs involved in that FAB and also that all the ANSPs involved in a FAB may decide to have a combined SMS. The safety performance indicators should take into account these arrangements.~~
~~Different approaches could be applied towards aggregation and weighting of results for the EoSM indicator both at State and ANSP level within a FAB or between ANSPs providing services in the same State. The following may be possible options:~~

- ~~The use of weighted averages based on traffic size;~~
- ~~Use of average scores together with an assessment of the lowest and highest score;~~
- ~~Applying the lowest score for each management objective (so far this option is considered as the best practice).~~

EXAMPLE FOR EoSM MEASUREMENT AT ANSP LEVEL

The EoSM KPI is based on the EUROCONTROL Safety Framework Maturity Survey (SFMS) which has been implemented for several years at ANSP level. The numerical analysis at ANSP

level has been validated during the implementation of the SFMS by EUROCONTROL and is based on Study Areas (SA). This is the reason why in section B of AMC 5 SKPI the mapping is provided in order to match the Study Areas to the Management Objectives. The overall score of EoSM is using the weightings of the SA as established in SFMS and the scoring of each MO is based on average weightings.

Example:

The following tables represent the results for calculating the scores for EoSM at ANSP level as follows:

- Table 1 presents the association between the selected level of implementation and the numerical value from 0 to 4;
- Table 2 illustrates the score calculated for each Study Area (SA) and the overall effectiveness score (average) of the EoSM at ANSP level; and
- Table 3 presents the effectiveness score for each Management Objective.

QUESTIONS	Selected level	Numerical value
SA1-1	A	0
SA1-2	E	4
SA1-3	E	4
SA2-1	B	1
SA2-2	D	3
SA2-3	E	4
SA2-4	D	3
SA3-1	D	3
SA3-2	D	3
SA4-1	C	2
SA4-2	D	3
SA4-3	B	1
SA5-1	D	3
SA6-1	D	3
SA7-1	C	2
SA7-2	B	1
SA8-1	A	0
SA8-2	C	2
SA8-3	C	2
SA9-1	D	3
SA9-2	B	1
SA9-3	C	2
SA10-1	D	3
SA11-1	C	2
SA11-2	B	1
SA11-3	B	1

Table 1

SAs	SA score
1	52.7
2	57.4
3	60.3
4	54.7
5	52.7
6	53.5
7	47.7
8	51.4
9	51.1
10	56.0
11	54,4
average	**53,8**

Table 2

MOs	MO score
1.1	100
1.2	50
1.3	75
1.4	25
1.5	50
1.6a	50
1.6b	25
2.1	75
3.1	50
3.2	75
3.3	62.5
3.4	50
4.1	75
4.2	51
5.1	0
5.2	100

Table 3

The application of the formula for calculation of the overall effectiveness score

$$S_j = \frac{100\sum_{k=1}^{n_j} r_{kj}.w_{kj}}{4\sum_{k=1}^{n_j} w_{kj}}$$

is illustrated for the calculation of the score for SA1 as follows:
S1 = 100*(0*5+4*5+4*4+1*4+3*2+4*5+3*2+3*1+3*1+2*2+3*3+1*3+3*4+3*4+2*5+1*3+0*5+2*5+2*3+3*2+1*4+2*4+3*4+2*4+1*4+1*5)/(4*(5+5+4+4+2+5+2+1+1+2+3+3+4+4+5+3+5+5+3+2+4+4+4+4+4+5))
S1 = 52,7

In this calculation the numerical values for each question from Table 1 are multiplied by the corresponding weightings for SA1, taken from section 2.1 of Appendix 2 to AMC 5 SKPI:

$$100\sum_{k=1}^{n_j} r_{kj}.w_{kj}$$

Then the result is divided by the sum of weights: $4\sum_{k=1}^{n_j} w_{kj}$

GM ~~4~~ 5 SKPI — Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — ANSP level — Verification Mechanism

VERIFICATION OF ANSP EoSM BY THE NSA/COMPETENT AUTHORITY

When verifying the questionnaires completed by an ANSP for EoSM, the NSA may organise bilateral interview sessions. In these interview sessions the NSA coordinator may ask the ANSP focal point some additional questions and request some additional proof in order to verify the correctness of the answers provided to the questionnaires. Examples of the verification questions, together with examples of the possible outcome of the fulfilment of the objectives of EoSM for each level of implementation, are provided in Appendix 1 to GM ~~4~~ 5 SKPI — Verification of ANSP EoSM by the NSA/competent authority.

COORDINATION BETWEEN THE NSAs FOR THE VERIFICATION OF THE ANSPs

The competent authorities/NSAs might need better coordination between them in the verification process in order to achieve consistent and comparable results at European level. Such coordination could be coordinated and facilitated by EASA, supported by PRB and EUROCONTROL. One potential solution could be the extension of the terms of reference of the NSA Coordination Platform (NCP) in the field of harmonisation of the verification mechanism of the safety KPIs at ANSP level.

Notwithstanding the above and notwithstanding the fact that NSA may delegate the verification task to another entity, the responsibility for verification of the safety KPI measurement at ANSP level stays with the overseeing competent authority/NSA.

III Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology

AMC 4 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — General

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

The severity part of the risk analysis tool methodology dedicated to operational occurrences should follow the principle of evaluating several criteria and allocating a certain score to each criterion, depending on how severe each criterion is evaluated to be.

Each criterion should have a limited number of options with corresponding scores. Some criteria have an ATM Ground and an ATM Airborne component and both scores should be counted when evaluating the ATM Overall score. Other criteria should be only relevant either for ATM Ground or ATM Airborne.

The overall score for severity of an occurrence should be the sum of the scores allocated to each applicable individual criterion.

The overall score for the severity of an occurrence should be built from the sum of the score allocated to the risk of collision/proximity (itself a sum of the score allocated to the separation and the score allocated to the rate of closure) and the degree of controllability over the incident.

The severity of the ~~For~~ ATM-specific occurrences ~~(i.e. technical occurrences affecting the capability to provide safe ATM/ANS services)~~ should refer to the service provider's capability to provide safe ATM/CNS services. ~~the~~ The criteria which should be considered are: the ~~service affected~~, service~~/function~~ provided, operational function, type of failure, extension of the failure ~~and its~~ scope and duration.

The severity of occurrences reported by Member States should be the ATM Overall ~~severity~~. For ATM-specific occurrences, the ATM Overall coincides with ATM Ground severity.

Member States should ensure that arrangements are in place for ~~the~~ reporting of the ATM Overall severity score ~~to be reported~~.

AMC 5 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — Methodology for Separation Minima Infringements

The severity of Separation Minima Infringements should be calculated as the sum of the scores totalled in each of the two main criteria:

1. Risk of collision;
2. Controllability.

A. Risk of collision

The risk of collision should be determined by the sum of the scores for the following sub-criteria:

1. Separation — based solely on the minimum distance achieved between aircraft or aircraft and obstacles. The greatest value between the horizontal and vertical in percentage of the applicable separation should be considered.
2. Rate of closure — based on the vertical and horizontal speed, measured at the moment the separation is infringed. The greatest of the predefined intervals for each of the horizontal and vertical speeds should be considered for the evaluation, if the separation is lost after the crossing point (i.e. if the aircraft are on diverging headings when the separation is lost, then the rate of closure is considered 'none').

The following table should be used to determine the scores of the criteria 'separation' and 'rate of closure':

	Risk of collision	ATM ground	ATM airborne	ATM overall	RF weight
Separation	Minimum separation achieved	0	0	0 to 10 ATM Ground **OR** ATM airborne	20
	Separation > 75 % minimum	1	1		
	Separation > 50 %, < = 75 % minimum	3	3		
	Separation > 25 %, < = 50 % minimum	7	7		
	Separation <= 25 % minimum	10	10		
Rate of closure	Rate of closure NONE	0	0	0 to 5 ATM Ground **OR** ATM airborne	10
	Rate of closure LOW (< = 85 knots, < = 1 000 ft/mn)	1	1		
	Rate of closure MEDIUM (> 85 and < = 205 knots, > 1 000 and < = 2 000 ft/mn)	2	2		
	Rate of closure HIGH (> 205 and < = 700 knots, > 2 000 and < = 4 000 ft/mn)	4	4		
	Rate of closure VERY HIGH (> 700 knots, > 4 000 ft/mn)	5	5		

For the risk of collision, either ATM Ground or ATM Airborne severity should be scored, not both. The ATM Airborne severity should be used only in cases where ATC is not responsible for providing separation (i.e. certain classes of airspaces; e.g. close encounter between IFR and VFR flights in Class E airspace).

B. Controllability

Controllability should be the second major criterion of severity and describes the 'level of control' maintained over the situation [Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs) and pilots supported by Safety Nets].

The controllability score should be defined by the following sub-criteria:

1. Conflict detection,
2. Planning,
3. Execution,
4. Ground safety nets (STCA),
5. Recovery,
6. Airborne safety nets (TCAS),
7. Pilot execution of TCAS RA.

Conflict detection should refer to ATM ground detection; therefore the ATM Overall score should have the same score as ATM Ground. ATM Airborne should not be scored here. There are three possible scenarios:

- 'Potential conflict DETECTED' includes cases where the conflict is detected but ATC decided to accept the situation.
- 'Potential conflict detected LATE' when there is not enough time to make and/or execute the plan. It should not be scored whenever separation is lost; consideration should be

taken with regard to the circumstances involved. In units with STCA with 'look-ahead' time (predictive STCA) the conflict could be detected due to the predictive STCA. If ATCO became aware of the conflict only through the predictive STCA, then it should be scored as 'Potential conflict detected LATE'.

- The score 'Potential conflict NOT detected' is self-explanatory.

In cases such as level busts or other incidents where ATC cannot form prior plan, conflict detection should not be applicable and a zero should be scored to maintain the Reliability Factor tracked as explained in section D.

		ATM ground	ATM airborne	ATM overall	RF weight
Detection	Potential conflict DETECTED	0		0 to 5 ATM ground	10
	Potential conflict detected LATE	3			
	Potential conflict NOT detected	5			

Planning refers to the ATM Ground plan and, therefore, the ATM Overall score should have the same score as ATM Ground. ATM Airborne should not be scored here. The performance, the timing and efficiency of the ATM Ground planning should be assessed. The plan refers to the first plan developed by ATC to solve the potentially hazardous/conflict situation detected in the previous step. This plan should be referred to in the subsequent execution steps but not necessarily in the recovery step.

- When the planning is either late or does not lead to a timely and effective resolution of the conflict, then 'Plan INADEQUATE' should be scored.
- When 'Conflict NOT detected' is scored, then also 'NO Pplan' and 'NO Execution' should ~~also~~ be scored.
- Whenever conflict detection is not applicable (such as level bust cases), then the planning sub-criterion is not applicable and a zero should be scored to maintain the Reliability Factor tracked as explained in section D.

		ATM ground	ATM airborne	ATM overall	RF weight
Planning	Plan CORRECT	0		0 to 5 ATM ground	10
	Plan INADEQUATE	3			
	NO plan	5			

Execution refers in general to ATM Ground execution in accordance with the developed plan but it should have ATM Ground and ATM Airborne components. Execution refers to the execution of the first plan developed by ATC to solve the detected hazardous/conflict situation. When assessing the execution, the time and efficiency of that execution should be assessed. Pilot execution of the received instructions/clearances should be scored as ATM Airborne.

- ATM Ground execution should be scored as 'Execution INADEQUATE' when it is not timely or not effective. It refers to the same plan developed in the planning criterion, prior to the separation infringement. It includes the cases when it is contrary to any prior good planning. The pilot execution should be scored separately as ATM Airborne.
- If the previous step was scored as 'Plan INADEQUATE', then the execution should be also scored as 'Execution INADEQUATE', unless there is no execution at all, in which case it is

scored as 'No Execution'. In other words, the execution cannot be CORRECT if the plan is INADEQUATE.

- When no conflict is detected, 'NO plan' and 'NO execution' should apply. 'NO execution' also should comprise cases when there is detection and a plan but this is not implemented at all.
- Whenever conflict detection and planning are not applicable, such as deviation from ATC clearance (e.g. runway incursion due to pilot deviation from ATC clearance), then the execution criterion for ATM Ground should also not be applicable and should be scored 0.
- In case of no pilot deviation from the instructed plan by the ATCO, ATM Overall should have the same score as ATM Ground and ATM Airborne should be scored 0.

		ATM ground	ATM airborne	ATM overall	RF weight
Execution	Execution CORRECT	0	0	0 to 15 ATM ground + ATM airborne	10
	Execution INADEQUATE	3	5		
	NO Execution	5	10		

Ground Safety Nets (STCA) (Short Term Conflict Alert or other similar ground safety net)

Only Current (not-predictive) STCA should be scored here. This criterion follows the principles of TCAS, except when the STCA is a ground-based defence. Cases of false/nuisance alerts should be disregarded. This sub-criterion should have only the ATM Ground element. ATM Airborne should not be scored here.

- If current STCA triggers and is used by the ATCO, then it served its purpose as designed and a 'zero' should be scored for ATM ground. As such, the units with and without STCA are scored in the same manner;
- When the conflict is detected by the ATCO before the STCA triggers, then a zero should be scored;
- 'No detection' should be scored when the conflict was not detected or detected late by the ATM Ground and STCA should have been triggered according to its implemented logic, but it failed to function. Hence the ground safety net barrier did not work.

		ATM ground	ATM airborne	ATM overall	RF weight
STCA ATM ground	Current STCA triggered	0		0 or 5	
	10				

Recovery from the actual incident is the phase requiring immediate action to restore the safety margins (e.g. separation) or at least to confine the hazard. Recovery starts from the moment the safety margins have been breached (potentially due to an inadequate or missing initial plan to solve the hazardous situation). This sub-criterion applies to both ATM Ground and ATM Airborne. Therefore, ATM Overall should be **the sum** of the ATM Ground and ATM Airborne values.
From this step (recovery) the plan should be considered as a new one and as different from the first plan established in the detection/planning phase. It is seeking the performance of bringing the system back within its safety envelope (such as re-establishment of the separation minima). Recovery might include, depending on type of occurrence (e.g. airspace in

which it occurred and services to be provided), cases where traffic information or avoiding actions were issued by ATC.

- 'Recovery CORRECT' should be scored when the actions taken after the separation minima infringement were adequate and the separation was re-established within a reasonable timeframe.
- Scoring 'Recovery INADEQUATE' indicates that the ATM reaction, after the actual incident is declared, had not improved the situation.
- When scoring 'NO recovery', consideration should be given as to whether a TCAS RA or pilot see-and-avoid action was triggered, as this could be the reason to not follow the ATC instructions. In this case, there should be no penalty on the ATM Airborne part.
- When the aircraft are already diverging, then recovery should be scored as not applicable and a zero value should be given.

		ATM ground	ATM airborne	ATM overall	RF weight
Recovery	Recovery CORRECT	0	0	0 to 25 ATM ground + ATM airborne	10
	Recovery INADEQUATE	5	6		
	NO recovery or the ATM ground actions for recovery have worsened the situation or ATM airborne has worsened the situation	10	15		

Airborne Safety Nets (TCAS) — The TCAS sub-criterion should be scored only for useful TCAS RAs (as per ICAO definitions). A similar logic applies for see-and-avoid environments where TCAS does not function. Note: For this sub-criterion ATM Overall should take the score of ATM Airborne. ATM Ground should be scored for the purposes of Reliability Factor evaluation as described in section D and ATM Ground severity evaluation when done separately from the ATM Overall.

- The 'No TCAS RA' option should be used in situations when the geometry of the encounter would require a TCAS RA (based on ICAO TCAS logic) and that did not occur.
- 'TCAS triggered…' should be scored as not applicable (i.e. a score of zero should be given) if adequate ATC instructions are issued before the pilot reaction due to TCAS RA.
- For cases where TCAS RA contributed significantly to the recovery and re-establishment of separation, 'TCAS triggered...' should be scored.

		ATM ground	ATM airborne	ATM overall	RF weight
TCAS	TCAS triggered or see-and-avoid pilot decision (in the absence of TCAS)	10	0	0 or 10 ATM airborne	10
	NO TCAS RA	0	10		

Pilot execution of TCAS RA (or application of see-and-avoid in cases where TCAS is not applicable) and recovery is a criterion to gather the complementary performance to ATM ground.

- 'Pilot(s) INSUFFICIENTLY followed RA' should apply when pilot action is not reacting fully in accordance with the TCAS RA.

- 'Pilot(s) INCORRECTLY followed RA (or, in the absence of RA, took other inadequate action)' should be scored whenever the pilot actions were either missing or contradictory (e.g. did not follow the RA). A contradictory reaction or non-reaction to a TCAS RA should be considered as the worst possible case.

		ATM ground	ATM airborne	ATM overall	RF weight
Pilot execution of TCAS RA	Pilot(s) followed RA (or, in absence of RA, took other effective action, as a result of see-and-avoid decision)		0	0 to 15 ATM airborne	10
	Pilot(s) INSUFFICIENTLY followed RA		10		
	Pilot(s) INCORRECTLY followed RA (or, in the absence of RA, took other inadequate action)		15		

The score of the controllability criterion should be the sum of the scores of its components: Detection, Planning, Execution, STCA, Recovery, TCAS RA and Pilot Action.

C. Final scores

Once all criteria have been evaluated and scored accordingly, the final score for severity should be the sum of the scores for 'Risk of collision' and 'Controllability'.
When the overall scores have been calculated as above, the equivalence with the severity for ATM Overall should be as follows:

ATM Overall Score	Severity class
Between 0–9	No safety effect (E)
Between 10–17	Significant incident (C)
Between 18–30	Major incident (B)
Higher than 31	Serious incident (A)

D. Reliability Factor

Every criterion of the methodology should have its own importance for the evaluation of severity. If there is no information for evaluation of a certain criterion or the information available is ambiguous or the scoring panel cannot agree on the choice that should be made, then these should be identified as missing elements from the methodology.
In order to record and track the influence of the missing elements on the final severity score, an Overall Reliability Factor (RF) should be calculated in parallel with the severity score. The RF should be based purely on the amount of criteria which are considered when evaluating the severity score.
Each criterion should have its associated RF weight. The predefined RF weight per criterion is presented in the last column (RF) in the tables in sections A and B. The value of the Overall RF should be the sum of the RF weights associated to the criteria which are taken into account for the severity evaluation.
Not all criteria should be always applicable (e.g. units without Safety nets, or Safety nets did not trigger). Any criterion positively known not to be applicable to the particular situation

under consideration should be scored with a zero value and its associated RF weight should be added to the overall RF.
In the situation where a certain criterion is applicable but there is not enough information to make a judgement from the investigation report (due to lack of data or lack of clarity of the details), the score for that criterion should have value 'blank'. 'Blank' value for a certain criterion indicates that the relevant RF weight should not take part in the calculation of the Overall RF.
If during the evaluation of two different occurrences a certain criterion is scored in the first case as zero (0) and in the second case as 'blank', the ATM overall severity score in both cases should have the same value but the RF should be lower in the second case.
If a score is recorded for a specific criterion, then its RF weight should be added to the overall RF value as follows:

- For the Separation, Rate of closure, Conflict detection, Planning, Ground safety nets (STCA) criteria, which have only ATM Ground component, full RF value should be added if the ATM Ground value is recorded (except for Separation and Rate of closure where the ATM Ground value could be replaced by ATM Airborne).
- For the Execution, Recovery and Airborne Safety Nets (TCAS) criteria, which have both ground and airborne components, half of the RF value should be added if the ATM Ground value is recorded and half of the weight if the ATM Airborne value is recorded.
- For the Pilot execution of TCAS RA criterion, which has only an airborne component, full RF value should be added if the ATM airborne is recorded.

The RF should reach a value of 100 when all data for all criteria have been entered.
The Overall RF associated to the occurrence should be calibrated in such a way that the results of the severity assessment should be acceptable if the Overall RF has a minimum value of 70. Whenever there is not enough information (RF < 70) the occurrence should be categorised as 'Not determined' (D), regardless[12] of the severity indicated after application of the methodology.

GM ~~5~~ 6 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology for Separation Minima Infringements — General description

The process for evaluation of occurrences severity is presented in the following diagram:

[12] It can be contended that if the occurrence has already reached maximum possible severity, any additional data will not change the severity value. However, the occurrence is still recorded as not determined, since it is important to identify any missing data.



Figure 3 — Visualisation of evaluation of occurrences severity

Distinction between ATM Ground and ATM Overall severity may be made in order to allow ANSPs to identify their own contribution to any occurrence, identify causes and possible mitigation plans and/or corrective actions. In order to be able to fill in all necessary fields for the ATM Overall severity, information not immediately available to ANSPs may be required, such as information on the existence or not of a TCAS RA on the causal factors on the airborne side.

Different occurrences scenarios may be considered when evaluating severity as it is done in EUROCONTROL Risk Analysis Tool (RAT):

Scenario	Description
1. More than one aircraft	When two or more aircraft are involved in the occurrence and a standard separation is defined — usually for incidents with airborne aircraft, e.g. usually involving separation minima infringements.
2. Aircraft — aircraft tower	When the occurrence is an encounter between two aircraft under tower ATC. This includes situations where a) both aircraft are airborne; b) both aircraft are on the ground; c) one aircraft is airborne and one is on the ground. In addition, this should be used for occurrences involving one aircraft and a vehicle that, at the time of occurrence, was occupying/intersecting an active runway.
3. Aircraft with ground Movement	When the occurrence is an encounter between an aircraft and a vehicle (includes towed aircraft). In this situation, the aircraft could be on the ground or it could be airborne.
4. One aircraft	When only one aircraft is involved in the occurrence (e.g. airspace infringement, level bust without involvement of a second aircraft, loss of separation with ground and/or obstacles). This also applies for near-CFIT occurrences.
5. ATM-specific occurrence	To be applied in cases of technical occurrences influencing the capability to provide safe ATM/ANS services.

The following link may be made between the occurrences scenarios as in RAT and the occurrence types referred to in Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 (the performance regulation):

- Separation minima infringements: scenario 1;
- Runway incursions: scenarios 2, ~~and~~ 3 and 4;
- ATM-specific occurrences: scenario 5.

GM ~~6~~ 7 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — Methodology for Separation Minima Infringements — Risk of Collision — Score Determination

Example: If in a Separation Minima Infringement occurrence:

- the minimum separation achieved was 60 % horizontally and 30 % vertically;
- the rate of closure at separation loss was 160 kts and 3 000 ft/min;
- ATC was providing radar separation,

then:

- ATM Ground is scored 3 for separation (highest value of the two separations, i.e. the value for 60 % horizontally);
- ATM Ground is scored 4 for rate of closure (highest value of the two possible marks, i.e. the value 3 000 ft/min);
- ATM Overall for Risk of collision is 7 with RF 30.

GM ~~7~~ 8 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — Methodology for Separation Minima Infringements — Controllability score determination

The score of controllability may be used to facilitate an evaluation of the amount of hazard or entropy. If the situation is controlled, even if separation is lost, it is nevertheless recovered by the ATM system and not by chance. For this step the typical defence barriers as they apply chronologically may be followed.
The ATM Ground elements may be used to evaluate whether and how ATC (ATC means not only the ATCO, but the ATCO supported by ATM system) worked the conflict situation between the aircraft later involved in the actual occurrence. The global picture should be considered and not only the two aircraft between which separation was lost. In certain cases while trying to work an aircraft pair, ATC could generate an occurrence between another pair. All aircraft relevant to the occurrence under analysis should be considered.
When evaluating the criterion **Ground Safety Nets (STCA)**

- Predictive STCA is meant to be an STCA that triggers an alarm with sufficient time in advance of infringement of the separation allowing air traffic controllers enough time to react;
- Current STCA is meant to be an STCA that triggers an alarm not before the separation minima is being infringed (or triggers at the time when the separation minima starts to be infringed).

When evaluating the criterion **Airborne Safety Nets (TCAS)** it should be noted that this sub-criterion has an ATM Ground element, but the ATM Overall only takes the value of ATM Airborne. The purpose of the ATM Ground element here is to allow evaluating the ATM Ground value as described in GM 8. When ATM Ground is scored 10, the ATM Airborne and ATM Overall for criterion **Airborne Safety Nets (TCAS)** should be scored zero. In such a case, it is quite possible to have ATM Ground with higher score than ATM Overall and when evaluating severity in accordance with the table in GM 8 SKPI this could result in a higher severity for ATM Ground

than for ATM Overall. This indicates the higher contribution to the occurrence of the ATM Ground component compared to the ATM Overall.

Example of controllability score determination:
Conflict detected, planning inadequate, execution inadequate by ATC, correct by pilot, STCA not applicable, recovery correct by ATC and pilot, TCAS RA needed but not triggered, pilot response not applicable:

	Conflict detection	Planning	Execution	Ground Safety Nets (STCA)	Recovery	Airborne Safety Nets (TCAS)	Pilot execution of TCAS RA	Total score
Ground	Yes	Inadequate	Inadequate	N/A	Correct	N/A		6
	0	3	3	0	0	0		
Airborne			Correct		Correct	No	N/A	10
			0		0	10	0	
RF	*10*	*10*	*5+5*	*10*	*5+5*	*5+5*	*10*	*70*

ATM Overall Controllability
= Conflict detection + Planning + Execution + Ground Safety Nets (STCA) + Recovery + Airborne Safety Nets (TCAS) + Pilot Execution of TCAS RA
= 0+3+3+0+0+10+0
= 16

GM ~~8~~ 9SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — Methodology for Separation Minima Infringements — Final scores

Example: Following the score determination in GM 6 and 7 SKPI,
Severity ATM Ground = Risk of collision score Ground + Controllability score Ground = 7 + 6 = 13
Severity ATM Overall = Risk of collision score Overall + Controllability score Overall = 7 + 16 = 23
When evaluating the ATM Ground value only, the table from AMC 7 SKPI, D may be extended as follows:

ATM Ground value	**Severity class**		**ATM Overall value**	**Severity class**
Between 0–9	No safety effect		Between 0–9	No safety effect
Between 10–17	Significant incident		Between 10–17	Significant incident
Between 18–30	Major incident		Between 18–30	Major incident
Higher than 31	Serious incident		Higher than 31	Serious incident

Example:
Severity class ATM Ground for score 13 = Significant incident
Severity class ATM Overall for score 23 = Major incident

GM ~~9~~ 10 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — Methodology for Separation Minima Infringements — Reliability Factor

Example: When scoring 'Not Applicable' as in GM 7 for the Pilot Execution of TCAS RA (because there was no TCAS RA in the example provided), the value of the score is 0. Nevertheless, the relevant value of the RF is added to the RF Overall.
Example: In the examples of GM 6 and GM 7 the RF for each criterion is also recorded. The overall RF based on these examples is calculated to be 100, which means that the severity in this example is evaluated with all necessary data available. In this case, and in other cases where the overall RF is calculated to be 70 or more, the resulting severity may be considered as valid.
The same example as in GM 7 may be presented with some data missing (value 'blank') as follows:

	Conflict detection	Planning	Execution	Ground Safety Nets (STCA)	Recovery	Airborne Safety Nets (TCAS)	Pilot execution of TCAS RA	Total score
Ground	No data	Inadequate	Inadequate	N/A	Correct	No data		6
	blank	3	3	0	0	Blank		
Airborne			No data		No data	No data	No data	10
			blank		blank	Blank	blank	
RF	*0*	*10*	*5+0*	*10*	*5+0*	*0+0*	*0*	*30*

If to the RF of Controllability in this example the RF of Risk of Collision from GM 6 is added (30), the Overall RF has a value of 60. Since the Overall RF < 70, the occurrence should be categorised as 'Not determined' (D).

AMC 6 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — Methodology for Runway Incursions

Applying the severity classification methodology for Runway Incursions, the severity should be calculated as the sum of the total scores in each of the two main criteria:

1. Risk of collision;
2. Controllability.

A. Risk of collision

The risk of collision should be determined by the sum of the scores for the following sub-criteria:

1. Separation. When evaluating the severity of runway incursion this criterion should be interpreted as safety margin infringed. The moderation panel/investigators should, based on experts judgment, choose a score between 0 and 10, based on the perceived safety margin achieved. If there is no agreement on the safety margin, then the moderation panel/investigators will not score the criterion at all and the field should be left blank. This should be reflected in the value of the Reliability Factor by not adding the RF weight for the separation criterion.

	Risk of collision	ATM ground	ATM airborne	ATM overall	RF weight
separation	Safety margin achieved	0	0	0 to 10 ATM Ground **OR** ATM airborne	20
	Safety margin infringed minor	1–3	1–3		
	Safety margin infringed medium	4–6	4–6		
	Safety margin infringed significant	7–9	7–9		
	Safety margin infringed critical	10	10		

2. Rate of closure — based on the vertical and horizontal speed, measured at the moment the safety margin is considered to have been lost. The greatest of the predefined intervals for each of the horizontal and vertical speeds are to be considered for the evaluation.

Depending on the situation, speed intervals should be applied as follows:

- More than one aircraft — no standard separation defined,
- Aircraft with ground movement.

In cases of unauthorised entry on the runway when no other aircraft/vehicle/person was present, the rate of closure should be 'NONE'.

	More than one aircraft — no standard separation defined	Aircraft with ground movement	ATM ground	ATM airborne	ATM overall	RF weight
rate of closure	Rate of closure NONE	Rate of closure NONE	0	0	0 to 5 ATM Ground **OR** ATM airborne	10
	Rate of closure LOW (<= 50 knots, <= 500 ft/mn)	Rate of closure LOW (<= 20 knots)	1	1		
	Rate of closure MEDIUM (>50 and <= 100 knots, > 500 and <= 1 000 ft/mn)	Rate of closure MEDIUM (>20 and <= 40 knots)	2	2		
	Rate of closure HIGH (>100 and <= 250 knots, > 1 000 and <= 2 000 ft/mn)	Rate of closure HIGH (>40 and <= 80 knots)	4	4		
	Rate of closure VERY HIGH (>250 knots, > 2 000 ft/mn)	Rate of closure VERY HIGH (>80 knots)	5	5		

For the risk of collision, *either* ATM Ground *or* ATM Airborne severity should be scored and not both ATM Ground and ATM Airborne. The ATM Airborne severity should be used only in cases where ATC is not responsible for providing separation (i.e. certain classes of airspaces, e.g. close encounter between IFR and VFR flights in Class E airspace).

B. Controllability

The scoring for controllability should follow the same logic as in AMC 5 section B, with only a few exceptions, as follows:

- STCA is not appropriate for this encounter, hence it should be replaced by more general aerodrome ground safety nets, such as RIMCAS (Runway Incursion Monitoring and Collision Avoidance System);
- Airborne Safety Nets (TCAS) is not normally available when Runway Incursions occur, therefore only pilot see-and-avoid action should be considered. Lack of see-and-avoid should be scored in the case of low visibility and IMC conditions.
- All other sections are identical with the previous scenario, with the exception of the Safety Nets where A-SMGCS (Advanced Surface Movement Guidance & Control System) or RIMCAS should be considered, and the see-and-avoid part where driver action should also be taken into account, alongside that of the pilot.

The controllability score should be defined by the following aspects:

1. Conflict detection,
2. Planning,
3. Execution,
4. General ground safety nets, e.g. A-SMGCS,
5. Recovery,
6. Airborne Safety Nets (see-and-avoid),
7. Pilot/driver execution of see-and-avoid.

The controllability scoring should be identical in all aspects with section B of AMC 5 SKPI.

C. Final scores

The final scoring should be identical in all aspects with section C of AMC 5 SKPI.

D. Reliability Factor

The Reliability Factor evaluation should be identical to the description in section D of AMC 5 SKPI.

AMC 7 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — Methodology for ATM-specific occurrences

A. Overview

The ATM-specific occurrences severity evaluation should be based on a combination of criteria. For each criterion a number of options should be available.
The combination of the chosen options for each criterion should provide the severity of an ATM-specific occurrence.
The following criteria should be considered when determining the severity of an ATM-specific occurrence:

1. Service affected,
2. Service/Function provided,
3. Operational function,
4. Type of failure,
5. Extension,
6. Scope,
7. Duration.

B. Options for ATM-specific occurrences

The following options should be considered when evaluating each criterion in AMC 7 SKPI section A:

1. Criterion 'Service affected' — the effect of the system failure should be assigned to one of the following services:
   a. (Upper) Area Control Centre — ATC service for controlled flights in a block of airspace;
   b. Approach Control — ATC service for arriving or departing controlled flights;
   c. Aerodrome Control — ATC service for aerodrome traffic;
   d. Oceanic Control — ATC service for controlled flights over the high seas;
   e. Flight Information Service — service provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights.
2. Criterion 'Service/Function provided' — the following options should be available for the Service/Function criterion:
   a. Communication — aeronautical fixed and mobile services to enable ground-to-ground, air-to-ground and air-to-air communications for ATC purposes;
   b. Navigation — those facilities and services that provide aircraft with positioning and timing information;
   c. Surveillance — those facilities and services used to determine the respective positions of aircraft to allow safe separation;
   d. Air Traffic Services — the various flight information services, alerting services, air traffic advisory services and ATC services (area, approach and aerodrome control services);
   e. Airspace management — a planning function with the primary objective of maximising the utilisation of available airspace by dynamic time-sharing and, at times, the segregation of airspace among various categories of airspace users on the basis of short-term needs;
   f. Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management — the air traffic flow management is a function established with the objective of contributing to a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic by ensuring that ATC capacity is utilised to the maximum extent possible, and that the traffic volume is compatible with the capacities declared by the appropriate air traffic service providers.
   g. Information Service — a service established within the defined area of coverage responsible for the provision of aeronautical information and data necessary for the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation;
3. Criterion 'Operational function' — the selected option for the criterion 'Service/Function provided' should be considered when selecting the option for the criterion 'Operational function'. The following options should be available:
   a. For Communication services:
      - Air/Ground Communication — two-way communication between aircraft and stations or locations on the surface of the earth;
      - Ground/Ground Communication — two-way communication between stations or locations on the surface of the earth.
   b. For Navigation service:
      - Navigation Function.
   c. For Surveillance service:

- Air Surveillance — those facilities and services used to determine the respective positions of aircraft in the air to ensure safe separation;
- Ground Surveillance — those facilities and services used to determine the respective positions of aircraft on the ground to allow the detection of conflicts;
- Surface Movement Guidance and Control — a function providing routing, guidance and surveillance for the control of aircraft and vehicles in order to maintain the declared surface movement rate under all weather conditions within the aerodrome visibility operational level while maintaining the required level of safety.

d. For Air Traffic Services:

- Flight Plan Information — specified information provided to air traffic service units, relative to an intended flight or portion of a flight of an aircraft;
- Flight Information and Alert — provision of Flight Information (e.g. last position) in support to alerting services;
- Ops Room Management Capability — the functions which enables to combine/split sectors, assign roles on controllers working position;
- Decision Making Support Tools — such as Medium Term Conflict Detection, Arrival/Departure Manager, Collaborative Decision Making;
- Safety Nets — a (ground-based) safety net is a functionality within the ATM system that is assigned by the ANSP with the sole purpose of monitoring the environment of operations in order to provide timely alerts of an increased risk to flight safety which may include resolution advice.

e. For Airspace Management:

- Real Time Airspace Environment — the display on the executive air traffic controller Controllers Working Position of the entire airspace configuration at a given time (e.g. restricted/danger areas).

f. For Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management:

- Tactical & Real Time — the function that provides traffic prediction, flow monitoring and warning.

g. For Support Information Services:

- Aeronautical Information — provision of aeronautical information and data necessary for the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation;
- Meteorological Information — meteorological report, analysis, forecast and any other statement relating to existing or expected meteorological conditions.

4. Criterion 'Type of failure' — the following options should be available for the 'Type of failure' criterion:

a. Total loss of service/function — the service/function is not available to the controller or pilot;

b. Partial loss of service/function — not all of the service/function is available to ATC or pilot (e.g. loss of one or several sub-functions);

c. Redundancy reduction — loss of a technical backup. There are fewer technical ways to provide the service/function;

d. Undetected corruption of service/function — data presented is incorrect but is not detected and used as being correct — if the corruption is detected it means the function will have to be removed totally (total loss of function) or partially (partial loss of function);

e. Loss of supervision — unable to control or monitor the function. If this means that the main function has to be removed, then this would be a total loss;

f. Corruption of supervision — undetected corruption of supervision. It has no impact unless a second action takes place. If left alone there will be no impact. If an operator does something in response to an incorrect indication then a different type of failure could occur.

5. Criterion 'Extension' — the physical extension of the failure should be categorised as one of the following options:

   a. Controller Working Position — one Controller Working Position (CWP);

   b. Sector suite — a set of CWPs which work together to control a sector(s);

   c. Multiple suites — self-explanatory;

   d. Unit — as applicable, the entire ACC/UAC/APP operations room, the whole Tower, etc.

6. Criterion 'Scope' — the operational scope of the effect should be classified as one of the following options:

   a. One — one frequency, one aircraft as applicable;

   b. Some — as applicable more than one frequency, more than one a/c, etc., and less than all;

   c. All — all frequencies, all aircraft as applicable.

7. Criterion 'Duration' — T1 is the time interval between the initiation of the technical event and the moment when it triggers actual or potential operational consequences either for the air traffic controller (ATCO) or the pilot.

   a. Duration less than T1 — this option should be chosen when the technical failure did not last long enough to trigger actual or potential operational consequences on the air traffic controller or the pilot. In such a case the severity of the ATM-specific occurrence should have no impact on the air traffic services and should be classified with severity E. Consequently, there is no need for the user to further apply the RAT methodology for this technical failure (just record the severity E);

   b. Duration greater than or equal to T1 — this option should be selected when the technical failure lasted longer than or equally to T1 and triggered actual or potential operational consequences on the air traffic controller or the pilot.

C. Severity

The severity of ATM-specific occurrences should be classified as follows:

1. AA — Total inability to provide safe ATM services (equivalent to 'Serious incident') — an occurrence associated with the total inability to provide any degree of ATM services, where:

   a. there is a sudden and non-managed total loss of ATM service or situation awareness;

   b. there is a totally corrupted ATM service or corrupted information provided to ATS personnel.

2. A — Serious inability to provide safe ATM services (also equivalent to 'Serious incident') — an occurrence associated with almost a total and sudden inability to provide any degree of ATM services in compliance with applicable safety requirements. It involves circumstances indicating that the ability to provide ATM services is severely compromised

and has the potential to impact many aircraft safe operations over a significant period of time.

3. B — Partial inability to provide safe ATM services (equivalent to 'Major incident') — an occurrence associated with the sudden and partial inability to provide ATM services in compliance with applicable safety requirements.
4. C — Ability to provide safe but degraded ATM services (equivalent to 'Significant incident') — an occurrence involving circumstances indicating that a total, serious or partial inability to provide safe and non-degraded ATM services could have occurred, if the risk had not been managed/controlled by ATS personnel within safety requirements, even if this implied limitations in the provision of ATM services.
5. D — Not determined — insufficient information was available to determine the risk involved or inconclusive or conflicting evidence precluded such determination.
6. E — No effect on ATM services — occurrences which have no effect on the ability to provide safe and non-degraded ATM services (equivalent to 'No safety effect').

The severity on an ATM-specific occurrence should be established, based on the combination of options chosen for each criterion.

GM ~~10~~ 11 SKPI — Severity Classification Based on the Risk Analysis Tool Methodology — Methodology for ATM-specific occurrences

A. Examples of some criteria for evaluating ATM-specific occurrences

Criterion 'Type of failure'
The following figure illustrates Total Loss and Redundancy Reduction in Air-Ground Communication.



Figure 4 — Total Loss and Redundancy Reduction in air-ground communication

Criterion 'Extension'
The figure bellow illustrates an ATC unit with several sector suites, each of which consists of 3 Controllers Working Positions (CWP):



Figure 5 — ATC unit, sectors and suites

Criterion 'Scope'
The table below gives an indication of what one/some/all represents for different operational functions (criterion 'Scope').

Services	Operational functions	Scope (how many … were impacted)
Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Communication(s) ATCO/Pilot
Communication	Ground/Ground Communication	Communication(s) ATCO/ATCO
Navigation	Navigation	Pilot(s)
Surveillance	Air Surveillance	Displayed Radar Track(s)
Surveillance	Ground Surveillance	Displayed Radar Track(s)
Surveillance	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Aircraft(s)/Vehicle(s)
Air Traffic Services	Flight Plan Information	Flight Plan(s)
Air Traffic Services	Flight Information & Alert	Flight(s)
Air Traffic Services	Ops Room Management	N/A (extension should be sufficient)
Air Traffic Services	Decision Making Support	Fight(s)
Air Traffic Services	Safety Nets	Conflict(s)
Air Traffic Services	Real Time Airspace Environment	Route(s), Area(s), …
Air Traffic Flow Capacity Management	Tactical & Real Time	Flight(s)
Information Services	Aeronautical Information	Information Type(s)
Information Services	Meteorological Information	Information Type(s)

Criterion 'Duration'

When criterion 'Duration' is evaluated, T1 should be used for separating technical glitches with no operational consequences from failures that impact the ANSP ability to provide ATM services.

Some of the values of T1 may be predefined, for example when they are part of the SLA between the technical and operational units (departments) or when they are part of the ATS unit safety case. When the value of T1 is predefined by the ANSP, it should be done based on inputs provided by the ATCOs and/or pilots. Alternatively, if a T1 is not predefined at the moment of the investigation, the evaluation of the 'duration' criterion may be done by

determining if a particular occurrence/failure triggered actual or potential operational consequences (the criterion should be scored greater than or equal to T1).

This value cannot be established at European level as it is dependent on the functionalities of the ATM provider's system architecture, airspace complexity, traffic load and concept of operations. When choosing the option 'less than T1' or 'greater than or equal to T1' there is no need to know exactly the duration of the event but whether it has a potential or real operational impact, i.e. is greater, or not, than the T1 value established locally.

Typical examples of operational impact where 'Duration' is greater than or equal to T1:

- ATC/Pilot had to do something different;
- ATC/Pilot is presented with incorrect, reduced or no information;
- Workload increase;
- Capacity reduction;
- Reduced ability to provide safe services;
- ATCO can no longer cope with the situation.

The charts below illustrate the ATM system both in a steady state and failure modes, in order to ease the understanding of the role of T1.

- <u>Steady state of the technical system (no failure)</u>

  The chart below illustrates a steady state where the ATM system delivers all operational functions as expected.



- <u>ATM-specific technical event with a potential or real operational impact</u>

  The chart below provides the occurrence timeline in case of a total failure of an operational function. In the given example the failure has an operational impact on the ability to provide ATM services (this could be the case in a total failure of the air-ground communication function, total failure of surveillance function; see examples 1 and 3 below).



T0	ATM-specific technical event commences.
T0 to T1	ATM-specific technical event has no operational impact as the ATC maintain desired traffic level.
T1	ATM-specific technical event triggers operational consequences on ATC controller or pilot.
T1 to T2	Potential safety impact on ATC or pilot.
T3	The ATM-specific technical event finishes.
T1 to T4	Business effect on ATC or Pilot, e.g. regulations applied.
T4	ATC returns to the desired traffic levels.

- Redundancy reduction

  The chart below illustrates the occurrence timeline in the case of a redundancy reduction with no operational impact (duration is less than T1). This case could be applied in the Example 2 from section C, the failure on day D.



T0	ATM-specific technical event commences.
T1	Does not take place.
T2	Does not take place.
T0 to T3	ATM-specific technical event has no impact. ATC maintain desired traffic level.
T3	ATM-specific technical event finishes.
T4	Does not take place.

B. Look-up table

Following the selection of criteria options described in this AMC 9 SKPI, the severity for an ATM-specific occurrence may be determined by identifying the appropriate combination in the look-up table presented in Appendix 1 to GM ~~10~~ 11 SKPI — Look-up Table for Severity Classification of ATM-specific occurrences and retrieve the predetermined severity in column 'Severity'.
The look-up table contains all the realistic combination of the criteria described in this GM. An occurrence code is uniquely assigned to each combination.
It is to be noted that in case of combination of criteria that are not realistic the severity is marked 'X' in the look-up table. In such case the severity ~~can not~~ cannot be determined (category D). Therefore, the user should try to map a given failure to the credible combination available in the look-up table.
A severity is predefined for each of the identified realistic combinations. A sample of a section of this look-up table is given below:

Code	Service Affected	Services	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	uratio	T1	Severity
AR-AGC/000	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		AA
AR-AGC/001	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		AA
AR-AGC/002	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		A
AR-AGC/010	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		AA
AR-AGC/011	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
AR-AGC/012	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		A
AR-AGC/020	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-AGC/021	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-AGC/022	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AR-AGC/030	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-AGC/031	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AR-AGC/032	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AR-AGC/100	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		AA
AR-AGC/101	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		AA
AR-AGC/102	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		A
AR-AGC/110	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		AA
AR-AGC/111	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
AR-AGC/112	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		A
AR-AGC/120	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		A
AR-AGC/121	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		A
AR-AGC/122	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		A
AR-AGC/130	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AR-AGC/131	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AR-AGC/132	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AR-AGC/200	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-AGC/201	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-AGC/202	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C

Figure 6 — Extract of look-up table in Appendix 1 to GM 10 SKPI

C. Examples for ATM-specific occurrences

Example 1

All communications with aircraft were lost in the sector South in the ACC X. The failure lasted 1 min 12 sec.

The service provided was 'Communication'. As the communication was lost with the aircraft, the operational function affected is 'Air-Ground Communication'.

No communication with the aircraft in the sector was possible during that time; therefore the type of failure is 'Total ~~lost~~ loss of function'. Service affected is 'Area Control Centre'. The sector South was only ACC sector affected by the failure. As such, the extension is 'Sector

Suite'. In this case the communication with all aircraft in the sector was lost and therefore the scope is 'All'.

In the ACC x, the T1 is predefined for Total loss of Air-Ground communication function as being T1 = 20 seconds.

As the total duration of failure is 1 min 12 sec, the duration is higher than T1 and therefore the RAT look-up table may be used.

For these selected options the corresponding combination in the look-up table is:

Code	Service Affected	Services	Operational functions	Type of failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1	Severity
AR-AGC/120	Area control services	Communication	Air/Ground communication	Total loss of function	Sector suite	All	> T1	~20s	A

Therefore, the Severity for the failure in Example 1 is 'A — Serious inability to provide safe ATM services'.

Example 2

Due to telecom failure there is loss of redundancy of some frequencies affecting several sectors in APP Z. There were two such occurrences at APP Z: one on day D which lasted 5 minutes and the other on day D+2 which lasted two hours.

The service provided was 'Communication'. As the redundancy is for radio communication with the aircraft, the operational function affected is 'Air-Ground Communication'.

The type of failure is 'Redundancy reduction' and affects several sectors and several frequencies; therefore, the extension is 'Multiple Suites' and scope 'Some'.

In the APP Z, the local procedure requires that in case of loss of back-up frequencies (i.e. redundancies), capacity limitations are put in place after 30 minutes, which is our T1.

Therefore, duration of the failure on day D is less than T1 and the severity is directly classified as 'E — No effect on ATM services' and there is no need to use the look-up table.

For the failure on day D+2 the duration is greater than or equal to T1 and therefore the look-up table might be used and the corresponding combination is:

Code	Service affected	Services	Operational functions	Type of failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1	Severity
AP-AGC/311	Approach control services	Communi-cation	Air/Ground communi-cation	Redundancy reduction	Multiple suites	Some	> T1	1800 s	C

Therefore the Severity for the failure in Example 2 on day D+2 is 'C — Ability to provide safe but degraded ATM services'.

Example 3

Total failure of the radar data processing system (normal and back-up) in an ACC (duration 2 minutes).

Service affected = Area control services

The service is 'Surveillance' and the operational function is 'Air Surveillance in the Area control services'. It is a total loss of function which extends to the whole unit and affects all targets.

For the combination above the T1 is set to ~ 40s, therefore Duration is > T1 and therefore the look-up table might be used and the corresponding combination is:

Code	Service affected	Services	Operational functions	Type of failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1	Severity
AR-ASV/100	Area control services	Surveillance	Air surveillance	Total loss of function	Unit	All	> T1	40 s	A

Therefore the Severity for the failure in Example 3 is 'A — Serious inability to provide safe ATM services'.

AMC 8 SKPI — RAT methodology — ~~Verification~~ Monitoring mechanism

The Member States' points of contact~~,~~ established in accordance with Directive 2003/42/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1330/2007, should collect verified information regarding the application of severity classification using the Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) methodology for the reported occurrences within the scope of Commission Regulation (EU) No 390/2013. ~~691/2010 as amended by Regulation (EU) No 1216/2011~~.

~~The collection of information relevant to the use of the RAT methodology should make use of existing safety data reporting mechanisms, with enhancements where needed.~~

When the Member States report on the monitoring of the performance plans and targets in accordance with Article 18 and Annex V ~~17~~ of Commission Regulation (EU) No 390/2013 ~~691/2010.~~ ~~T~~they should report the percentage of occurrences that been evaluated by the use of the severity classification using the RAT methodology.

For the application of the severity classification on an individual basis for all occurrences within the scope of the regulation Member States should provide the data by ~~The collection of information relevant to the use of the RAT methodology should~~ makeing use of existing safety data reporting mechanisms, that is, either the European Central Repository and/or the Annual Summary Template Mechanism, with enhancements where needed.

IV Just culture

GM ~~11~~ 12 SKPI — Just culture — General

The Just Culture KPI aims at measuring the level of presence and corresponding level of absence of just culture at State and at ANSP level. The metrics have been constructed to respond to the criteria of: clearly defined, auditable, verifiable, repeatable and indicative of the level of just culture being implemented. The just culture KPI consists of metrics in the areas of policy and its implementation, legal/judiciary and occurrence reporting and investigation.
The main aim of the indicator and of the questionnaires is to identify possible obstacles and impediments to the application of the just culture (JC).
Reference is made to the 'State level' instead of 'NSA level' because, although a large number of questions refer to the existing situation in the national authority, a limited number of others deal with elements which go beyond the field of competence of the authority and may have to be addressed at the level of other State entities.
The questionnaires identify several elements related to an effective just culture, each element in turn with a number of sub-elements. These sub-elements are binary, i.e. the answer can only be 'yes' or 'no'. The States and ANSPs may qualify the 'no' answers in their respective

completed questionnaire (column 'Justification and remarks') by indicating the related obstacles.
A positive reply gives an indication of a just culture context while a negative reply indicates a potential deficit/obstacles in just culture implementation. However, it is not expected that all replies should be positive but the identification of negative elements would give indication of possible areas of improvement and could be considered as incentives for improving the just culture in a particular State/organisation. State/ANSP may be asked to provide evidence for justification of the answers supported by written documents such as arrangements, procedures, correspondence or other documents.

AMC 9 SKPI — Just culture — Reporting at State level

A. Reporting

The just culture indicator should be reported by verified responses to a questionnaire at State level. The questionnaire which should be answered by the Member State/competent authority is indicated in Appendix 1 to AMC 9 SKPI — Just Culture Questionnaire — State level (questions P.1 to P.~~10~~ 9, L.1 to L.~~8~~ 7, and O.1 to O.2). The questions should be answered with 'yes' or 'no'. For each question, the State should provide information and evidence to justify the answers and may add any applicable explanatory remarks.

B. Verification

Questionnaires should be dispatched together with those for the Effectiveness of Safety Management (EoSM) indicator following the same verification process.
The verification mechanism for JC measurement should be the same as in AMC 2 SKPI, section C.

GM ~~12~~ 13 SKPI — Just culture — Reporting and Verification at State level

Some examples of the possible justification material which support the verification of completed JC questionnaire at State level are provided in Appendix 1 to GM ~~12~~13 SKPI — Just Culture — State level — possible justification. This appendix consists of the State-level JC questions with an additional column providing possible evidence and some explanatory notes where considered necessary.

In addition to the filled-in questionnaire, the State may report on the just culture indicator using the following format, including an indication of possible areas for improvement.

No of questions answered with:	**Yes**	**No**
Policy and its implementation		
Legal/Judiciary		
Occurrence reporting and investigation		
Identification of possible areas of improvement		
Policy and its implementation		
… …		
Legal/Judiciary		
… …		
Occurrence reporting and investigation		
… …		

AMC 10 SKPI — Just culture — Reporting at ANSP level

A. Reporting

The just culture indicator should be reported by verified responses to a questionnaire at ANSP level. The questionnaire which should be answered by the Air Navigation Service Providers is indicated in Appendix 1 to AMC 10 SKPI — Just Culture Questionnaire — ANSP level (questions P.1 to P.13, L.1 to L.3, and O.1 to O.8). The questions should be answered with 'yes' or 'no'.
For each question, the ANSP should provide to the NSA information and evidence to justify its answers and may add any applicable explanatory remarks.

B. Verification

Questionnaires should be dispatched together with those for the Effectiveness of Safety Management indicator following the same verification process.
The verification mechanism for JC measurement at ANSP level should be the same as in AMC 3 SKPI, section D.

GM~~13~~ 14 SKPI — Just culture — Reporting and Verification at ANSP level

Some examples of the possible justification material which support the verification of completed JC questionnaire at ANSP level are provided in Appendix 1 to GM ~~13~~14 SKPI — Just Culture — ANSP level — possible justification. This appendix consists of the ANSP-level JC questions with an additional column providing possible evidence and some explanatory notes where considered necessary.
In addition to the filled-in questionnaire, the ANSP may report on the just culture indicator using the following presentation format, including a self-assessment of possible areas for improvement.

No of questions answered with:	**Yes**	**No**
Policy and its implementation		
Legal/Judiciary		
Occurrence reporting and investigation		
Identification of possible areas of improvement		
Policy and its implementation		
… …		
Legal/Judiciary		
… …		
Occurrence reporting and investigation		
… …		

GM15 SKPI — Interdependencies - evaluation of the impact on safety of the performance plan

Purpose

The purpose of this guidance material is to describe the possible process to be applied when describing consideration of the interdependencies between key performance areas in the performance plan, including an evaluation of the impact on safety in the performance plan when complying with Article 11, 3, (e) and point 3,3 of Annex II to the performance regulation.

Description of possible process to be applied when identifying interdependences and impact on safety

The ATM performance plan includes identifying interdependencies between cost, environment, capacity and safety. The competent authority should be considered as an integral part of the interdependencies because of the competent authorities' responsibilities in relation to certification and oversight. Planned actions to achieve the targets in the performance areas of environment, capacity and cost-efficiency most likely will bring changes in the functional systems, as defined in Regulation (EU) 1035/2011[13] (common requirements regulation), of the ATM/ANS providers and their competent authorities (NSAs).

The performance scheme regulation establishes provisions[14] for an evaluation of the impact on safety of the performance plan. This is valid for all entities which contribute to the performance plans, including the competent authorities (NSAs).

All entities contributing to the improvement of the performance at local level should make an analysis of impact on their functional systems by the changes which will be introduced by the improvements in the other performance areas foreseen to be implemented within the reference period. Assessment of the identified changes to the functional systems should be done at the time of performance planning and the relevant possible mitigations identified. Description of the changes with potential effect on safety and the mitigations identified should be included in the performance plan.

In instances where changes to functional systems are scheduled for medium to long-term future implementation, safety mitigations for safety assurance should be included in the performance plan as far as practicable. If the planned changes are without effect on safety they may not be included in the performance plan. However, the Member States may also include a high level description of some changes in the other performance areas which will not affect their functional systems. The process for the assessment of changes and their insertion in the performance plan are provided in the diagram (Figure X-X).

When describing the consideration of the interdependencies between safety performance area and the rest of the performance areas in the performance plan, Member States should, at minimum, include in the performance plan:

- Performance area and the target which' achievement will introduce the change to the functional system;
- Functional systems affected;
- Description of:
    - affected elements of the functional system and the changes introduced in each of them;
    - general description of planned mitigations and activities for safety assurance and other relevant information.

[13] Article 2 (3) of Regulation 1035/2011 - 'functional system' means a combination of systems, procedures and human resources organised to perform a function within the context of ATM.

[14] Article 11, 3 (e) and Annex II, 3.3 of Regulation 390/2013 (performance scheme regulation).



Figure 6 Interdependences evaluation

Examples of changes that may have an effect on safety and how the relevant interdependences may be described in the performance plan item 3.3Examples of changes for ANS providers driven by improvement in performance areas which have effect on safety				
Performance area/reason for change	**Functional system affected/ Change description**	**Potential changes to the elements of functional system and possible mitigation measures**		**Remarks**
Cost efficiency driven change (reduce cost for personnel)	ANSP xxx, ACCs yyy, zzz etc. Removal of assistant position (tasks go to ATCO and/or automation)	Human resources	Reduction in operational personnel; ATCO additional training for new role; Training for technical personnel;	The change is planned for the beginning of 2019 and will support achieving the cost-efficiency target by reducing the unit rate with 1.06 %. In order for the ATCO to take over the role of the assistant then it is likely that the information used by the assistant will have to be presented to the ATCO. Moreover, in order to avoid overload the information used by the assistant and the information used by the ATCO will have to be presented in a different, more user friendly, form. It may also be necessary to provide additional automation to perform some assistant's tasks. This certainly implies changes to the equipment at the ATCO's working position and very probably implies changes to the functions providing information to those working positions.
		Procedures	Change to operational and maintenance procedures.	
		Systems	Change to operator interface likely change to functions for the manipulation and visibility of surveillance and flight data information and management; Possibly the addition of new flight lists in CWP of planning and executive controllers	
		Architecture	Removal of assistant position and likely changes to the way information is managed and distributed within the system Redistribution of function/ responsibility between	

			human - automation	
		Environment	Possible change to sector shape/organisation to limit ATCO workload	
Capacity driven change - increase in traffic in airspace	ANSP A and B Change the organisation of the upper airspace and introduction of new technology	Human resources	Training for new procedures, airspace organisation and equipment; Possible increase in personnel ; Working hours/shift patterns (fatigue and the associated increased risk of human errors)	The change is a deliberate attempt by the provider of ATS to increase the capacity as indicated in the performance plan from 2017. Daily and seasonal fluctuations in traffic are not considered to be a change. The change is actually a change in the environment of operation that would require a change in the functional system in order to make the operation acceptably safe. Changes are required to the surveillance or communications systems already present, the changes may involve the operational use of new or modified information that is already within the current system. Such use could involve an architectural change to make the information available to the changed components.
		Procedures	New or changed procedures (including contingency measures) to handle new services and increased traffic; Changes to the ANSP organisation for delivering services	

		System/ constituents	Possibly improved surveillance, communications and/or other systems e.g. ATCO decision support tools; Changes to the display of operational data to controllers at the point of service delivery; Changes to communications systems (architecture etc.) used for the delivery of an ATS service	
		Architecture	Possibly if the surveillance and communications system changes require changes in the interfaces with equipment already present	
		Environment	Increase in traffic; Airspace change	

4. Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA)

1. The purpose of a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is to assess the impacts and consequences of rules and requirements which are being proposed. The assessment thus, would aim to support the decision making process (e.g. among all the possible regulatory options which is the one with the least overall impact on the regulated persons/organisations) in the implementation of the Basic Regulation.

2. In order to conduct a RIA, several regulatory options should be identified and assessed in terms of safety, environmental, economic, social and regulatory harmonisation of the impacts to the regulated persons and organisations. However, in this case, there were no alternative options to be assessed because Regulation (EU) No 390/2013 already specifies the way the safety key performance indicators should be developed.

3. For the reasons above, a RIA has not been undertaken for this NPA. Still, the Agency would also like to highlight that the amendments to the AMCs and GM are not substantial but aim at facilitating the implementation of the safety KPIs. The amendments are proposed based on the experience of safety KPIs implementation during the first reference period and the main goal is to further facilitate the stakeholders.

4. In addition, it is important to underline that the purpose of the new proposed GM is to help with the implementation of the performance regulation and also to harmonise the way the Implementing Rule is applied.

5. Finally, the purpose of the performance scheme is to improve the performance of the European ATM system in terms of safety, capacity, cost-effectiveness and environment, therefore, the overall impact is expected to be positive.

5. References

5.1. Affected CS, AMC and GM

Decision 2011/017/R of the Executive Director of the European Aviation Safety Agency of 16th December 2011 on acceptable means of compliance and guidance material to Section 2 of Annex I to Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010[15] laying down a performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1216/2011 'Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material for the implementation and measurement of safety KPIs (ATM performance IR)'.

5.2. Reference documents

No.

[15] Commission Regulation (EC) No 691/2010 of 29 July 2010 laying down a performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions and amending Regulation (EC) No 2096/2005 laying down common requirements for the provisions of air navigation services (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 1). Regulation as last amended by the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1216/2011 (OJ L 310, 25.11.2011, p. 3).

6. Appendices

The below appendices will appear as Appendices (A) to (J) to this NPA.

- (A) — Appendix 1 to AMC 2 SKPI — Questionnaire for Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — State level
- (B) — Appendix 2 to AMC 2 SKPI — List of Weightings for Evaluation of Effectiveness of Safety Management Questionnaire — State level
- (C) — Appendix 1 to AMC 3 SKPI — Questionnaire for Measurement of Effectiveness of Safety Management KPI — ANSP level
- (D) — Appendix 2 to AMC 3 SKPI — List of Weightings for evaluation of Effectiveness of Safety Management Questionnaire — ANSP level (not included as this Appendix was not changed)
- (E) — Appendix 1 to AMC 9 SKPI — Just Culture Questionnaire — State level
- (F) — Appendix 1 to AMC 10 SKPI — Just Culture Questionnaire — ANSP level
- (G) — Appendix 1 to GM 4 SKPI Verification of ANSP EoSM by NSA/competent authority
- (H) — Appendix 1 to GM 10 SKPI — Look-up Table for Severity Classification of ATM-specific occurrences
- (I) — Appendix 1 to GM 12 SKPI — Just Culture — State level — possible justification
- (J) — Appendix 1 to GM 13 SKPI — Just Culture — ANSP level — possible justification

Name	
Organisation	
State	
Job Title	

Component 1 State safety policy and objectives		
Element 1.1 State safety legislative framework		
MO1.1 : Implement the EU safety legislative and regulatory framework, including where necessary, by aligning the national framework.		
Q.1.1 There is a well-established primary aviation legislation that contains provisions enabling the government and its administration to ~~proactively supervise~~ oversee the civil aviation activities and implements the EU safety regulatory framework in relation to ATM/ANS.		
A Initiating	There is a primary legislative framework. However it is not yet in line with the EU regulatory framework, neither adapted to the level of complexity of the national aviation system or does not cover all ATM/ANS oversight aspects.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ A gap/overlap analysis of the primary legislative framework and the EU regulatory framework has been performed and an Implementation Plan for updating the ATM/ANS primary legislation in line with the EU regulatory framework has been prepared.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Primary aviation legislation in the field of ATM/ANS in line with the EU regulatory framework has~~ve~~ been published and implemented.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The best (good) practices that are being implemented by other States or promulgated within the EU (~~e.g .~~i.e. through EASA GM) ~~in the area of establishing the primary aviation legislation with regard to ATM in line with the EU regulatory framework~~ are being actively adopted.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Best (good) practices in the development and establishment of a primary legislative framework including ATM ANS are established with other States and recognised by the ATM industry.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q1.2 ~~There are adequate financial and competent~~ The necessary resources and capabilities are in place to carry out the tasks assigned to the competent authorities (CAs) under EU Regulations in an efficient and timely manner ~~all phases of safety regulatory processes~~.		
A Initiating	Resources for the tasks assigned to the CAs under EU Regulations ~~safety regulatory functions~~ are provided on an '~~as and when needed~~' ad-hoc basis.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	**~~All of Initiating plus:~~** Resources only allow for a limited number of the tasks assigned to CAs under EU Regulations ~~safety regulatory activities~~. A plan is in place to increase resource levels.	***B***
C Implementing	**~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~** Resource allocations (either internal or through the means of qualified entities ~~recognised organisations~~) are sufficient to cover, at least at minimum level~~,~~ the tasks assigned to CAs under EU Regulation ~~safety regulatory functions~~. A periodic assessment every 2 years ~~review~~ of the human resources needed to perform the safety oversight function is in place.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** There is a resource plan in place to ensure continued allocation of adequate resources to all the tasks assigned to CAs under EU Regulations ~~safety regulatory functions~~. An ~~multi-~~annual resource planning process is in place for all ~~phases of~~ the tasks assigned to CAs under EU Regulations ~~safety regulatory processes~~.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Safety has a high priority during resource allocation and all the tasks assigned to CAs under EU Regulations are well resourced. ~~Safety authorities,~~ The responsibilities and accountabilities within the CA are reviewed after any significant organisational change. The ~~Regulator~~ competent authority has sufficient resources to ensure that the tasks assigned to CAs under EU Regulations ~~safety regulatory functions provided~~ are effectively performed and the State is setting regulatory best (good) practices which are recognised by the ATM/ANS industry. Continuous improvement is achieved by periodic review and follow-up measures implementation based on the HR assessment conducted.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q1.3 There are national secondary regulations that address requirements stemming from primary legislation, international obligations and they are in line with the EU Regulatory Framework in relation to ATM/ANS.		
A Initiating	There is secondary legislation for civil aviation. However, it does not ~~cover~~ address all elements of the primary legislation relating to ATM/ANS and it is not yet aligned with the EU regulatory framework.	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ A gap/overlap analysis of the secondary legislative ~~framework~~ against the EU regulatory framework has been performed and an Implementation Plan for the secondary legislation in line with the EU regulatory framework is in place and its implementation has commenced.	○ B
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The secondary legislation addresses requirements stemming from primary legislation, international obligations and it is aligned with the EU regulatory framework.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** ~~Secondary legislation is constantly being evaluated and modified when necessary in order to adjust to the changing ATM environment and to take into account the evolution of the EU regulatory framework.~~ ~~The best practices that are being implemented by other States promulgated within with the EU (e.g. through EASA GM) in the area of establishing secondary legislation with regard to ATM are being actively adapted and adopted.~~ A process is in place to manage the implementation of changes in national secondary legislation.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** ~~Best practices in the development and establishment of a secondary legislation framework including ATM are established with other States and with the EU institutions and are recognised by the ATM industry and by the EU.~~ Secondary legislation is constantly being evaluated and modified when necessary in order to adjust to the changing ATM/ANS environment and to take into account the evolution of the EU regulatory framework.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q1.4 National regulations are regularly reviewed, assessed, maintained up to date and in line with the European regulatory framework by the appropriate authority.		
A Initiating	Staff have only limited knowledge of requirements and there is no formal process that ensures requirements are maintained up to date.	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ A process has been identified to maintain national regulations up to date and in line with the EU regulations but its initial implementation is incomplete. ~~ad hoc and ineffective.~~	○ B
C Implementing	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ The process to maintain all national regulations up to date and in line with the EU regulatory framework is formalised and systematic. Procedures are kept up to date and changes are notified to staff.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** There is a formal process in place to periodically review national regulations which ensures that they continue to be relevant, up to date, effective and in line with the EU regulatory framework.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The organisation has an effective mechanism in place to identify changes within the organisation that could affect regulatory processess.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q1.5 The State's regulatory process takes into account the need to implement and comply with ~~national requirements and~~ international obligations ~~including the obligations steaming~~ stemming from EU regulations in a timely and consistent manner.		
A Initiating	There is awareness of the international obligations including the obligations ~~steaming~~ stemming from EU regulations and requirements and the necessity to comply with them in a timely manner. However, compliance is on an ad hoc basis (e.g. due to limited resources).	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ There is awareness of the international obligations including the obligations ~~steaming~~ stemming from EU regulations and plans are in place to comply with them in a timely manner. Work has started in some areas.	○ B
C Implementing	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ International obligations including the obligations ~~steaming~~ stemming from EU regulations related to safety are known and they have been implemented in a timely manner ~~to satisfy national requirements and international obligations including the obligations steaming from EU regulations~~.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** There is a process in place to proactively ensure, timely and consistent conformity with national requirements and international obligations including the obligations ~~steaming~~ stemming from EU regulations.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** There is a systematic process in place, recognised by the ATM/ANS industry, to regularly review and amend the safety standards or to contribute to their review within the EU and to ensure on-going consistent compliance with national requirements and international obligations including the obligations steaming from EU regulations.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Element 1.2 State safety responsibilities and accountabilities		
MO1.2 : Establish national safety responsibilities and maintain the national safety plan in line with the European Aviation Safety Plan, where applicable. The national safety plan shall include the state policy to ensure the necessary resources.		
Q.1.6 There is a competent authority either nominated or established to be responsible for safety management (i.e. certification, oversight, licensing) in ATM/ANS supported by appropriate and adequate technical and nontechnical staff with safety policies, regulatory functions, roles, responsibilities and objectives in place.		
A Initiating	There are ~~safety regulatory~~ body/ies in place performing ~~regulatory functions~~ the tasks assigned to them under EU Regulations (e.g. certification, oversight) on an ad hoc basis. However, there is no formally nominated or established competent authority in the field of ATM/ANS.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is an approved plan to formalise the nomination or establishment ~~creation~~ of a competent authority in the field of ATM/ANS that will perform the tasks assigned to them under EU Regulations ~~safety regulatory functions~~ (e.g. certification, oversight). Implementation has commenced. Recruitment of staff is under way.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ A competent authority for the field of ATM/ANS has been nominated or established and safety policies~~, regulatory functions~~ and objectives are in place. ~~The competent authority is supported by appropriate and adequate technical and nontechnical staff.~~	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The ~~Regulatory~~ processes and procedures are used to establish consistency across the organisation. As a result, the ~~regulatory~~ certification and oversight functions performed across the ATM/ANS industry are consistent and an integrated ~~annual planning~~ process is in place.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Safety policies~~, regulatory functions~~ and objectives are periodically reviewed with the aim of continuous improvement. The competent authority is establishing safety best (good) practices or actively contributes to the ~~establishment~~ development of EU guidance material and acceptable means of compliance for the ATM/ANS industry.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q1.7 The oversight and certification functions are executed independently of ~~regulatory and~~ service provision functions. ~~and~~ The organizations are ~~clearly~~ adequately separated, at the functional level at least, from the service providers. ~~all levels in the State.~~		
A Initiating	There is no adequate separation, at the functional level at least, between the competent authority and the service providers. ~~provision functions.~~	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Some of the ~~regulatory and service~~ ~~provision~~ certification and oversight functions are separated from the service provision functions. There is a plan in place to establish ~~complete functional~~adequate separation, at the functional level at least, and implementation has commenced.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ ~~Functional~~ Adequate separation of ~~regulation~~ certification and oversight functions from the ~~and~~ service provisions has been established. However, ultimately they report to the same level of authority.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The ~~regulatory~~ certification and oversight functions from the ~~and~~ service provision functions and organisations are separated and with effective safety interfaces established.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The separated ~~regulatory~~ certification and oversight functions and service provision functions and/or organisations are periodically reviewed and are incorporated within the overall aviation safety system.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q1.8 Legislation and procedures are in place to ensure the oversight of safety requirements in accordance with EU regulations and, where applicable, with national and international obligations.		
A Initiating	Existing legislation and national procedures does not cover the safety oversight requirements, and is not in line with the EU regulations neither adapted to the level of complexity of the national aviation system.	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	**All of Initiating plus:** A gap analysis between the existing legislative framework and national procedures and the EU regulations has been performed and an Implementation Plan for the safety oversight system has been prepared and has been initiated.	○ B
C Implementing	**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:** The relevant legislation and national procedures needed to implement the EU regulations for safety oversight have been published and implemented.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The relevant legislation and national procedures needed to implement the EU regulations for safety oversight are applied in a consistent manner. Comprehensive guidance material is being adapted in line with the guidance material published by EASA or by another European Institution, and are adopted from ATM industry best practices.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The legislation, guidance material and associated national procedures on safety oversight are periodically reviewed and amended with the aim of continuous improvement. These are incorporated within the overall aviation safety system.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q1.9 The relevant competent authority for safety has documented responsibilities and accountabilities of their staff. In addition, it has ~~delegated~~ empowered their ~~sufficient legal authority to~~ staff to ~~allow them~~ to execute their duties. Staff within the competent authority understand and accept their responsibilities.		
A Initiating	There is no formal designation of responsibilities and accountabilities covering ~~safety regulatory~~ certification and oversight functions ~~(e.g. safety oversight, rulemaking)~~. Not all roles and responsibilities have been communicated to staff.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is a generic division of roles and responsibilities and ad hoc actions taken in order to make staff aware of their responsibilities. There is a plan in place to ensure all staff are aware of their roles and responsibilities.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Documented responsibilities and accountabilities for ~~regulatory~~ competent authority's staff are in place and are derived from EU or national requirements. Individuals are aware of their roles and responsibilities with regard to ~~safety regulatory~~ certification and oversight functions ~~(e.g. safety oversight, rulemaking)~~.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Safety responsibilities and accountabilities of appropriate staff are proactively assessed for their fitness for purpose. Staff is consulted with regard to improve and review their responsibilities and accountabilities.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Safety responsibilities and accountabilities are periodically reviewed and modified with the aim of continuous improvement (including after any significant organisational change). Individuals take proactive action to have the ~~rules and procedures~~ responsibilities and accountabilities changed where a safety benefit is identified.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Element 1.3 Accident and incident investigation		
MO1.3a: Establish and maintain the independence of the civil aviation safety investigation authorities, including necessary resources.		
Q1.10 There is an independent entity empowered to make civil aviation safety investigations.		
A Initiating	There are arrangements for creating an ad-hoc structure, outside competent authority and ANSP for the investigation, of safety occurrences such as accidents and serious incidents.	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Plans and financial commitments for putting in place an independent entity for safety occurrences investigations are well documented.	○ B
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ An independent entity with main objectives for safety occurrences investigation is well established and acts effectively.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The safety occurrences investigation entity is recognised by the national civil aviation community for providing added value for safety.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** A mechanism is established for continuous improvement of the safety occurrences investigation processes of the entity which aim to provide added value for safety to the civil aviation community in a proactive manner.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

MO1.3b: Establish means to ensure that appropriate safety measures are taken after safety recommendations have been issued by a civil aviation safety investigation authority.		
Q.1.11 There is a mechanism to ensure that the results of occurrence reporting system and investigation activities are used in the identification of deficiencies and safety concerns and their resolution.		
A Initiating	Results from occurrence reporting system and investigation activities are used for identification and analysis of safety deficiencies and concerns on an ad hoc basis. A plan to formalise the analysis of the results from the occurrence reporting system and investigation activities is being developed.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is an approved plan in place to formalise the analysis of the results from the occurrence reporting system and investigation activities in order to provide safety recommendations. There is evidence that some areas of the plan have been implemented.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ There is a formal mechanism for identification and analysis of deficiencies and safety concerns resulting from the investigation of safety occurrence reporting. Safety recommendations/directives are issued based on identified safety deficiencies, and concerns.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Follow-up actions resulting from safety recommendation/directives are monitored to ensure corrective and mitigation actions are implemented. There are documented ~~cases~~ processes where measures (i.e. safety directives, restrictions, etc.) may ~~operating restrictions have~~ been~~~~ imposed, where appropriate. This should be based on the systematic identification of deficiencies and concerns resulted from the occurrence reporting system.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Best (good) practices with regard to the identification of safety deficiencies and concerns and their resolution are shared with civil aviation safety investigation authorities ~~safety regulatory organisations~~. The process of resolving identified safety concerns is monitored to ensure continuous improvement. The safety deficiency, identification and analysis approach is recognised as best in class within the ATM/ANS industry.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q1.12 A mechanism has been established to ensure that ~~appropriate safety measures are based on~~ the actions proposed in safety recommendations issued by a civil aviation safety investigation authority are properly followed-up.		
A Initiating	~~Safety measures~~ Actions based on safety recommendations issued by a civil aviation safety investigation authority are taken on ad hoc basis.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	**~~All of Initiating plus:~~** There is plan to establish a more systematic mechanism for dealing with safety recommendations issued by a civil aviation safety investigation authority.	***B***
C Implementing	**~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~** The mechanism for ensuring that appropriate ~~safety measures~~ actions are taken after safety recommendations issued by a civil aviation safety investigation authority is in place but not systematically used. No enough resources have been allocated to it.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**~~All of Implementing plus:~~** The process for dealing with safety recommendations issued by a civil aviation safety investigation authority is systematically applied and there is an ~~department~~ appointed person(s) with the overall responsibility for dealing with it.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** There is a continuous review of the process with the aim to continuously improve it. ~~The mechanism of dealing with safety recommendations issued by a civil aviation safety investigation authority is recognised as one of the best practises.~~	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

MO1.3c - Ensure that civil aviation safety investigation authorities involve subject matter expertise from the ATM/ANS domain.		
Q1.13 There is a mechanism to ensure that civil aviation investigation authorities (AIB) involve ATM/ANS subject matter expertise ~~involvement~~ in their ~~investigation~~ processes for the investigation of occurrences related to ATM/ANS.		
A Initiating	~~During some safety occurrences investigations~~ On ad-hoc basis subject matter experts are involved in the investigation process of occurrences related to ATM/ANS domain.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is a plan for establishing a formal procedure for evaluating the necessity of use of subject matter expertise in the occurrences investigations on systematic way.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The subject matter experts are ~~included in~~ involved in the occurrences investigations related to ATM/ANS based on the formal procedure established ~~when considered appropriate in accordance with the legislation~~.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The subject matter experts involved in the investigation are properly trained for the investigation process.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The system for use of subject matter expertise in investigation is continuously improved using the feed-back of the stakeholders.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Element 1.4 Enforcement policy		
MO1.4: Establish appropriate, transparent and proportionate enforcement procedures, including for the suspension, limitation and revocation of licenses and certificates and the application of other effective penalties.		
Q1.14 There are ~~is a~~ well established procedures for handling of non-compliances and implementation of appropriate enforcement measures as provided for in Article 7(7) of Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 and Article 10, Article 22a(d), and Articles 25 and 68 of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, while taking into account the need to ensure the continuity of air navigation services and as provided for in Regulation (EU) No 805/2011 ~~aviation legislation that delegates powers to the competent authority and its staff for enforcement, including suspension, revocation of licences and certificates and other penalties~~.		
A Initiating	~~Arrangements exist for ad-hoc~~ The handling of non-compliance and the limitation, suspension, revocation of licenses and certificates are performed on ad-hoc basis, with no formalised procedure and criteria. The enforcement measures and penalties are not formalised in the national aviation framework.	○ *A*
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is a plan for establishing a formal procedure for handling of non-compliances and implementation of appropriate enforcement measures as provided for in Article 7(7) of Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 and Article 10, Article 22a(d), and Articles 25 and 68 of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, while taking into account the need to ensure the continuity of air navigation services and as provided for in Regulation (EU) No 805/2011~~evaluating the necessity of use of subject matter expertise in the occurrences investigations on systematic way~~.	○ *B*
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Formal framework and procedures for handling of non-compliances and implementation of enforcement measures, including limitation, suspension, revocation of licenses and certificates and other penalties are in place.	○ *C*
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** There is a systematic approach in handling of non-compliances and applying the enforcement procedures with proved safety benefits.	○ *D*
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Continuous improvement of handling of non-compliances and the enforcement measures is in place ~~procedures including the best practices~~.	○ *E*
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Element 1.5 Management of related interfaces		
MO1.5a: Ensure adequate management of the internal interfaces within the NSA.		
Q1.15 All safety related internal interfaces within the competent authority are effectively managed.		
A Initiating	The competent authority is aware of its internal safety related interfaces but manages them on an informal basis.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Internal safety related interfaces are identified. Processes and procedures planned to manage them in a formalised way have been initiated.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ All safety related internal interfaces are managed in a formal manner. Safety requirements are specified and documented in appropriate managerial arrangements (e.g. a ~~common~~ Management System etc).	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** All internal safety related interfaces are managed and measured to assess their effectiveness. The competent authority processes ensure that a consistent corporate approach is applied to safety related activities across the organisation.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** ~~Surveys are conducted on a regular basis to identify weaknesses in the internal interface processes.~~ The ~~safety regulatory~~ certification and oversight functions are incorporated within the competent authority. All internal safety related interfaces are managed effectively and are measured systematically with the aim of continuous improvement.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q1.16 Related internal management systems (e.g. QMS) have been coordinated.		
A Initiating	There is un-coordinated ad hoc integration of internal management systems. Processes and procedures across within the competent authority are conducted in isolation.	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ A formal plan exists for further alignment of internal management systems, which has been initiated. Processes and procedures across the competent authority have been mapped and potential synergies identified.	○ B
C Implementing	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ The integration of the alignment of the internal management systems is on-going. Processes and procedures to ensure a coherent approach amongst internal management systems ~~and~~ in line with State Safety Programme are still in place, even following organisational changes.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Where appropriate, there is full integration of all ~~management~~ systems across the organisation. Relationships between departments are being proactively built. Competent authority processes and procedures ensure that a consistent corporate approach is applied to safety related activities across the authority.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Working practices ensure that the competent authority works as a coherent system and not as a group of individual or fragmented units. There is a review process in place to ensure that the competent authority can adapt proactively to organisational changes and continuously improve the internal management systems. Processes and procedures are incorporated within the overall internal management system.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q1.17 All external interfaces with a safety impact (other Regulators, ANSPs, MIL, Airspace Users, Airports, etc.) are coherent and effectively managed.		
A Initiating	There is an informal structure in place for the collection, investigation, evaluation and dissemination of safety occurrence data.	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ External safety related interfaces are identified and processes and procedures are planned to manage them in a formalised way. Implementation activities have commenced.	○ B
C Implementing	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ All safety related external interfaces are managed in a formal manner. Safety requirements are specified and documented in appropriate managerial arrangements (e.g. where appropriate, Letters of Agreement - LOAs; Service Level Agreements - SLAs, MoUs etc). The competent authority plans to be the subject of peer review type activities.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** All external safety related interfaces are managed and measured to determine their effectiveness. The competent authority processes ensure that a consistent corporate approach is applied to external safety related interfaces. The competent authority participates in peer review type activities with other Regulators/competent authorities and act on the results.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Internal surveys are conducted on a regular basis to identify and fix weaknesses in the external interface process. The ~~Regulatory Organisation~~ competent authority leads peer review type activities with other ~~Regulators~~ authorities, and is recognised as best (good) practices ~~in class~~ within the ATM/ANS industry. There is a systemic view of ATM/ANS which correlates the ~~safety regulatory~~ certification and oversight functions for all industry elements, ANSPs, Airports, Airspace Users, Military and other competent authorities.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q1.18 Working relationships with ANSPs are based on formalised processes and procedures in accordance with their safety significance.		
A Initiating	The relationship (e.g. ~~communication and consultation~~ reporting and assessment of safety occurrences) with ANSPs is informal and ad-hoc.	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ The relationship (e.g. communication and consultation) with ANSPs is being formalised and procedures have been developed and implementation activities have started.	○ B
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The relationship (e.g. ~~communication and consultation~~ reporting and assessment of safety occurrences) with ANSPs is formalised and procedures have been implemented.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The relationship (e.g. ~~communication and consultation~~ reporting and assessment of safety occurrences) with ANSPs is not only formalised but also collaborative (e.g. through joint policy boards with defined terms of reference). Historic data is shared when appropriate.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The relationship with ANSPs is systemically and proactively reviewed for continuous improvement. ~~Real-time~~ Regulatory sharing of safety related data is in place with respect to the management of safety. Formalised sharing of staff (~~i.e.~~ e.g. secondments) is systematically practiced. Support and guidance is provided on the basis of mutual respect and trust.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Component 2 Safety risk management		
Element 2.1 Safety requirements for the air navigation service provider's SMS		
MO2.1: Establish controls which govern how service providers' safety management systems (SMS) will identify hazards and manage safety risks		
Q2.1 The competent authority has established oversight procedures which aim to monitor compliance with the SMS requirements by the service providers in particular the requirements for hazards identification and risk assessment and mitigation.		
A Initiating	The competent authority oversees the service provider's risk assessment process on ad hoc basis.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ A formal procedure for continuous oversight of the risk assessment processes of the service provider has been prepared but it has not been approved neither implemented.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ A formal procedure for continuous oversight of the risk assessment processes of the service provider has been implemented. The service provider procedure for hazard identification and risk assessment and mitigation has been approved by the competent authority.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The procedure for overseeing the service provider's risk assessment processes is systematically applied.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The procedure for overseeing the service provider's risk assessment processes is constantly reviewing for continuous improvement and for introducing risk-based oversight approach.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Element 2.2 Agreement on the service provider's safety performance		
MO2.2: Agree on safety performance of an individual, national or FAB service provider.		
Q2.2 The competent authority has agreed with individual air navigation service providers on the safety performance (consistent with the ones contained in the national performance plans).		
A Initiating	Acceptable safety levels are established through the ATM safety regulatory framework in a limited number of areas and in an ad hoc manner.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is a plan in place to establish and formalise acceptable safety levels for the ATM system through the ATM safety regulatory framework. Implementation activities have commenced.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Formalised acceptable safety levels have been established for the ATM system through the implementation of the State Safety Programme.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** *An* evaluation of the acceptable safety levels is carried out on a regular basis and changes are introduced when necessary.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The acceptable safety level review process is proactively incorporated within the overall aviation safety system. Based on proactive recommendations, acceptable safety levels are linked to potential safety-critical hazards and events through the State Safety Plan.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q2.3 The safety performance achieved is regularly monitored and assessed in order to determine their compliance with safety requirements.		
A Initiating	Ad hoc monitoring is carried out ~~but~~ and there is limited assessment and determination of compliance with the safety requirements.	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ An approved plan is in place to formalise the safety monitoring and assessment of safety levels against safety targets and thresholds. Implementation activities have commenced.	○ B
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ There is a formalised and effective system in place for safety level monitoring and assessment. Some initial safety targets and thresholds have been monitored and assessed ~~established and internal benchmarking activities~~ to determine whether ~~their~~ ANSPs comply with safety requirements ~~have started~~.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Assessments of safety levels are carried out using validated safety targets and thresholds on a regular basis, and safety recommendations/directives are issued when necessary. External benchmarking activities have started with the aim of incorporating available best (good) practices.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The results of the monitoring and assessment of acceptable safety levels are used for improvements of the European regulatory and oversight aspects of ATM. Internal and external benchmarking activities are well established and aim to continuously improve the levels of safety, and set new standards of safety requirements within the ATM industry.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q2.4 The State informs the general public on the overall ATM safety related performance through routine publication of achieved safety performance and trend.		
A Initiating	All ATM safety related performance information is deemed as confidential and is not made available to the public.	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ A limited amount of ATM safety related performance information is made available to the public.	○ B
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Appropriate ATM safety related performance information is made available to the public.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The ATM safety related performance information is systematically reviewed with the aim to present the public with a comprehensive view on achieved safety performance and trends.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The State proactively provides access to appropriate ATM safety related performance information. Achieved and projected safety performance are transparent to the public. There is a feedback process in place that enables those receiving/ accessing information to comment on its relevance, and corrective measures are put in place to rectify any communication deficiencies.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Component 3 Safety assurance		
Element 3.1 Safety oversight		
MO3.1a: Attribution of powers to the NSA responsible for safety oversight of air navigation service providers		
Q3.1 There is a well-established oversight process based on documented procedures for verification of compliance with applicable requirements by ~~legislation that nominates the competent authority/NSA as responsible for the safety oversight of~~ air navigation service providers ~~and provides all the necessary means to execute their safety oversight tasks~~.		
A Initiating	There is not process in place ~~legislation nominating a competent authority/NSA as responsible~~ for safety oversight of the air navigation service provider ~~but~~ and the ~~State~~competent authority performs ~~arrange~~ ~~for~~ ad hoc inspections.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is a plan in place to establish formalised process ~~legislation for the nomination of the competent authority/NSA as responsible~~ for the safety oversight of the air navigation service provider. Implementation activities have commenced.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ ~~The legislation nominating the competent authority/NSA as responsible for safety oversight of the air navigation service provider has been established.~~ The competent authority follows documented procedures when performing ~~has initiating procedures for~~ the safety oversight of the air navigation service providers. It includes guidance materials intended to support the safety oversight personnel when performing their functions.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The procedures for safety oversight of the air navigation service provider are applied systematically in accordance with the European regulatory framework. The competent authority introduces a risk-based safety oversight ~~procedure~~.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The procedures for safety oversight are constantly reviewed~~ing~~ for continuous improvement. The competent authority is applying the risk-based safety oversight based on established criteria ~~procedure~~.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

MO3.1b: Establishment of a national safety oversight system and programme to ensure effective monitoring of the air navigation service provider's (ANSP) compliance with the applicable regulations and monitoring of the safety oversight function.		
Q3.2 The competent authority's safety oversight system is implemented in accordance with applicable regulation for safety oversight (i.e. processes and procedures for the oversight of the safety requirements (e.g. granting, revocation, limitation or suspension of license/certificate; authority to conduct inspections/audits, ~~make recommendations,~~ monitoring activity to ensure that objectives and requirements are met; planning, conducting oversight activities) are effectively implemented).		
A Initiating	The safety oversight system is based on ad hoc arrangements. Deviations from the applicable regulation for safety oversight exist.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ The safety oversight system is partially implemented. However, there is a plan in place to ensure it will meet the applicable regulation for safety oversight.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The safety oversight system has been implemented and meets the applicable regulation for safety oversight.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The safety oversight system is systematically managed and measured for its effectiveness. There is a process in place to adapt and implement industry best (good) practices concerning the safety oversight system.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The safety oversight system is reviewed and amended with the aim of continuous improvement. It is recognised in the ATM/ANS industry as being amongst the best.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q3.3 All persons involved in safety oversight activities are competent to perform the required functions. ~~Audits are conducted by qualified auditors to ensure that all applicable ATM safety requirements and implementing arrangements by ANSPs are being met.~~		
A Initiating	~~Audits are conducted on an ad hoc basis but are not consistent with the applicable regulation for safety oversight.~~ There is no formalised process in place defining the education, training, technical and operational knowledge, experience and qualifications relevant to the duties of each person involved in safety oversight activities within the structure of the competent authority and the persons involved in safety oversight activities are trained on an ad hoc basis.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Implementation activities in respect of definition and formalisation of the education, training, technical and operational knowledge, experience and qualifications relevant to the duties of each person involved in safety oversight activities within the structure of the competent authority have started but they are not yet completed. There are insufficient trained auditors to effectively monitor the ~~implementation~~ compliance with ~~of~~ ATM/ANS ~~safety~~ requirements.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Regular audits are performed by ~~qualified~~ competent staff who are independent ~~of~~ from the ANSPs.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** There is a systematic approach to the education, (specific) training, technical and operational knowledge relevant to the persons involved in safety oversight activities ~~auditing~~. The European ~~safety regulatory~~ framework on the subject is used to ensure that there are consistent ~~auditing~~ rules and processes across the State's ATM/ANS safety for the qualifications and training of persons involved in the ATM/ANS safety oversight activities.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The European ~~safety regulatory~~ framework in respect of the qualifications and training of persons involved in the ATM/ANS safety oversight activities ~~auditing processes~~ is incorporated within the overall safety system and the State participates in its periodical review to ensure continuous improvement.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q3.4 Processes and methods are in place to ensure that the ~~European safety~~ requirements in respect to safety-related changes to the ~~ATM~~ functional system are being met.		
A Initiating	The competent authority reviews of safety arguments in respect of changes to the ~~ATM~~ functional system are performed on an ad hoc basis. There are limited ~~regulatory safety~~ review methods in place.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ The process for the competent authority reviews of proposed changes to the ~~ATM~~ functional system has started to be formalised, but there are insufficient staff to perform all reviews. Initial implementation has started.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ There is a systematic approach to approval of changes to the ~~ATM~~ functional system. Reviews of changes to the ~~ATM~~ functional system are performed by qualified staff who are independent ~~of~~ from the ANSPs. A formal ~~regulatory safety~~ review mechanism is in place. However, risk assessment regulatory reviews are conducted only on changes that are safety critical.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The ~~safety regulatory~~ process is used to ensure that there is a consistent approach to changes to the ~~ATM~~ functional system and reviews are conducted commensurate with the level of risk posed. Where appropriate, quantified safety levels are used. The ~~regulatory safety~~ review mechanism and its associated methodologies are ~~reviewed~~ assessed and kept in line with industry standards.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The European ~~safety regulatory~~ framework in respect of changes to the ~~ATM~~ functional system is incorporated within the overall safety system and the State participates in its periodical review to ensure continuous improvement. The national regulatory safety review mechanism is recognised amongst ATM/ANS industry best (good) practice.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q3.5 The results of the safety oversight and monitoring activities (e.g. audits, inspections, certification, oversight of changes, oversight of ATM staff etc.) are used to determine areas in which safety would require improvement as matter of priority ~~in the identification of deficiencies and safety concerns and their resolution~~.		
A Initiating	The results of the safety oversight and monitoring activities are used in the identification and analysis of safety deficiencies and concerns on an ad hoc basis. A plan to formalise the analysis of the results from the safety oversight activities is being developed.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ A formal plan has been developed to use the results of the safety oversight and monitoring activities for the prioritisation of the safety areas where improvements necessitates ~~issuance of safety recommendations and for the resolution of safety deficiencies and concerns~~. There is an evidence that some areas of the plan have been implemented ~~initiated~~.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ There is a formal system in place for the identification and analysis of deficiencies and safety concerns resulting from safety oversight and monitoring activities. Safety measures ~~recommendations~~/directives are issued based on identified safety deficiencies, and concerns.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** ~~Follow-up~~ Actions resulting from analysis of the safety oversight and monitoring activities ~~safety~~ recommendation/directives are followed ~~monitored~~ to ensure corrective and mitigation measures ~~actions~~ are effectively implemented.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Best (good) practices with regard to the identification of safety deficiencies and concerns and their resolution are shared with other competent authorities. The process of resolving identified safety concerns is monitored to ensure continuous improvement. The safety deficiency, identification and analysis approach is recognised as best in class within the ATM industry.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Element 3.2 Safety data collection, analysis and exchange		
MO3.2: Establishment of mechanisms to ensure the capture and storage of data on hazards and safety risks and analysis of that data at ANSP and State levels as well as its dissemination and exchange.		
Q3.6 ~~Mechanisms are~~ A system is in place to appropriately collect, store, analyse and disseminate safety data and information ~~ensure the capture and storage of data on hazards and safety risks and analysis of that data. In addition, mechanisms are in place for dissemination of data and information from that data~~.		
A Initiating	There are available records for identified hazards and safety risks. The relevant information is communicated on an ad hoc basis.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Plans for establishing a formal procedure for systematic collection, storage, analysis and dissemination of hazards and safety risks data.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ There is an established procedure for collection, storage, analysis and dissemination of hazards and safety risks data at ~~ANSP and~~ State levels.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The procedure for collection, storage, analysis and dissemination of hazards and safety risks data at ~~ANSP and~~ State levels is used systematically. The information ~~extracted and disseminated is well analysed and~~ gives possibility for planning of safety measures.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** There is continuous improvement of the collection, storage, analysis and dissemination of hazards and safety risks data process including international exchange.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q3.7 Institutional arrangements are in place to actively exchange safety information with service providers and/or other States, as appropriate, developed on the basis of ~~for the supervisory and regulatory tasks as regards~~ collection, investigation, evaluation, and respecting appropriate protection ~~and dissemination~~ of occurrence data.		
A Initiating	There is an informal structure in place to actively exchange safety information developed on the basis of ~~for~~ the collection, investigation~~,~~ and evaluation ~~and dissemination~~ of safety occurrence data.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is an approved plan to formalise the arrangements for active exchange of safety information developed on the basis ~~existing structure for the collection, investigation, evaluation and dissemination~~ of safety occurrence data. There is State commitment from management to allocate resources so that independent activities for the investigation and evaluation of accidents and serious incidents can be implemented.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The ~~Regulatory function~~ State has a formal independent system in place that provides for active exchange of safety information developed on the basis of the collection, investigation~~,~~ and evaluation ~~and dissemination~~ of safety occurrence data.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The State has a formal and robust system in place that provides for the capture of internal- and external-wide information exchange on ATM/ANS occurrences. The system is enhanced through the adoption of regulatory best (good) practices.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The State system for the development of information from the collection, investigation~~,~~ and evaluation ~~and dissemination~~ of safety occurrence data is regularly reviewed to ensure continuous improvement. ~~The system is considered to be amongst the best in class within the ATM industry, and is adopted and adapted by other States.~~	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q3.8 The State is implementing a just culture climate.		
A Initiating	There is an awareness of the need to implement just culture, but no formal steps have been implemented yet.	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ Formal steps to implement a just culture have been initiated with various stakeholders.	○ B
C Implementing	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ Just culture is perceived to be place. However, the system has yet to be tested to fully validate the application of the just culture principles and policies implemented.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The State(s) within which the Organisation operates has made clear, agreed, structural arrangements about who gets to draw the line between the acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour. Dialogue with stakeholders on Just Culture issues is established and followed. The system has been tested and validated in a number of cases.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The involvement of the domain expertise in support of drawing the line jointly with judicial system is ensured. A continuous dialogue with Judicial authorities and the media on just culture issues is established and followed. The system is considered to be robust and is being adopted and adapted by other States.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q3.9 The results of occurrence reporting system and investigation activities are used in the identification of deficiencies and safety concerns and their resolution.		
A Initiating	Results from occurrence reporting system and investigation activities are used for identification and analysis of safety deficiencies and concerns on an ad hoc basis. A plan to formalise the analysis of the results from the occurrence reporting system and investigation activities is being developed.	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ There is an approved plan in place to formalise the analysis of the results from the occurrence reporting system and investigation activities in order to provide safety recommendations. There is evidence that some areas of the plan have been initiated.	○ B
C Implementing	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ There is a formal system for identification and analysis of deficiencies and safety concerns resulting from the investigation of safety occurrence reporting. Safety recommendations/directives are issued based on identified safety deficiencies, and concerns.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Follow-up actions resulting from safety recommendation/directives are monitored to ensure corrective and mitigation actions are implemented. There are documented cases where operating restrictions have been imposed, where appropriate, based on the systematic identification of deficiencies and concerns resulted from the occurrence reporting system.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Best (good) practices with regard to the identification of safety deficiencies and concerns and their resolution are shared with safety regulatory organisations. The process of resolving identified safety concerns is monitored to ensure continuous improvement. The safety deficiency, identification and analysis approach is recognised as best in class within the ATM industry.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Element 3.3 Safety-data-driven targeting of oversight of areas of greater concern or need		
MO3.3: Establishment of procedures to prioritise inspections, audits and surveys towards the areas of greater safety concern or need or in accordance with the identified safety risks.		
Q3.10 Inspections, audits and surveys are prioritised towards the areas of greater safety concern or need or in accordance with the identified safety risks (risk-based oversight).		
A Initiating	Ad-hoc inspections are conducted when particular safety issue has been raised.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is a plan to formalise the procedure for the prioritising of inspections, audits and surveys towards the areas of greater safety concern or need or in accordance with the identified safety risks (risk-based oversight).	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The formal procedure for the prioritising of inspections, audits and surveys towards the areas of greater safety concern or need or in accordance with the identified safety risks (risk-based oversight) has been approved and it is being initially applied. Well established formal procedure for planning the inspection, audit and survey activities, based on the existing information of safety concerns.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The formal procedure for the prioritising of inspections, audits and surveys towards the areas of greater safety concern or need or in accordance with the identified safety risks (risk-based oversight) is systematically applied. The available best (good) practises are constantly reviewed with the aim of improving the procedure. Possibilities for ad-hoc reprioritising of the inspection/audit activities, based on the newly arising safety concerns	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** There is a continuous improvement of the procedure and means for the prioritising of inspections, audits and surveys towards the areas of greater safety concern or need or in accordance with the identified safety risks (risk-based oversight). They are used to develop best (good) practises on risk-based oversight measure at the EU level. Continuous review of the inspection/audit activities to resolve pro-actively identified safety issues.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Component 4 Safety promotion		
Element 4.1 Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information		
MO4.1a: Training of NSA personnel on applicable legislative and regulatory framework		
Q4.1 Staff are qualified and trained. Technical and administrative staff are qualified and competent for the tasks required of them ~~and are certified/licensed where required~~.		
A Initiating	Staff have little knowledge of ATM/ANS; however there is a growing understanding of the requirements against which ATM/ANS is regulated.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Individuals understand the requirements for the provision of ATM/ANS ~~safety regulatory functions~~ but have yet to develop the skills required to apply them.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ There are adequate and trained staff who are ~~certified/licensed~~ qualified/competent where required, according to the requirements of their role. There is a training plan in place to ensure on-going competency and qualification of staff.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** There is a proactive process in place to review and amend the competency and qualification schemes.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The competency and qualification schemes established are recognised as the best in class by the ATM/ANS industry.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

MO4.1b: Promotion of awareness of safety information and communication and dissemination of safety-related information amongst the aviation authorities within a State.		
Q4.2 The competent authority has an established system that gathers information on best (good) practices, safety-relevant information and safety lessons learned from the industry (such as regional/local operational safety improvement action plans, toolkits).		
A Initiating	Information gathering on best (good) practices and lessons learned is done on an ad hoc basis. Evaluation of the applicability of best (good) practices and lessons learned is done on an ad hoc basis.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ A formal plan is in place to gather best (good) practices and lessons learned. Initial implementation has started. Some formal evaluation of the applicability of best (good) practices and lessons learned is undertaken.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ There is a robust and effective mechanism in place for the collection of best (good) practices and lessons learned. Their applicability to different situations is evaluated, and information disseminated / best (good) practice adopted where appropriate. Formal evaluation of the applicability of best (good) practices and lessons learned is undertaken.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The information gathering mechanism is periodically reviewed. The competent authority actively participates in developing best (good) practices and shares these with other competent authority.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** There is a systematic process in place to proactively review and improve the information gathering mechanism. The State is establishing best (good) practices which are recognised within the ATM industry**.**	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Q4.3 There is a process in place to share best (good) practices, safety-relevant information and safety lessons learned internally, nationally, regionally and with international bodies.		
A Initiating	Sharing of best (good) practices and safety lessons learned is done on an ad hoc basis. Information is shared internally but there are no plans to release it to external stakeholders in any way, as these matters are considered to be confidential.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ The benefits of sharing best (good) practices and safety lessons learned with other parties ~~is~~ are recognised. A plan is in place to identify and develop a network to enable this sharing and implementation activities have commenced. Information has started to be shared externally, but it is considered that there are insufficient safeguards to sharing information more widely.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ A national policy has been published with regard to sharing safety related best (good) practices and safety lessons learned with other parties. A documented process is in place to enable the sharing of best (good) practices and safety lessons learned internally and also with other competent authorities and international bodies.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Best (good) practices and safety lessons learned are systematically shared internally, nationally, regionally and with international bodies with the aim of establishing remedial actions, as appropriate.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The process is reviewed on a regular basis and is incorporated within the competent authority at all levels with the aim of continuous improvement. Remedial actions arising and lessons learned are used in national and/or European safety improvement initiatives.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Element 4.2 External training, communication and dissemination of safety information		
MO4.2a: Education/training of ANSP personnel and air traffic controllers (ATCO) training organisations on applicable legislative and regulatory framework.		
Q4.4 Competent authority ensures that education/training is provided to the ANSPs' ~~personnel~~ and ATCO training organisations' personnel on the applicable legislative ~~and regulatory~~ framework.		
A Initiating	Ad-hoc support to the ANSPs ~~S~~ and ATCO training organisations ~~or ad hoc check that training~~ is provided ~~to the relevant personnel~~ on the applicable safety legislative ~~and regulatory~~ framework.	○ **A**
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Commitment to provide support concerning SMS requirements and guidance material to the ANSPs and ATCO training organisations is in place. ~~conduct systematic oversight to the ANSP training activities in the legislative/regulatory subjects~~.	○ **B**
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ A formal procedure for ~~systematic~~ communication and dissemination of safety related information related to SMS requirements and guidance material to ~~oversight of~~ the ANSP and ATCO training organisations ~~personnel training planning in both training programmes and training content with respect to the legislation/regulation,~~ is being implemented.	○ **C**
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** ~~The~~ Training, communication and dissemination of safety information to ~~oversight procedure of~~ ANSP and ATCO Training organisations ~~personnel training planning in both training programmes and training content~~ with respect to the safety legislation/regulations is applied systematically.	○ **D**
E Continuous Improvement	~~**All of Managing & Measuring plus:**~~ There is a continuous communication and dissemination of safety information to ~~review of the procedure for oversight~~ ANSP and ATCO training organisations ~~personnel training planning in both training programmes and training content~~ with respect to the safety legislation/regulations. Feedback from the ATM/ANS industry are taken into account ~~The review aims~~ for continuous improvements. ~~The competent authority participates actively in the development and enhancement of the existing legislative and regulatory framework for its continuous improvements.~~	○ **E**
Please provide justification for selected answer		

MO4.2b: Promotion of awareness of safety information and communication and dissemination of safety-related information with external stakeholders.
See Questions MO4.1b (Q4.2 and Q4.3)

Component 5 Safety culture		
Element 5.1 Establishment and promotion of safety culture		
MO5.1 : Establishment and promotion of safety culture within the competent authority/NSA.		
Q5 1 There is a safety culture in the competent authority that is led by the management in ensuring that relevant staff are aware of and support the regulatory organisation's shared beliefs~~, assumptions~~ and values.		
A Initiating	There are few shared beliefs~~, assumptions~~ and values across the competent authority ~~regulatory organisation~~. ~~There are differences between what is done, what is said and what is understood.~~ Staff may not have a ~~harmonised~~ 'common' understanding of what 'safety' means for their activities.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is growing commitment towards establishing a safety culture across all levels of the competent authority ~~organisation~~. Staff within the competent authority has a good level of safety awareness. The competent authority is starting to ~~cater for and~~ put processes in place to facilitate the consideration of safety throughout its activities.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ There is a safety culture in place, but this is not yet mature. Further work is needed to ensure that staff engages in a proactive manner. Staff across the competent authority is involved in safety activities (passively).	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Safety related experiences are openly exchanged internally and externally. The competent authority shares ~~operations~~ ~~informed learning and reporting cultures as well as a Just Culture~~ ~~with respect to~~ internally oversight error.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Activities include the identification and sharing of best (good) practices related to ~~regulatory~~ safety culture. The competent authority safety culture is led by the senior management and the organisation's safety culture is well recognised by the ATM/ANS industry.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Element 5.2 Measurement and improvement of Safety Culture		
MO5.2: Establishment of procedures to measure and improve safety culture within the competent authority/NSA.		
Q5.2 Safety culture is measured on a regular basis and there is an improvement programme in place.		
A Initiating	The need to have safety culture measurements in place is not yet recognised. The competent authority is determining what safety means for them and is generating some awareness of this throughout the organisation.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Senior management is aware of the need to have periodic measurements of safety culture in place as well as an improvement plan, but what and when will be measured is still being defined.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Safety culture has been measured and results are available within the competent authority. An improvement plan has been agreed by the senior management.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Safety culture enablers and disablers are identified and the improvement initiative is sharing those with other competent authorities. There are incentives for being pro-active and committed to improving safety culture (due to their internalised belief that safety oversight and safety management are important). The competent authority assesses its safety culture on a systematic basis and implements plans to improve any identified weaknesses.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Improvement plans are set to ensure that staff are aware of and support the competent authority's shared beliefs, assumptions and values regarding safety across the Regulatory function. Senior management and staff are proactively and jointly participating in continuously improving the safety culture within the competent authority. Their approach is widely recognised within the ATM/ANS industry.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Signed: **Name:** **Date, place:**	
Contact Telephone:	
E-Mail:	

(B) — Appendix 2 to AMC 2 SKPI — List of Weightings for Evaluation of Effectiveness of Safety Management Questionnaire — State level

	MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES																			
QUESTIONS	**1.1**	**1.2**	**1.3a**	**1.3b**	**1.3c**	**1.4**	**1.5a**	**1.5b**	**2.1**	**2.2**	**3.1a**	**3.1b**	**3.2**	**3.3**	**4.1a**	**4.1b**	**4.2a**	**4.2b**	**5.1**	**5.2**
Q1.1	0.20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.2	0.20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.3	0.20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.4	0.20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.5	0.20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.6	-	~~0.25~~ 0.334	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.7	-	~~0.25~~ 0.334	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
~~**Q1.8**~~	~~-~~	~~0.25~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~
Q1.9	-	~~0.25~~ 0.334	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.10	-	-	1		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.11	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.12	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.13	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.14	-	-	-	-	-	1		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.15	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.16	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q1.18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q2.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q2.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.334	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q2.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.334	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q2.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.334	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q3.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q3.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q3.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q3.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q3.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q3.6	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q3.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q3.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q3.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q3.10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Q4.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Q4.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	-
Q4.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	-
Q4.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Q5.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Q5.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1

Name	
Organisation	
State	
Job Title	

SA1: Development of a Positive and Proactive Safety Culture		
SA1-1 A positive and pro-active just, flexible, and informed safety culture (the shared beliefs, assumptions, and values regarding safety) that supports reporting and learning led by management.		
A Initiating	Within the organisation, there are significant differences between what is said, what is done, and what is believed. The competent authority may be regarded as being responsible for safety. The organisation determines what safety means and generates some awareness of this throughout the organisation. Individuals may have a different understanding of how their activities contribute to safety.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Individuals within the organisation have a good level of systematic safety management awareness. The organisation is starting to put processes in place for systematic safety management.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ A positive safety culture is developing, although it is still immature. Individuals are starting to be involved in systematic safety management.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Staff are proactively involved in planning for and implementing systematic safety management. The organisation operates informed learning and reporting cultures, as well as a just culture with respect to errors in operations."	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Individuals across the organisation are proactively and constantly striving to improve their approach to systematic safety management. They are supported by measurement and review processes and organisational management. Experiences are openly exchanged internally and externally. Within the organisation, there is a complete alignment between what is said, what is done, and what is believed.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA1.2 Regular measurement of safety culture and an improvement programme.		
A Initiating	The organisation does not see the need to have a safety culture measuring mechanism in place.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ The organisation is aware of the need to have periodic measurements of safety culture in place, as well as an improvement plan. However, what will be measured, and when, is still being defined.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Safety culture is measured and results are available. An improvement plan addresses the need for individuals to be aware of, and support, the organisation's shared beliefs, assumptions and values regarding safety.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The organisation assesses its safety culture on a regular basis and implements improvements to any identified weaknesses. Safety Culture enablers and barriers are identified, and solutions to reduce barriers are being implemented.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** All personnel are pro-active and committed to improving safety. Safety Culture Surveys confirm that, within the organisation, there is a high level of alignment between what is said, what is done, and what is believed. Organisational management approves a continuous improvement plan.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA1.3 An open climate for reporting and investigation of occurrences.		
A Initiating	Management believes there are no issues regarding the existing reporting and investigation culture and therefore does not see the need for any activity or dialogue with the staff in this area.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Discussions between staff and management to define an open reporting and investigation climate are underway. However, there is no agreed policy in place yet.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Safety data-sharing and publication policies are supported by the staff. Safety data are sufficiently protected from external interference within legal limits.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Within the organisation, the line between acceptable and unacceptable mistakes is established and known by the staff. Just reporting and investigation culture principles are in place and systematically applied within the organisation.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Under certain legal regimes, there is a clear and published policy on how dialogue with judicial authorities and media is established and followed.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA2: Organisational and Individual Safety Responsibilities		
SA2-1 An approved, clearly documented, and recognised system for the management of safety. Management structure, responsibilities, accountabilities and authorities are clearly defined and documented.		
A Initiating	No formal designation of authorities, responsibilities or accountabilities for the management of safety exists.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Safety authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities have been identified but not yet formalized. Line managers assume responsibility for safety.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The process to maintain all national regulations up to date and in line with the EU regulatory framework is formalised and systematic. Procedures are kept up to date and changes are notified to staff.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Procedures are in place to address the need to review safety authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities after any significant organisational change.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Safety authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities are periodically reviewed to determine whether they are suitable and effective (i.e., continuous improvement of safety management).	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA2-2 A clearly defined safety management function/safety manager that is independent of line management.		
A Initiating	A safety management function has not yet been appointed to develop the SMS.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ A safety management function has been appointed to develop and maintain the SMS.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The safety management function is independent of line management and develops and maintains an effective SMS. The safety manager has access to the resources required for the proper development and maintenance of the SMS.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The highest organisational level recognises its role in the SMS and actively supports the development, implementation, maintenance, and promotion of the SMS throughout the organisation (including support departments).	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** There is clear evidence that the highest organisational level plays a pro-active role in the continuous improvement of the SMS.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA2-3 An integrated safety planning process is adopted by the organisation with published and measurable safety goals and objectives for which the executive is accountable.		
A Initiating	An ad hoc or non-existent safety planning process is utilised by the organisation. Safety goals and objectives have not been identified or documented for the implementation of a safety management system.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Identification of an appropriate SMS has been identified. A compliance gap analysis has been performed and a SMS Implementation Plan developed to meet the applicable safety regulatory requirements.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The requirements expressed in the SMS Implementation Plan have been completed. The SMS meets the regulatory requirements, but may not incorporate best (good) practice.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** An Organisation Safety Plan is published on a periodic basis with specific accountable and measurable safety management goals and targets.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The Organisation Safety Plan goals and objectives are developed and prioritized based on organisation safety risks which have been identified through trend analysis, risk assessment processes and identified system safety deficiencies. Where appropriate (considering ANSP size and complexity), the organisation is committed to share and implement ATM safety management international best (good) practice.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA2-4 Clear understanding and acceptance of safety management accountabilities and responsibilities by all relevant staff and contractors. **Commitment to continuous improvement to safety.**		
A Initiating	Knowledge of the principles underpinning SMS amongst all staff and contractors is negligible.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ All staff and contractors apply rules and procedures to their tasks in the knowledge that some of the rules and procedures need improvement. All staff and contractors are only partially aware of their roles in the SMS.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ All staff and contractors are aware of how their actions impact the safety of the wider operation and how the actions of others impact safety.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** All staff and contractors across the organisation are actively promoting and improving safety. All staff and contractors take pro-active day-to-day action to have rules and procedures changed where they identify a safety benefit by the change.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The organisation regularly reviews and assesses documented safety management responsibilities.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA3 Timely compliance with international obligations		
SA3-1 A formal SMS that meets all applicable safety requirements.		
A Initiating	There is no SMS in place. There may be deviations from safety requirements.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ The SMS is partially implemented, but it is not yet effective; it does not yet meet the safety requirements.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The essential parts of the SMS are implemented, and the organisation meets the safety requirements.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** The SMS is fully implemented and effective.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Where applicable, the organisation is committed to going beyond compliance and operating at the highest international safety standard.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA3-2 An organisation that strives to go beyond compliance, takes into account the need to ensure, in a timely manner, that there are no inconsistencies with European or national requirements or international safety standards.		
A Initiating	There is little awareness of the regional or international safety standards.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is an awareness of the European or national requirements or international safety standards. Work has started in some areas.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ European or national requirements or international safety standards are known and met as required.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** There is a process in place to address the need for timely and consistent compliance with European or national requirements or international safety standards.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The organisation has a structured mechanism to address the need for on-going and consistent compliance with European or national requirements or international safety standards. It contributes to a European, national or international dialogue to improve these requirements or standards.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA4: Safety standards and procedures		
SA4-1 Clearly defined and documented safety standards and procedures.		
A Initiating	Some safety and safety management procedures exist, but they are not complete. Operations manuals do not contain any specific safety management procedures.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ The documentation of SMS processes and procedures has started and is progressing as planned.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The documentation of the essential parts of the SMS processes and procedures is complete. The processes and procedures ensure that the organisation is compliant with all applicable safety and regulatory requirements.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** There is clear evidence that the safety and safety management documentation is readily available to all personnel in the organisation. This documentation details safety and safety management processes and procedures that meet or exceed the applicable safety and regulatory requirements.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Processes are in place and are being applied to give effect to the organisation's commitment to continuously improve safety and safety management processes and procedures.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA4-2 Clearly defined and documented safety standards and procedures.		
A Initiating	Staff have limited knowledge of SMS processes and procedures. There is no formal process that maintains the SMS, nor is there an identified authority (or authorities) responsible for the updates.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ A process to maintain all safety and safety management procedures exists, but its initial implementation is ad-hoc and not fully effective. The authority (or authorities) responsible for the updates are partially identified.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The process to maintain all safety and safety management procedures is documented and practised. Procedures are kept up-to-date on an ad-hoc basis.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** There is a formal process in place to periodically review safety and safety management procedures and ensure that they remain relevant, up-to-date, and effective. The authority (or authorities) responsible for the updates are completely identified. All safety-related procedures are documented in an appropriate manner and are known by the staff.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Changes within the organisation that could affect safety and/or the safety management framework are subjected to formal review.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA4-3 Emergency/Contingency response procedures and an emergency/contingency response plan that documents the orderly and efficient transition from normal to emergency operations and return to normal operations.		
A Initiating	The organisation has sound primary Air Traffic Management systems but does not have redundant capabilities or back-up systems.	○ A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ There are procedures and some redundant capabilities and resources to cope with abnormal and unexpected situations.	○ B
C Implementing	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ All primary systems have redundant capabilities, and emergency/contingency response procedures have been developed, documented, and distributed to appropriate staff. The emergency/contingency response plan is properly coordinated with the emergency/contingency response plans of those organisations it must interface with during the provision of its services.	○ C
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Primary Air Traffic Management systems are reliable and have redundant capabilities and back-up systems. The emergency/contingency response plan and procedures have been rehearsed through desktop or operational exercises.	○ D
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The Emergency/Contingency Response planning processes and Emergency/Contingency Procedures and Plans are regularly exercised and revised to keep them up-to-date.	○ E
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA5 Competency		
SA5-1 Staff, and contractors (where appropriate) are trained, competent in safety and safety management, and where required, licensed.		
A Initiating	Competent staff and contractors (where appropriate) are provided on an ad-hoc basis for safety and safety management activities. There are no formal competency methods (including proficiency, licensing, and training).	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Competent staff, and contractors (where appropriate) are provided and allocated based on limited planning and only for a limited number of positions related to operations and safety management activities. Competency methods are being developed.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Competency methods have been designed and are applied. An annual planning process for training is in place.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** There is a process for the training providers(s) to receive feedback on the effectiveness of training programmes; based on feedback, the training programmes are revised to improve effectiveness.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Competency methods (including proficiency, licensing, and training) are periodically reviewed and improved with industry best (good) practice adopted. Training plans cover safety and SMS activities and allow for the improvement of staff skills and competency.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA6 Risk Management		
SA6-1 A continuing risk management process that identifies, assesses, classifies, and controls all identified safety risks within the organisation, including potential future risks.		
A Initiating	There is no formal risk management process in place.	○ *A*
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ The principles of risk management are documented and understood. There is an approved plan in place to implement the risk management process.	○ *B*
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ There is an approved and structured process in place for the assessment of current and potential safety risks, but it is not yet mature. Training in risk assessment is on-going.	○ *C*
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** There is clear evidence that safety risk management is embedded within the organisation and identified safety risks are managed and controlled.	○ *D*
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Methods are in place to predict future safety risks and to mitigate these risks. The risk management processes are reviewed and improved on a periodic basis. The organisation develops best (good) practice guidelines that it shares with other ANSPs.	○ *E*
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA7 Safety interfaces		
SA7-1 Effectively managed safety-related internal interfaces (e.g. quality management system, security, and environment).		
A Initiating	The relationships between various different internal interfaces are defined; however, the interfaces operate in isolation.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Internal safety-related interfaces are managed on an informal or ad-hoc basis.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Internal safety-related interfaces are managed with a solid understanding of the boundaries and relationships between the interfaces.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Safety-related internal interfaces are coordinated, and relationships are managed through interface agreements (e.g., Letters of Agreement (LoAs), Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), Service-Level Agreements (SLAs)).	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** A process is in place to regularly identify weaknesses in agreed interface arrangements (LoAs/MoUs/SLAs etc) .	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA7-2 The effective management of external interfaces with a safety impact (e.g., MIL, airspace users, airports). Formalised processes and procedures dealing with external agreements, services, and supplies (e.g., cross-border Letters of Agreement). (NB: for certain organisations MET, CNS and/or AIS are internal interfaces of the Organisation).		
A Initiating	There are a limited number of agreements in place.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Safety-related external interfaces are managed on an informal or ad-hoc basis. Draft contractual arrangements are being prepared and negotiated for all safety-related external interfaces. Some elements are already formalised and implemented.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Safety requirements are specified and documented in appropriate agreements.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Activities with safety-related external interfaces are coordinated and relationships are managed through documented agreements. Safety requirements within contractual agreements are systematically reviewed and revised as necessary..	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** External services and suppliers are surveyed/audited and systematically monitored to identify deviations from the documented arrangements.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA8 Safety reporting, investigation and improvement		
SA 8-1 A continuing organisation-wide process to report and investigate safety occurrences and risks.		
A Initiating	There is an informal system in place for reporting safety occurrences and risks, but reports are not reviewed systematically. The reporting system is not organisation-wide. Investigation is done on an ad-hoc basis and with little or no feedback.	A
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is a plan to formalise the existing reporting and investigation system. There is commitment from management to allocate resources to implement this system. The reporting system is wide-spread but does not yet cover the whole organisation. Feedback is given on an ad-hoc basis.	B
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The system in place is commensurate with the size of the organisation. The organisation has a complete and formal system that records all reported information relevant to the SMS, including incidents and accidents. Corrective and preventive actions are taken in response to event analysis.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Identified safety-related risks and deficiencies are actively and continuously monitored and reviewed for improvement.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Personnel who report safety occurrences, risks and problems are empowered to suggest corrective actions, and there is a feedback process in place.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA8-3 "Appropriate safety information and knowledge is shared with Industry stakeholders. Information disclosure is compliant with agreed publication and confidentiality policies/agreements."		
A Initiating	Safety data and information are treated as confidential. There are no plans to release it in any way to any industry stakeholders.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Safety data and information are shared internally, but the organisation is reluctant or unwilling to share data with industry stakeholders.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Safety data and information is shared internally, nationally, and with international bodies when it is required by regulation.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** There is a clear and published policy that encourages the proactive sharing of safety-related information with other parties.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Safety data and information are actively shared internally, nationally, with recognised international bodies, and with other industry stakeholders. The organisation has a process in place to receive and act on safety data and information from external stakeholders.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA9: Safety Performance Monitoring		
SA9-1 An established and active monitoring system that uses and tracks suitable safety indicators and associated targets (e.g., lagging and leading indicators).		
A Initiating	There are no indicators, thresholds, or formal monitoring system in place to measure safety achievements and trends.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is a plan to implement a monitoring system. A limited set of indicators has been implemented.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ The safety monitoring system has been implemented and documented. Indicators and targets have been set: limited to meeting the safety requirements.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Additional indicators are also defined and monitored to meet both organisational and local safety objectives. All indicators are tracked against thresholds/targets on a regular basis. Trends are analysed for safety improvement purposes.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Safety indicators covering all aspects of the system/operations are mature and used to measure safety improvement. There are comprehensive metrics in place to measure and monitor indicators and thresholds throughout the system.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA9-2 Methods to measure safety performance, which is compared within and between ANSPs.		
A Initiating	Ad-hoc safety performance data related to individual incidents is available, but there is no systematic approach for measuring safety performance.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ The implementation of some qualitative and quantitative techniques in certain parts of the organisation has started. However, there is insufficient data to analyse.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Qualitative techniques are in place, and the implementation of quantitative techniques has started.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Safety performance is measured using statistical and other quantitative techniques. Internal comparative analysis is done, and external comparative analysis has begun.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The reporting, operational safety survey and SMS auditing programmes are integral parts of the management and operational processes. Results are used to drive further safety improvements across the organisation. Internal and external comparative analysis is well-established.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA9-3 "A general public knowledgeable of the ANSP's performance through routine publication of achieved safety levels and trends."		
A Initiating	Safety-related performance information is not made available to the public under any circumstances.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ A limited amount of safety-related performance information is made available, but only to selected authorities.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ High-level safety-related performance information is made available according to applicable requirements.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Safety performance information not governed by applicable requirements is also made available to the public.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** The organisation voluntarily makes available appropriate safety-related performance information to the general public. The achieved safety levels and trends are transparent to the general public.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA10: Operational Safety Surveys and SMS Audits		
SA10-1 Internal and independent (external) operational safety surveys and SMS audits.		
A Initiating	There is no plan to conduct systematic operational safety surveys and SMS audits. Operational safety surveys, SMS audits, and gap assessments are conducted on an ad-hoc basis (e.g., when deficiencies in the system or in working arrangements are found).	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is a plan in place to formalise the conduct of systematic operational safety surveys and SMS audits. A limited number of operational safety surveys and SMS audits have been carried out.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ Internal operational safety surveys and SMS audits are conducted on a periodic basis. Based on the output of operational safety surveys and SMS audits, a process is in place that requires the development and implementation of appropriate improvement plans.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Internal or external operational safety surveys and SMS audits are carried out in a systematic way. There is a process in place to monitor, analyse trends, and identify areas that require follow-up operational safety surveys or SMS audits. Follow-up operational safety surveys, SMS audits, and gap assessments are conducted in all areas affecting operational safety and the SMS. Operational safety surveys and SMS audits are actively reviewed to assess opportunities for system improvement.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Independent (external) operational safety surveys and SMS audits are periodically conducted. The outputs from operational safety surveys and SMS audits are incorporated as appropriate into operations or the SMS. There is a process in place that requires external data (e.g. pilot performance trend information) to be considered when selecting areas to be subject to operational safety surveys and SMS audits.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA11: Adoption and Sharing of best (good) Practices		
SA11-1 A structured approach exists to promote safety, its standing within the organisation and lessons learned through application of the SMS.		
A Initiating	There is no structured approach to promote safety and its management within the organisation. The organisation has the capability to identify lessons learnt and promote them but on an ad-hoc basis.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Ad-hoc processes are in place to gather and then promote information on safety, lessons learnt and the SMS. Some initial implementation has begun. Some internal best (good) practices practises are spread across units within the organisation, but there is no systematic structure for internal safety promotion.	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ An organisational approach has been established to promote safety, lessons learned and the SMS.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Formal methods are in place to capture safety knowledge and promote it internally. The standing of safety and its management is a consistent and expected feature in internal communication.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** Staff are encouraged to share lessons learned in order that the lessons can be promoted across the organisation. Strategies to promote safety and its management are developed by senior levels in the organisation and are being implemented. Other industries' initiatives in relation to internal safety promotion are periodically reviewed with the approach being modified on the basis of the information gathered.	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA11-2 A structured approach to gather information on operational safety and SMS best (good) practices from the industry.		
A Initiating	There is no structured approach to gather best (good) practices from the industry. The organisation has the capability to identify and adopt industry best (good) practices on an ad-hoc basis.	○ ***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ There is an ad-hoc structure in place to gather information on operational safety and SMS best (good) practices . Some initial implementation has begun. Some internal best (good) practices are spread across units within the organisation, but there is no systematic structure for the adoption of best (good) practices .	○ ***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ A structure has been established to identify applicable operational safety and SMS best (good) practices from the industry.	○ ***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Industry best (good) practices are periodically reviewed to provide the most current information, which is then assessed for applicability, and adopted as appropriate.	○ ***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** All relevant best (good) practices are readily accessible to appropriate personnel. The organisation actively participates in developing industry best (good) practices .	○ ***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

SA11-3 Sharing of safety and SMS-related best (good) practices with industry stakeholders.		
A Initiating	There are no plans to release and share best (good) practices with industry stakeholders.	***A***
B Planning/Initial Implementation	~~**All of Initiating plus:**~~ Sharing of best (good) practice is ad-hoc and takes place in response to requests for assistance from industry stakeholders.	***B***
C Implementing	~~**All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:**~~ ~~Best practices are shared with industry stakeholders as required by regulation~~. A framework or formalised process is in place to share best (good) practice with industry.	***C***
D Managing & Measuring	**All of Implementing plus:** Best (good) practices are actively shared with industry stakeholders. Sharing of safety-related best (good) practices with industry has demonstrated improved safety performance.	***D***
E Continuous Improvement	**All of Managing & Measuring plus:** SMS-related best (good) practices are pro-actively shared with industry stakeholders with the aim of improving SMS standards.	***E***
Please provide justification for selected answer		

Signed: **Name:** **Date, place:**	
Contact Telephone:	
E-Mail:	

(E) — Appendix 1 to AMC 9 SKPI — Just Culture Questionnaire — State level

Name	
Organization	
State	
Job Title	

Just Culture Questionnaire

Policy and its implementation

Policy elements related questions

ST.P.1	Is there a ~~n explicit~~ clearly identified Just Culture policy, ~~which is~~ endorsed by [the relevant Ministry or aviation authority~~]~~ ~~at appropriate State level~~ and made public?	○ **Yes** ○ **No**
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ST.P.2	Does ~~it~~ the Just Culture Policy contain a description of what is considered to be unacceptable behaviour?	○ **Yes** ○ **No**
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ST.P.3	Does ~~it~~ the Just Culture Policy refer to legal provisions which guarantee no punishment for self-reported occurrences (except for the cases defined above in question ST.P.2)?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

~~**ST.P.4**~~	~~Does it provide for legal support (e.g. counselling, court expertise etc.) for its own staff in case of prosecution / legal action related to a reported safety event?~~	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ST.P.~~5~~ 4	Does the State require a Just Culture policy in Air Navigation Service Providers?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

Roles and Responsibilities clearly defined and implemented		
ST.P.~~6~~ 5	Is the role of different State authorities and Air Navigation Service Providers in handling safety reports and the flow of information clearly defined in the State?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ST.P.~~7~~ 6	Is the safety investigation and/or analysis process within the State entirely independent from any judicial authority?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ST.P.~~8~~ 7	Does the State ~~actively strive~~ take initiatives to promote Just Culture provisions in its ~~legislative framework~~ judicial system?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

Training		
ST.P.~~9~~ 8	~~Is there a regulatory requirement~~ Does the State ensure that ~~to include~~ elements and/or courses on Just Culture are included in the training programmes for relevant staff working in the competent authority ~~and service providers~~ (~~ab initio~~ initial and ~~recurrent~~ continuation training)?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ST.P.~~10~~ 9	Are qualifications and training requirements as regards Just Culture for State safety investigators clearly defined?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

Legal/Judiciary		
Primary legislation		
ST.L.1	In case there is a Freedom of Information legislation, does it provide for exemptions applicable to safety information?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

~~**ST.L.2**~~	~~If an incident falls under Just Culture policy, are general provisions referring to potential threatening the safety of the public applicable by judicial authorities under penal law?~~	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ST.L.~~3~~ 2	Are there provisions in the law affording protection from prosecution to individuals involved in safety events, under the principles of Just Culture?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

(E) — Appendix 1 to AMC 9 SKPI — Just Culture Questionnaire — State level

Judicial procedures and specific aviation legislation		
ST.L.~~4~~ 3	Is there an entity within the State, supported by Subject Matter Experts, with clearly defined ~~rules~~ principles~~,~~ against which the Subject Matter Experts ~~which~~ decide ~~s~~ whether relevant safety events are a matter for prosecution?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ST.L.~~5~~ 4	Is there a judicial procedure to ensure that in the case of prosecution linked to an aviation accident/incident Subject Matter Experts will be involved?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ST.L.~~6~~ 5	Are the provisions of Directive 2003/42/EC on occurrence reporting in civil aviation and in particular the provisions contained in its Article 8 (Protection of information) fully and effectively implemented in the national legislation?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

Formal agreement		
ST.L.~~7~~ 6	Is there an ~~advance agreement~~ established process on exchange of information to guarantee appropriate use of safety information by police/judicial authorities?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ST.L.~~8~~ 7	Is there an agreed process to deal with interactions on aviation incident matters between the aviation authorities and judicial/police authorities?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

Occurrence reporting and investigation		
Occurrence reporting and investigation		
ST.O.1	Does the State provide regular statistical feedback to the public based on safety reports received (e.g. annual reports)?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ST.O.2	Are Subject Matter Experts involved in making the decision in cases where personnel licences/ratings could be affected?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

(F) — Appendix 1 to AMC 10 SKPI — Just Culture Questionnaire — ANSP level

Name	
Organization	
State	
Job Title	

Just Culture Questionnaire

Policy and its implementation

Policy elements related questions

ANSP.P.1	Is there an explicit Just Culture policy, which is formally endorsed by management and staff representatives and made public?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.P.2	Does the Just Culture policy contain a description of what is considered to be unacceptable behaviour?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

(F) — Appendix 1 to AMC 10 SKPI — Just Culture Questionnaire — ANSP level

ANSP.P.3	In the case of self-reported occurrences (except for the cases defined above in question ANSP.P.2), does the Just Culture policy treat the reporter justly and in accordance with the policy and principles of the service provider? ~~guarantee that no disciplinary action will be taken regarding against the reporter by the service provider for self-reported occurrences?~~	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.P.4	Does the ANSP provide legal support for its own staff in case of prosecution / legal action related to a safety occurrence?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.P.5	Is there an established and well known stress management system in place such as Critical Incident Stress Management programme?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.P.6	Does the ANSP ensure that ~~Are safety~~ actions taken in respect to staff after an occurrence preserve in full ~~without impact on~~ the pay and benefits of the staff member concerned until the end of the investigation?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

Roles and Responsibilities clearly defined and implemented		
ANSP.P.7	Are the service provider~~'s~~ safety investigators completely ~~independent and~~ separate from any line, competency or ops management?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.P.8	Do the service provider's safety investigators have full, unimpeded access to all relevant data for investigations?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.P.9	Is access to safety data clearly defined and confidentiality ensured?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.P.10	Does the ANSP ensure that ~~Are~~ the ~~staff~~ persons providing Critical Incident Stress Management clearly nominated and adequately trained?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

Training		
ANSP.P.11	Is there regular training and/or briefings on relevant legislation for safety in the context of Just Culture?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.P.12	Are the principles of Just Culture included in all relevant training curricula (~~ab-initio~~ initial and ~~recurrent~~ continuation training)?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.P.13	Are qualifications and training requirements as regards Just Culture for the ANSP's safety investigators clearly defined?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

Legal/Judiciary		
Judicial procedures and specific aviation legislation		
ANSP.L.1	Is the spirit of Directive 2003/42/EC on occurrence reporting in civil aviation and in particular the provisions of its Article 8 (Protection of information) fully transposed into internal procedures?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

Formal agreement		
ANSP.L.2	Notwithstanding the judicial independence, is there any agreement between ANSPs and judicial/police authorities to ensure protection of reported incident data and involved individuals?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.L.3	Is there an agreed process to deal with incident matters between the ANSP and its national aviation authorities?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

(F) — Appendix 1 to AMC 10 SKPI — Just Culture Questionnaire — ANSP level

Occurrence reporting and investigation		
Occurrence reporting and investigation		
ANSP.O.1	Is the identity of personnel involved in occurrences protected by staff regulations?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.O.2	Does staff subject to investigations based on occurrence reports have access to related information?	
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.O.3	Is there a procedure in place to ensure that the ~~requirement for~~ staff subject to investigation can record his/her ~~to sign their~~ comments ~~agreement / disagreement with~~ as regards the findings of investigations?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.O.4	Is there a formal ~~procedure~~ process to inform staff having reported an occurrence of the progress of the investigation?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

(F) — Appendix 1 to AMC 10 SKPI — Just Culture Questionnaire — ANSP level

ANSP.O.5	Does the ANSP provide regular feedback to staff based on occurrence reports?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.O.6	Does the public annual report of the service provider provide statistical feedback on occurrence reports?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.O.7	Has automated reporting been accepted by staff and implemented by the service provider?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

ANSP.O.8	~~Is there a separate body, involving nominated~~ Are Subject Matter Experts involved in making the decision on whether a case is an 'honest' mistake or it falls under the 'unacceptable behaviour' category?	○ Yes ○ No
Justification and remarks for selected answer		

(G) — Appendix 1 to GM45 SKPI Verification of ANSP EoSM by NSA/competent authority

It is the responsibility of the ANSP to complete the ANSP-level Effectiveness of Safety Management questionnaire and for the NSAs to verify the evidence submitted. When answering the questions there are one of five levels of implementation to be selected. The ANSP should select the implementation level that best describes their organisation and provide evidence in support of the level selected.

In order to ensure consistent interpretation of the questions the following guidance has been prepared. Table A presents a set of generic principles that are applicable to each maturity level, throughout the questionnaire. Table B presents a set of outcomes for each question that align with each implementation level. It is important to be cognisant of BOTH tables when selecting the most appropriate implementation level since the principles of both tables are applicable. To further help with the interpretation of the questions additional explanations are provided at the end of each study area group.

Respondents are reminded that the answers should be conservative and ALL required elements must be in place for a certain level. This includes the generic elements from the table A below, as well as the particular elements suggested by the questionnaire and the guidance in Table B below. Even if a certain level has only one or two elements still missing, then the level below (which has all elements in place) must be selected.

Table A – Generic Principles for each Implementation Level

Initiating	***Planning / Initial Implementation***	***Implementing***	***Managing & Measuring***	***Continuous Improvement***
• Awareness for the need for SMS exists. No specific formal implementation actions are in place or planned • The processes for managing safety are ad-hoc and/or inconsistent with the Organisation's safety obligations.	• A gap analysis has been performed. • The Organisation has an SMS Implementation Plan that is consistent with the Organisation's safety goals and obligations. • Implementation is underway but not yet completed in some major aspects.	• The Organisation has achieved the required regulatory standard. • The SMS standard processes are in use across the organisation and are producing consistent results. The results are being measured using qualitative techniques.	• SMS Implementation has been completed and both safety performance and system performance are measured and controlled using statistical and other quantitative techniques. • Quantitative safety objectives are based on customer, end user and organisational needs. • Sub-processes are developed that significantly contribute to overall organisation safety performance.	• Safety processes / systems are firmly embedded within the organisation. • The focus is on continuous improvement in operational safety and maximising the effectiveness of SMS processes through innovative improvements. • There are defined processes to set standards and improvement targets. • The effectiveness of the SMS and safety improvement actions are measured and evaluated against defined improvements criteria.
The SMS framework is very	The SMS framework is not yet	The SMS framework meets the	The SMS framework is	The SMS framework is regularly

immature or non-existent in the organisation. The SMS components and elements are not documented and have not been implemented. No Implementation Plan has been formally developed.	effective and does not yet meet the required regulatory standard. The Implementation Plan exists. The plan is not yet fully deployed.	required regulatory standard. The SMS Implementation Plan is mostly implemented.	functioning and is effective in achieving the overall safety policy and objectives of the organisation. The Organisation is identifying and adopting industry best (good) practices.	reviewed and enhanced to achieve excellence in ATM safety management. On-going planning ensures that safety management activities are integrated and drive priorities for operational safety improvement. The Organisation is setting the industry SMS best (good) practices.
The organisation is not measuring and monitoring safety performance.	*The organisation has a plan to capture information about safety performance.*	*The organisation is collecting safety reports under a controlled process, and is responding to safety issues identified as a result of individual incident investigations.*	*The organisation is measuring safety performance. It has identified its key safety risks and has developed plans for improvement.*	*The organisation is managing its key safety risks in conjunction with external stakeholders and can demonstrate improved safety performance.*

(G) — Appendix 1 to GM45 SKPI Verification of ANSP EoSM by NSA/competent authority

Table B – Example Outcomes for Each Level and Every Question

Effectiveness Levels						
ID	***Objective***	***Initiating***	***Planning / Initial Implementation***	***Implementing***	***Managing and Measuring***	***Continuous Improvement***
SA1 Development of a positive and proactive safety culture						
SA1-1	A positive and pro-active just, flexible, and informed safety culture (the shared beliefs, assumptions, and values regarding safety) that supports reporting and learning led by management.	Within the organisation, there are significant differences between what is said, what is done, and what is believed. The competent authority may be regarded as being responsible for safety. The organisation determines what safety means and generates some awareness of this throughout the organisation. Individuals may have a different understanding of how their activities contribute to safety.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ Individuals within the organisation have a good level of systematic safety management awareness. The organisation is starting to put processes in place for systematic safety management.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ A positive safety culture is developing, although it is still immature. Individuals are starting to be involved in systematic safety management.	All of Implementing plus: Staff are proactively involved in planning for and implementing systematic safety management. The organisation operates informed learning and reporting cultures, as well as a just culture with respect to errors in operations.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: Individuals across the organisation are proactively and constantly striving to improve their approach to systematic safety management. They are supported by measurement and review processes and organisational management. Experiences are openly exchanged internally and externally. Within the organisation, there is a complete alignment between what is said, what is done, and what is believed.
SA1-1	**Outcomes of the objective**	~~People who make mistakes (human errors) are blamed~~	Individuals within the organisation have a good level	A positive safety culture is developing, although it is still	Staff are proactively involved in planning for and	Individuals across the organisation are

	fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation	~~for their failure to comply with rules.~~ ~~Disciplinary action may be seen as the best way to minimize the chance of employees making errors.~~ ~~Role of management is seen as endorsing the rules, pushing employees and expecting results.~~ ~~There may be an adversarial relationship between management and employees, with little trust or respect demonstrated.~~ ~~Problems are not anticipated; the organization reacts to each one as it occurs.~~ ~~Management does not understand the kinds of mistakes that actually occur in the organisation.~~ ~~There is little learning within the organization, which tends to adopt a defensive posture when criticised.~~ ~~Incidents and accidents are addressed by "fixing the people" as opposed to understanding what and why things happened.~~ ~~Management operates strictly by "command and control".~~ ~~Processes are highly bureaucratic and centralized.~~ ~~Departments and functions~~	of systematic safety management awareness. ~~The organisation is starting to put processes in place for systematic safety management.~~ ~~Management recognizes the need to implement processes that will allow them to understand the underlying factors that contribute to accidents and incidents.~~ ~~Management, working with employees and unions, begins the development of investigative and other processes (such as over-the-shoulder checks, unit evaluations, etc.) for the purpose of improving the safety performance of the organisation.~~ ~~Management recognizes the importance of safety training and starts to develop employee participation by inviting employees to identify training needs.~~ ~~Management encourages cross-departmental and cross-functional teams and communications.~~ ~~Safety management processes may be developed in isolation and are not as integrated and effective as they could be.~~ ~~Senior managers commit the organization to improving its safety performance, and agree on a safety vision.~~	immature. This is being achieved through forums such as safety committees, SMS integration working groups and other cross-organisational groups have been established for the sharing of information and the integration of safety processes. ~~Individuals are starting to be involved in systematic safety management.~~ ~~Management believes that it is more important to understand what has happened than to find someone to blame.~~ ~~The organisation has developed operational rules and procedures to support a just culture and to encourage self reporting~~ ~~Management works closely with union representatives to ensure that labour relations are positive and that labour contracts do not contribute to a "punitive climate".~~ ~~The organisation is somewhat open to learning from other companies, especially techniques and best practices.~~ ~~Management recognizes that suppliers and contractors may impact safety performance, and looks to understand and address those impacts before safety performance is affected.~~ ~~Trends identified through reporting and investigation are~~	implementing systematic safety management. It is expected that: ~~The organisation operates informed learning and reporting cultures, as well as a just culture with respect to errors in operations.~~ ~~Relationship between management and employees is respectful and supportive.~~ ~~A Just Culture Policy is extended to include all employees in the organization.~~ ~~An increase is seen in the number of reports being submitted by employees.~~ ~~Management realizes that an increase in the number of incident reports may well be an indication of a strong just culture. An increase in reporting is not seen negatively.~~ ~~Standards of accountability are applied consistently to everyone in the organisation.~~ ~~Management seeks the active involvement of employees in improving safety.~~ ~~Employees report not only safety concerns but also their own errors.~~ ~~People are adequately trained to perform their safety related duties.~~ ~~Information flows more freely as hierarchies are flattened and rank defers to technical~~	proactively and constantly striving to improve their approach to systematic safety management.~~They are supported by measurement and review processes and organisational management.~~ ~~Experiences are openly exchanged internally and externally.~~ ~~Within the organisation, there is a complete alignment between what is said, what is done, and what is believed.~~ ~~Management's role is seen as coaching people to improve safety performance.~~ ~~Managers encourage employees to share information in order to assist with the further improvement of existing processes.~~ ~~Employees share safety-related information, even cases of human error that would probably not have been identified.~~ ~~All types of information are openly and proactively shared up and down as well as across the organization for the~~

		behave as semi-autonomous units, with little collaboration or shared decision making. Conflicts are not resolved, departments and functions compete with each other. Safety is seen as a technical issue; mere compliance with rules and regulations is seen as adequate. There is a limited understanding of the hazards and risk associated with operations. There is limited understanding of the impact that changes may have on departments, functions, or the safety performance of the organisation. There are limited, if any, means for measuring the safety performance of the organisation. Management operates strictly by "command and control". Processes are highly bureaucratic and centralized. Departments and functions behave as semi-autonomous units, with little collaboration or shared decision making. Conflicts are not resolved, departments and functions	Senior managers formulate safety policy and communicate it to the workforce. Implementation is begun of a Safety Management System that looks to meet the needs of the organisation based on the CANSO Standard of Excellence in Safety Management Systems. An analysis is conducted to determine the gap between which SMS elements are already in place and what a fully implemented SMS requires. Senior management has formulated and communicated to the workforce a corporate safety policy. The SMS and training to support its implementation are under development. Communication on safety starts to develop ,although it is strictly related to safety occurrences.	used to improve process, procedures, etc. and are shared across operational units. Safety Training is seen as an important element of a learning culture and management provides the necessary support and resources. There is an expectation across the organization of co-operation rather than indifference or conflict. Employees view themselves as being part of a single team, not in competition with other departments. Senior managers function as a team and begin to co-ordinate departmental and functional decisions. People recognize and state the need for collaboration between departments and functions. Management provides the support, recognition, and resources necessary for collaborative work. Senior management encourage managers' awareness that good safety performance is good for business. Managers establish safety performance measures and analyse statistics to establish trends. They share this information with employees.	expertise during periods of high activity. People are willing to cross organizational boundaries to share safety information and concerns. The organisation invests heavily in the quality, motivation, and experience of its first-line supervisors. Processes are put in place to find ways to improve SMS integration across the organisation. The existence of conflict is recognized and addressed by searching for mutually beneficial solutions. There is no goal conflict between safety and production performance, so that safety is not jeopardized in pursuit of production targets. The organisation operates a best-in-class Safety Management System. There is a clear understanding of the hazards and risks associated with operations. It is understood that safe operations are the outcome of a positive interaction between Best Practices SMS and a sound safety culture. Decisions are made in full knowledge of their safety impact on work or processes as well as on department and	improvement of safety performance. Management cooperates with customers, suppliers, and contractors to improve their safety performance. When needed, the organisation can shift from centralized control to a decentralized mode in which the guidance of local operations depends largely on the professionalism of first-line supervisors. Management values and continuously encourages employees to forward ideas and suggestions for ways to improve safety performance. All individuals in the organisation feel personably responsible for safety. Senior managers make comparisons with external organisations chosen as benchmarks. Management undertakes a leadership role in creating and communicating the future safety vision for their organisation. The organisation looks to continuously improve and enhance its Safety

		~~compete with each other.~~ ~~Safety is seen as a technical issue; mere compliance with rules and regulations is seen as adequate.~~ ~~There is a limited understanding of the hazards and risk associated with operations.~~ ~~There is limited understanding of the impact that changes may have on departments, functions, or the safety performance of the organisation.~~ ~~There are limited, if any, means for measuring the safety performance of the organisation.~~ Safety is not recognised as a priority within the organisation and is strictly dealt with as required by the Regulations. Within the organisation there are • Low levels of trust • Lack of appreciation for the role the organisation plays in safety • Lack of accountabilities for safety outcomes Management gives little to no importance to safety issues.		~~Critical mechanisms for improving the sharing of information are established, such as executive management safety committees, management/employee safety committees, etc.~~ ~~Implementation of the Safety Management System is completed.~~ ~~All are aware of their duties and accountabilities as they relate to the safety management system.~~ The reporting and investigation system includes accidents, incidents, hazardous situations and precursor data. All employees are aware of their duties and accountabilities as they relate to safety. A reporting and investigation 'regime' has been established. Safety reports are produced but they are not proactive.	~~functions across the whole organisation.~~ ~~Everyone is kept informed of and adequately prepared for changes that may affect safety.~~ ~~Safety performance targets are set, measured and weaknesses identified and addressed.~~ • Safety performance measures have been identified and implemented. • Safety performance targets have been set and measured, and weaknesses identified and addressed. • The organisation has committed resources to collect, maintain and analyse safety data. **This category may only be selected if a formal (i.e. not an ad-hoc process) Safety Culture measurement has been performed, such as the EUROCONTROL Safety Culture Survey or similar.**	~~Management System.~~ Management undertakes a leadership role in creating and communicating the future safety vision for their organisation. On-going contacts are established with external stakeholders such as airlines, aviation associations, airports and other ANSPs in order to collect and address safety concerns. The organisation has developed and implemented methods for sharing lessons learnt. The organisation looks to continuously improve and enhance its Safety Management System **A safety culture measurement must have been made and targets set for the organisation to select this level.**

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SA1	~~Possible verification questions~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~Is there any regulatory input into your Safety Culture?~~ ~~If so, to what level? How is this impacting your progress in implementing Safety Culture?~~ ~~What is the role of management in leading Safety Culture?~~

SA1-2	Regular measurement of safety culture and an improvement programme.	The organisation does not see the need to have a safety culture measuring mechanism in place.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ The organisation is aware of the need to have periodic measurements of safety culture in place, as well as an improvement plan. However, what will be measured, and when, is still being defined.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ Safety culture is measured and results are available. An improvement plan addresses the need for individuals to be aware of, and support, the organisation's shared beliefs, assumptions and values regarding safety.	All of Implementing plus: The organisation assesses its safety culture on a regular basis and implements improvements to any identified weaknesses. Safety Culture enablers and barriers are identified, and solutions to reduce barriers are being implemented.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: All personnel are pro-active and committed to improving safety. Safety Culture Surveys confirm that, within the organisation, there is a high level of alignment between what is said, what is done, and what is believed. Organisational management approves a continuous improvement plan.
SA1-2	**Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation**	There is no attempt to measure or improve the organisation's safety culture. ~~No consideration is given to the impact of culture on the safety performance of the organisation.~~ ~~The implementation of SMS may be negatively affected if areas of safety culture deficiencies are not identified~~	There is a growing awareness of the impact of cultural issues in the workplace. ~~The importance of safety culture and the role it plays in supporting SMS implementation is starting to be understood. It is recognized that the success of the SMS depends upon a positive safety culture.~~ Based on the operational context of the organisation, a model of safety culture has been defined. Safety culture drivers have	Management becomes cognizant of the need to address safety culture issues in order to support new SMS processes. ~~Awareness campaigns and training on safety culture are introduced to all employees.~~ ~~Tools are developed and utilized for the measurement of safety culture, primarily in operational groups.~~ ~~Improvement plans focus on improving the initiating elements of a positive safety culture by instilling just culture~~	People are aware of the impact of cultural issues and consider these factors in key decisions. ~~A wide variety of tools and processes (i.e., surveys, focus groups, evaluations, observations, etc.) are used to assess safety culture across the organization.~~ ~~Improvement plans shift towards using improved reporting to enhance the informed and learning cultures across the entire organisation.~~	Safety and production are seen as interdependent and not mutually exclusive. ~~Top management is knowledgeable of the barriers and enablers to safety culture, and fully support efforts to eliminate barriers and enhance enablers.~~ ~~Safety culture assessment tools are used in a more targeted manner to further refine and enhance key safety~~

		~~and addressed.~~ ~~New SMS procedures and processes may not be followed or will be ineffective.~~	been identified. Awareness campaigns and training on safety culture are being introduced to all employees.~~to management.~~ ~~Management works with labour organisations in order to plan safety culture measurement and enhancement initiatives.~~ The organisation is researching how to measure safety culture.	~~and reporting cultures within the operational areas of the company.~~ Tools such as climate surveys and workshops have been developed and used to measure safety culture. Results of measurement efforts have been evaluated, areas for improvement identified and an action plan developed. In concert with employee representatives, a plan, including a communications plan, for safety culture assessment and enhancement has been developed and implemented. **At least one safety culture measurement must have been undertaken and finalised, with results available.**	A regular cycle of safety culture measurement has been agreed upon, e.g., once every two years. Feedback is provided to management and employees on the results of the assessment and plans for enhancement. **More than a single survey must have been undertaken and finalised in the past 3 to 5 years.**	~~culture enablers.~~ ~~Improvement plans look to all areas of the company, and focus on the flexible culture within the organization as well as enhancing the enablers to the other safety culture elements.~~ ~~People are rewarded for improving processes as well as results.~~ Assessment of safety culture has been expanded outside the operational groups. Action plans for enhancing safety culture, including continuous improvement, have been implemented. Levels of safety culture are improving over time.
~~**SA1-2**~~	~~**Possible verification questions**~~	~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~If low maturity:~~ ~~Why do you think measurement is not needed?~~ ~~How do you ensure improvement if you do not measure?~~				

		~~If signs of positive maturity level:~~ ~~How are measurements being done?~~ ~~What do you do with the measurements?~~ ~~Who are they available to?~~ ~~How are they made available?~~

SA1-3	**An open climate for reporting and investigation of occurrences.**	Management believes there are no issues regarding the existing reporting and investigation culture and therefore does not see the need for any activity or dialogue with the staff in this area.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ Discussions between staff and management to define an open reporting and investigation climate are underway. However, there is no agreed policy in place yet.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ Safety data-sharing and publication policies are supported by the staff. Safety data are sufficiently protected from external interference within legal limits.	All of Implementing plus: Within the organisation, the line between acceptable and unacceptable mistakes is established and known by the staff. Just reporting and investigation culture principles are in place and systematically applied within the organisation.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: Under certain legal regimes, there is a clear and published policy on how dialogue with judicial authorities and media is established and followed.
SA1-3	**Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation**	~~Individuals do not feel sufficiently responsible for safety, see little benefit in reporting problems that they observe, and fear retribution.~~ ~~Reporting is limited, and focused on accidents and incidents as opposed to precursors.~~ ~~Management tends to dissuade employees from sharing "bad news". At the same time there may be the belief that no news is good news.~~	Management begins to recognize the need for a just culture within the organization. ~~Management's response to mistakes is to put more controls in place via procedures and retraining. There tends to be less blaming.~~ Management, in close cooperation with union representatives and employees, begins development of a JC policy for all operational staff. ~~Efforts are undertaken to improve management/ employee relations and to improve trust.~~ Management begins to recognize the value of safety reporting. ~~need for more safety information.~~ ~~Management begins discussions with union~~	~~Management strongly encourages employees to report any safety concerns that they might have.~~ The organization has a confidential safety reporting program that allows all employees to report safety concerns that they might have. ~~The organization has established the necessary procedures, processes, and tools for collecting safety-related occurrence data.~~ The organization has established the necessary procedures, processes and tools for collecting hazard and system safety deficiencies from across the company, providing feedback to reporters, and disseminating lessons learned.	Reporting is not limited to accidents and incidents, but also extends to collection of precursor data, such as situations where there was no loss of separation but safety was not assured. ~~The necessary action is taken to address safety issues that have been identified, and mechanisms are in place to provide prompt feedback to incident reporters.~~ ~~Honest information flows up the organisation, ensuring that management has the necessary information to make critical decisions; in other words, telling the truth is more important than looking good.Self-assessment of safety performance, including the application of the SMS along with a comprehensive~~	~~Senior management is focused on obtaining the safety data necessary to reduce the rate of serious incidents and accidents, and recognizes that collecting increasing quantities of precursor data is essential.~~ Employees recognize the essential role of safety reporting, trust management to treat them fairly, and believe that their safety concerns will be investigated thoroughly and openly. Employees are comfortable reporting safety concerns directly to their supervisors, not just confidentially to the safety department. ~~The organisation seeks to~~

		There is no guarantee against penalties arising from the reporting of incidents. There is not trust between management and staff.	~~representatives to establish the processes necessary for collecting safety information such as a confidential safety reporting program, occurrence reporting processes, and reporting of maintenance errors and significant outages.~~ ~~The organisation has committed to developing the necessary reporting system(s), including the allocation of appropriate resources.~~	~~Safety reporting is increasing across the company.~~ Staff are protected and incident reporting is confidential.	~~corrective action programme, is established.~~ ~~Understanding achieved through a variety of means, including reporting, lessons learned, investigation, and self-assessment, is used to modify and improve safety processes throughout the organisation.~~ ~~Increased incident reporting, investigation, and analysis, and a proactive approach to understanding and addressing underlying factors and precursors, is likely to lead to an associated decrease in the most serious incidents.~~ A just culture policy has been adopted by the organisation for employees, including operational staff. The organisation has developed operational rules and procedures that support a just culture and encourage self-reporting (i.e., a well-defined process, such as a decision tree, for dealing with rule violations, including routine violations). A confidential reporting system, with feedback	~~collect safety concerns not only internally but externally from stakeholders as well.~~ ~~Based on information gathered through SMS processes, the organisation has a realistic view of risk, and anticipates problems and deals with their causes before they occur.~~ ~~Learning from outside the organization is valued.~~ ~~Time and resources are made available to acquire and adapt such knowledge to improve safety performance.~~

					processes to those who raise safety concerns, is in place for all employees, .	
SA1-3	**Possible verification questions** Additional explanations	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~If low maturity:~~ ~~Why does the management believe there is no need for an open climate?~~ ~~Is there an intention to put a policy regarding reporting and investigation of occurrences?~~ ~~If more positive maturity level:~~ ~~How is safety data protected?~~ ~~How is safety data published?~~ ~~How do staff feel about safety data being published?~~ ~~Who draws the line between acceptable and unacceptable mistakes?~~ ~~What mechanisms are in place for dialogue with judicial authorities?~~ **Individuals:** Means individual employees within the organisation whose responsibilities have a direct impact, or potential impact, on safety. **Management:** These are the people within the organisation who are accountable for safety and make the decisions that affect safety. **Measurement:** This refers not just to the fact that measurement takes place but to how things are measured. It refers to using the appropriate statistical and other quantitative techniques. These should be listed in the Justification paragraph. **Organisation:** In this context it means all those parts of the ANSP involved in ATM Safety. Where the ANSP is a Member of a formally established FAB and if this measurement is conducted at the level of the FAB, then 'organisation-wide' they can refer to the FAB and all other references to 'organisation' must be consistent with this approach. **Staff:** All those individual personnel, operational and technical, with a safety responsibility within their job description.			

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SA2 Organisational and individual safety responsibilities						
SA2-1	An approved, clearly documented, and recognised system for the management of safety. Management structure, responsibilities, accountabilities and authorities are clearly defined and documented.	No formal designation of authorities, responsibilities or accountabilities for the management of safety exists.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ Safety authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities have been identified but not yet formalized. Line managers assume responsibility for safety.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ Authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities for the management of safety have been defined and documented. Delineation of responsibility for the development, oversight and implementation of the SMS is clearly understood[1].	All of implementation plus: Procedures are in place to address the need to review safety authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities after any significant organisational change.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: Safety authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities are periodically reviewed to determine whether they are suitable and effective (i.e., continuous improvement of safety management).
SA2-1	**Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation**		~~Safety accountability procedure is in place. It may be associated with a list of staff who have safety accountabilities~~ Initial safety accountabilities are identified. A list of staff who have safety responsibilities is	Safety accountabilities of senior managers are documented. Safety accountability matrix that shows a complete and consistent stet of accountabilities is produced. ~~The organisation can~~	~~Safety r~~Responsibilities are clear and without overlap. ~~The organisation can provide an evidence that responsibilities are reviewed on a regulation basis and following any organisational change.~~	~~The organisation can provide an evidence that data on the effectiveness of safety management, and safety accountabilities and responsibilities of managers is~~ Evidence shows that data on the effectiveness of safety

[1] Line management is usually responsible for the implementation of procedures or practices which are required by the SMS, whilst specific responsibility for the development and oversight of the SMS and the organisation's safety outcomes centre in safety departments, executive management and board oversight committees depending on the structure and governance of the organisation.

			established.	~~provide an evidence which shows that safety accountabilities are being discharged.~~ Evidence shows that safety responsibilities are being delegated. SMS ownership is clearly documented.	Evidence shows that responsibilities are reviewed on 1) a regular basis, and 2), following any organisational change.	management and safety accountability/ responsibilities of managers are gathered and used to drive a process of continuous improvement
SA2-1	~~**Possible verification questions**~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~				

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SA2-2	A clearly defined safety management function/safety manager that is independent of line management.	A safety management function has not yet been appointed to develop the SMS.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ A safety management function has been appointed to develop and maintain the SMS.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ The safety management function is independent of line management and develops and maintains an effective SMS. The safety manager has access to the resources required for the proper development and maintenance of the SMS.	All of implementation plus: The highest organisational level recognises its role in the SMS and actively supports the development, implementation, maintenance, and promotion of the SMS throughout the organisation (including support departments).	All of Managing & Measuring plus: There is clear evidence that the highest organisational level plays a pro-active role in the continuous improvement of the SMS.
SA2-2	**Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation**		The Safety Manager has been appointed An SMS Implementation Plan has been produced Governance structure for the SMS has been approved and published.	~~The organisation can provide an e~~Evidence shows that the Safety Manager is providing effective and efficient challenge to proactively manage safety within the ANSP An SMS Resource plan exists.~~is in place~~ Safety Governance structures ~~are in place~~ (e.g., review board and/or safety action group) are in place.~~eg Review board and Safety action Group)~~	~~The organisation can provide evidences:~~ ~~That the SMS is fully embedded, within the organisation;~~ ~~That safety is considered in every investment decision;~~ ~~Of senior management support for safety.~~ Evidence shows that: • the SMS is fully embedded within the organisation; • safety is considered in every investment decision; senior management support for safety.	Evidence shows ~~Evidences exist~~ that safety and safety management have become a way of life in the organisation and drive decisions at all levels in the ANSP.
SA2-2	~~**Possible**~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~				

	~~**verification questions**~~	~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~How is the SMS maintained, promoted and continuously improved?~~

SA2-3	An integrated safety planning process is adopted by the organisation with published and measurable safety goals and objectives for which the executive is accountable.	An ad hoc or non existent safety planning process is utilised by the organisation. Safety goals and objectives have not been identified or documented for the implementation of a safety management system.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ Identification of an appropriate SMS has been identified. A compliance gap analysis has been performed and a SMS Implementation Plan developed to meet the applicable safety regulatory requirements.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ The requirements expressed in the SMS Implementation Plan have been completed. The SMS meets the regulatory requirements, but may not incorporate best (good) practices.	All of Implementing plus: An Organisation Safety Plan is published on a periodic basis with specific accountable and measurable safety management goals and targets.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: The Organisation Safety Plan goals and objectives are developed and prioritized based on organisation safety risks which have been identified through trend analysis, risk assessment processes and identified system safety deficiencies. Where appropriate (considering ANSP size and complexity), the organisation is committed to share and implement ATM safety management international best (good) practices.
SA2-3	**Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation**		There is evidence of a gap analysis between established procedure and the proposed SMS. Regulatory requirements are identified. SMS structure is agreed upon. A SMS Implementation plan is produced.	SMS Implementation Plan is completed. SMS is in place Evidences can be provided that the SMS addresses the regulatory requirements.	Organisation Safety Plan is in place. Measurable safety goals/targets exists.	The organisation understands its major safety risks The organisation Safety Plan identifies mitigations for key risks. The effectiveness of both SMS and Safety Plan are measured and the information used to

			~~SMS Implementation Plan is available.~~ ~~Evidence of gap analysis from established procedures to proposed SMS.~~			improve them on a continuous cycle.
SA2-3	**~~Possible verification questions~~**	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~What were the results of the gap analysis?~~ ~~How are the organisation safety objectives defined?~~ ~~Who is accountable for safety objectives?~~ ~~How often are safety objective revisited?~~				

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SA 2-4	Clear understanding and acceptance of safety management accountabilities and responsibilities by all relevant staff and contractors. Commitment to continuous improvement to safety.	Knowledge of the principles underpinning SMS amongst all staff and contractors is negligible.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ All staff and contractors apply rules and procedures to their tasks in the knowledge that some of the rules and procedures need improvement. All staff and contractors are only partially aware of their roles in the SMS.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ All staff and contractors are aware of how their actions impact the safety of the wider operation and how the actions of others impact safety.	All of implementation plus: All staff and contractors across the organisation are actively promoting and improving safety. All staff and contractors take pro-active day-to-day action to have rules and procedures changed where they identify a safety benefit by the change.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: The organisation regularly reviews and assesses documented safety management responsibilities.
SA2-4	**Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation**		Evidence shows that s~~S~~taff are ~~beginning~~ starting to become aware of the importance of a formal SMS. Evidence shows ~~exists~~ that procedures ~~that are~~ available as part of the developing SMS are starting to be applied.	Evidence shows that employees ~~The organisation can provide evidence that staff and contractors~~ are aware of how they ~~all~~ contribute the safety of the operation and why it is important that formal SMS is agreed and applied.	Evidence shows that : • safety and safety management are now core disciplines within the organisation; • safety is one of the key considerations in every part of the ANSP from operational units to finances and ~~HR~~ human resources departments	Evidence shows that the effectiveness of the ~~safety management system~~ SMS is continually assessed and that the data gathered are used in a cycle of continuous improvement.
SA2-4	~~**Possible verification questions**~~ Additional explanations	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~				

		~~How do you make staff and contractors aware of the SMS?~~ ~~How do you know how much individuals are aware of how their actions impact the safety of operations?~~ ~~Give examples of individual actions for SMS improvement~~ **Accountability:** The person who is accountable has ultimate responsibility (liability) for safety and ensuring that those who are responsible for safety undertake their duties effectively and efficiently, i.e. 'the Buck stops here'. **Appropriate:** In this context means providing an SMS that meets the needs of your organisation. It is realised that smaller organisations have less complex processes than larger ANSPs. However, the chosen SMS must be Justified and clear Evidence of its suitability given below. **Authority**: The person who is required to perform a certain safety management task is given all internal means to e.g. access the necessary data, avail of needed resources, experts etc. **Clear evidence:** It must be shown that the CEO/Board have clear accountabilities in regard to safety and evidence of this must be shown below. E.g. Example of CEO's written accountability and examples of how he/she takes a proactive role in improving safety. **Contractor:** In the context of this survey 'contractor' refers **to internal** 'contracted" staff with safety significant tasks and not external contractors. E.g. the IT department may have been outsourced, but the staff is on-site and for everyday work are working alongside permanent staff and operate under the rules. External 'contracted' staff are dealt with through external interfaces which are assessed in study area 7. **Delineation:** In this context means that accountabilities, responsibilities etc. are described and written down in detail. **Documentation:** A formal statement, documentation, or equivalent, endorsed by top management and/or Board is required. **Highest organisational level:** Means that post with overall accountability for Safety. E.g. the CEO. **Independent of Line Management:** Means an individual can exercise authority without reference to their line management and reports directly to a senior post without going through line management. E.g. Safety Manager reports directly to CEO **Integrated safety planning process:** Means that the process covers the entire organisation (not just single units) and is accountable to the highest level of the ANSP. E.g. the CEO/Board are accountable for the process.

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SA3 Timely compliance with international obligations						
SA3-1	**A formal SMS that meets all applicable safety requirements.**	There is no SMS in place. There may be deviations from safety requirements.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ The SMS is partially implemented, but it is not yet effective; it does not yet meet the safety requirements.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ The essential parts of the SMS are implemented, and the organisation meets the safety requirements.	All of Implementing plus: The SMS is fully implemented and effective. Operations are monitored regularly to identify deviations.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: Where applicable, the organisation is committed to going beyond compliance and operating at the highest international safety standard.
SA3-1	**Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation**		ANSP has a plan to implement a SMS and is working towards the goal through a prioritised program.	A compliant SMS is implemented ~~in place is compliant to the requirements~~.	The SMS is an effective management system which is assisting in decision making at the very highest levels.	The ANSP has recognised that there is benefit for its operations in having a mature SMS. There is a plan in place for reaching the highest international safety standards.
SA3-1	~~**Possible verification questions**~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~Do you have any intention to go beyond the regulatory requirements? (If yes, further explanation could be requested)~~				

SA3-2	**An organisation that strives to go beyond compliance, takes into account the need to ensure, in a timely manner, that there are no inconsistencies with European or national requirements or international safety standards.**	There is little awareness of the regional or international safety standards.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ There is an awareness of the European or national requirements or international safety standards. Work has started in some areas.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ European or national requirements or international safety standards are known and met as required.	All of Implementing plus: There is a process in place to address the need for timely and consistent compliance with European or national requirements or international safety standards.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: The organisation has a structured mechanism to address the need for ongoing and consistent compliance with European or national requirements or international safety standards. It contributes to a European, national or international dialogue to improve these requirements or standards.
SA3-2	**Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation**		A gap analysis has been completed, and areas of non-compliance are known and prioritised for action.	Compliance differences have been filed.	The organisation is compliant with new requirements ahead of the effective date. Embedded management processes (including audit) monitor practices to test internal compliance.	The organisation can identify areas of its operations which further legislative requirements are needed to improve safety standards.
SA3-~~2~~	‘	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~How do you follow the on-going development of European requirements and international standards?~~ ~~Could you provide an example of implementation of safety requirement before it enters into force?~~				

		Applicable: Means all those safety requirements laid down by State and International bodies. E.g. State Safety Plan, SES Regulations, etc. **Evidence:** Within the Evidence box you must show how you contribute and provide clear evidence of how contribute to national and international standards. Structured mechanisms must be clearly identified. **Examples:** Clear examples of going beyond compliance have to be provided (more than one). **Going beyond compliance**: Means not just meeting the requirements but doing so before the deadline and having things in place that go beyond the basic requirement. The 'applicable' safety requirements are often the 'minimum' standard required and it is feasible to reach higher levels of safety by implementing additional safety measures. To achieve this level ANSPs must demonstrate that they have not only achieved the applicable safety requirements but have also gone beyond that level of compliance. **International Safety Standards:** These are standards recognised by international organisations such as ICAO, EUROCONTROL, CANSO, EASA, etc. **Measurement is essential:** an indication of the potential differences with regulations, time to compliance, or other relevant metrics. **Monitored regularly:** Justification and Evidence of the methods used to monitor and evidence of the monitoring will be required. **Organisation** In this context it means all those parts of the ANSP involved in ATM Safety. Where the ANSP is a Member of a formally established FAB and if this survey is conducted at the level of the FAB, then 'organisation-wide' can refer to the FAB and all other references to 'organisation'must be consistent with this approach. **Process:** Give details on the process to ensure compliance and measurements used to monitor this process, such as number of regulations per year, people involved directly, average time to compliance, number of findings (if applicable) from audits, etc. **Safety Requirements:** Means all those safety requirements laid down by State and International bodies that you have to meet. E.g. State Safety Plan, SES and BR Regulations etc. **Timely and Consistent Compliance:** Means that the organisation consistently meets all deadlines set and has a process in place to ensure this happens. However, just having a process in place is not the same as meeting the target or implementing a specific project. **Timely Manner:** Means that all requirements and standards are met well within any deadlines set.

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SA4 Safety standards and procedures						
SA4-1	**Clearly defined and documented safety standards and procedures.**	Some safety and safety management procedures exist, but they are not complete. Operations manuals do not contain any specific safety management procedures.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ The documentation of SMS processes and procedures has started and is progressing as planned.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ The documentation of the essential parts of the SMS processes and procedures is complete. The processes and procedures ensure that the organisation is compliant with all applicable safety and regulatory requirements.	All of Implementing plus: There is clear evidence that the safety and safety management documentation is readily available to all personnel in the organisation. This documentation details safety and safety management processes and procedures that meet or exceed the applicable safety and regulatory requirements.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: Processes are in place and are being applied to give effect to the organisation's commitment to continuously improve safety and safety management processes and procedures.
SA4-1	**Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation**		The following documentation exists: • SMS policy statement ~~is in place~~ • Documented SMS framework • SMS ~~initial~~ implementation plan ~~is adopted~~ • Initial SMS documentation	Documented Compliance with Regulatory requirements	SMS published and available to all staff in the organisation Identification of best practice Compliance with best practice – to exceed regulatory requirements	The effectiveness of the organisations safety standards and procedures is measured and procedures are regularly updated to ensure that they reflect evolving best practice – i.e. better, quicker and more effective. Benchmarking against external organisations and sharing of best practice is an on-going activity.
SA4-1	**~~Possible verification questions~~**	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~				

		~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~Why are there some safety and safety management procedures not included in the operational manuals? Is there any intention to include these? If not, why not?~~ ~~How are safety standards and procedures made available to staff?~~ ~~What is the process to improve them?~~

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SA4-2	**Clearly defined and documented safety standards and procedures.**	Staff have limited knowledge of SMS processes and procedures. There is no formal process that maintains the SMS, nor is there an identified authority (or authorities) responsible for the updates.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ A process to maintain all safety and safety management procedures exists, but its initial implementation is ad-hoc and not fully effective. The authority (or authorities) responsible for the updates are partially identified.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ The process to maintain all safety and safety management procedures is documented and practised. Procedures are kept up-to-date on an ad-hoc basis.	All of Implementing plus: There is a formal process in place to periodically review safety and safety management procedures and ensure that they remain relevant, up-to-date, and effective. The authority (or authorities) responsible for the updates are completely identified. All safety-related procedures are documented in an appropriate manner and are known by the staff.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: Changes within the organisation that could affect safety and/or the safety management framework are subjected to formal review.
SA4-2	**Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation**	~~Staff are aware of the existence of the SMS, but are not familiar with the content or what they are required to do. It is hard to obtain a controlled and accurate copy of the SMS.~~ ~~The SMS exists, but is not up-to-date or formally maintained.~~ SMS documentation is not subject to	The process for maintaining the SMS ~~is documented and~~ is documented ~~well understood,~~ but not yet implemented. Uncontrolled and out-of-date copies of the manual may still be ~~SMS~~ ~~are~~ used locally within the organisation. Responsibility for ownership and maintenance is known and documented for only some ~~of some part of the SMS is identified. The remaining~~ parts of the SMS ~~are not formally maintained or up-to-date~~.	The SMS development processes are well understood and follow the formally documented processes. The procedures are controlled and the issue status is known, but they are not all up-to-date as a formal and regular review and update cycle has not yet been instigated	The SMS update process is well understood and managed ~~effectively~~. Authorities maintain the individual sections for which they are responsible ~~for~~ according to a periodic review cycle. All safety documents and procedures are up-to-date. All safety documents and procedures are easily accessible to staff. ~~The SMS is demonstrably up-to-date and made available to~~	All changes are subject to an impact assessment of ~~on~~ the SMS before they are implemented. ~~The SMS is continually updated and reviewed to improve its efficiency and effectiveness.~~ A well-established SMS change management process is in place and is continually reviewed to improve its efficiency and effectiveness.

		regular review and update. Staff familiarity with the SMS is low. Accessibility to SMS documents is low and not well understood.			~~all staff that require it.~~	
~~**SA4-2**~~	~~**Possible verification questions**~~	~~Why have you sored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~How do you ensure that safety and safety management procedures are kept relevant, up to date and effective?~~ ~~How are staff informed of updates to safety and safety management procedures?~~ ~~How often are safety and safety management procedures are updated?~~				

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SA4-3	**Emergency/Contingency response procedures and an emergency/contingency response plan that documents the orderly and efficient transition from normal to emergency operations and return to normal operations.**	The organisation has sound primary Air Traffic Management systems but does not have redundant capabilities or back-up systems.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ There are procedures and some redundant capabilities and resources to cope with abnormal and unexpected situations.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ All primary systems have redundant capabilities, and emergency/contingency response procedures have been developed, documented, and distributed to appropriate staff. The emergency/contingency response plan is properly coordinated with the emergency/contingency response plans of those organisations it must interface with during the provision of its services.	All of Implementing plus: Primary Air Traffic Management systems are reliable and have redundant capabilities and back-up systems. The emergency/contingency response plan and procedures have been rehearsed through desktop or operational exercises.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: The Emergency/Contingency Response planning processes and Emergency/Contingency Procedures and Plans are regularly exercised and revised to keep them up-to-date.
SA4-3	**Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation**	~~The description of each level of implementation could be considered self explanatory in terms of outcomes.~~ No emergency response planning has been carried out. No planned redundant capabilities exist.	The primary risks to the organisation from abnormal and unexpected situations have been analysed. Emergency response procedures are documented for the most likely abnormal situations. Redundant capabilities are in place for high-risk functions.	Redundant capabilities are in place for all primary systems. Emergency response procedures have been published. An emergency response plan has been published. The emergency response plan has been co-ordinated with interfacing organisations.	Redundant capabilities and back-ups exist for all primary systems. The schedule for rehearsal of the emergency response plan and procedures has been determined.	The schedule for regularly reviewing the organisation's key risks has been determined. Regular lessons learnt exercises are conducted on the effectiveness of the emergency response plan. To reach level E ANSPs must demonstrate that their emergency/ contingency response planning process is exercised on a regular

						basis and there is a process in place to ensure that the procedures are revised and kept up-to-date. In practical terms this means that contingency plans must be exercised either in real time if feasible or, if not, by simulation.
SA4~~-3~~	~~**Possible verification questions**~~ Additional explanations	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~How often do you review your contingency plans?~~ ~~Who is accountable for the whole contingency planning process?~~ ~~How often training of the contingency plan implementation is given to the staff?~~ **Ad-Hoc:** Means that plans are only developed as and when required and there is no formal planning process. **Authorities:** In the context of this survey this means those posts within the ANSP who are Accountable for Safety. **Documentation:** Documentation must be readily available to all staff, including those in remote locations. Intranet-based libraries are fine, however, there must be a process in place to ensure the documentation is updated and to check how easily it is accessible. Manuals buried in a library or web links that need countless clicks to access are not good examples, nor are those where personnel has to go through a complex registration procedure to access the documents. **Emergency/contingency response plans:** These must have been exercised, either through actual events, where practicable, or through simulation. **Examples:** Examples of such processes must be given. What are the resources allocated? Are these processes systematic or ad-hoc? **Formal Process:** This is an established formal process in place that is documented and approved at the highest level within the ANSP. **Formal Review:** This is an established formal review process in place that is documented and approved at the top level within the ANSP. **Organisation:** In this context it means all those parts of the ANSP involved in ATM Safety. Where the ANSP is a Member of a formally established FAB and if this survey is conducted at the level of the FAB, then 'organisation-wide' they can refer to the FAB and all other references to 'organisation' must be consistent with this approach. **Periodically:** Something that occurs at regular or predictable intervals. E.g. a safety audit cycle that occurs every 6 months, or some other defined period.				

		Periodicity of the process: This must be systematic and with proper resources allocated. What are the metrics used to ensure it works well? What are the regular monitoring indicators to check whether staff indeed know the appropriate safety procedures? Some sort of monitoring is required for this level. **Redundancy:** Monitoring of the redundancy as well as the readiness for crisis are needed (e.g. time to recovery, loss of capability on average etc.). Exercises and simulations should yield such results and indicate where improvement is potentially needed. **Redundant Capability:** The underlying concept behind redundant capability is to provide alternate means of providing a service. This may be a associated system or a standby network. To achieve redundancy, the network infrastructure (switches) must support redundancy protocols designed to negate the usual problems of putting loops into an Ethernet network, maintaining a default data path and switching to an alternate one when a fault occurs. **Safety Processes/Procedures:** Processes that are set out by local order or in the Safety Management Manual to ensure or enhance safety. **Safety Management Processes/Procedures:** Processes that are set out in the Safety Management Manual that define how safety should be managed within the organisation. **Safety Standards & Regulations:** Safety standards and Regulations are standards or requirements designed to ensure the safety of products, activities or processes, etc. They may be advisory or compulsory and may be issued by national and international bodies. E.g. National Regulator, ICAO, EUROCONTROL, EASA etc. **Staff:** All those individual personnel, operational and technical, with a safety responsibility within their job description. **Targets:** Further to the monitoring defined for D, there need to be targets defined in terms of review of procedures (threshold for review, number of reviews, average time to solution etc.) as well as ensuring a minimum level of staff awareness.

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SA5 Competency						
SA5-1	**Staff, and contractors (where appropriate) are trained, competent in safety and safety management, and where required, licensed.**	Competent staff and contractors (where appropriate) are provided on an ad-hoc basis for safety and safety management activities. There are no formal competency methods (including proficiency, licensing, and training).	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ Competent staff, and contractors (where appropriate) are provided and allocated based on limited planning and only for a limited number of positions related to operations and safety management activities. Competency methods are being developed.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ Competency methods have been designed and are applied. An annual planning process for training is in place.	All of Implementing plus: There is a process for the training providers(s) to receive feedback on the effectiveness of training programmes; based on feedback, the training programmes are revised to improve effectiveness.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: Competency methods (including proficiency, licensing, and training) are periodically reviewed and improved with industry best (good) practices adopted. Training plans cover safety and SMS activities and allow for the improvement of staff skills and competency.
SA5-1	**Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation**		Core Competencies for safety professionals are defined in policy. Training Plan is adopted.	Training course materials exists. Training statistics ~~(metric) is available.~~provide attendance records and competence assessment A gap analysis to identify any unfulfilled training needs or requirements has been established.	Safety professional performance standards related to core competency requirements as defined by the ANSP are met. ~~There are metrics for safety professional performance.~~ The o~~O~~rganisational structure shows recognised safety professional categories. Safety professionals possess required core competency process elements for their roles.	Training feedback is provided and analysed. Periodic training course review. Process Improvement Reports are available. Periodic Best (good) Practices Reports.
~~**SA5-1**~~	~~**Possible verification questions**~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~				

	Additional explanations	~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~Who undertakes competency activities (ATSEP, ATCOs, AIS staff, MET staff)?~~ ~~Is there an annual or multiannual plan in place for training staff required to undertake competency checks?~~ ~~How often are competencies checked?~~ ~~Is the competency scheme internal only, or is there regulatory involvement?~~ ~~Is there a scheme for examiners i.e. to evaluate their competency?~~ ~~How often are the training programmes reviewed for improvement purposes?~~ **Ad-Hoc:** Means that plans are only developed as and when required and there is no formal planning process. **Competent Staff:** Are those individual Operational/Technical personnel who have reached the required standard to operate safely within the ANSP. **Competency Methods/Processes:** Any process or procedure that is in place that meets current regulations to check the competency of staff (Operational & Engineering when appropriate) and includes proficiency, licensing, and training. **Contractor** In the context of this survey 'contractor' refers **to internal** "contracted" staff with safety significant tasks and not external contractors. E.g. the IT department may have been outsourced, but the staff is on-site and for everyday work are working alongside permanent staff and operate under the rules. External 'contracted' staff are dealt with through external interfaces which are assessed in study area 7. **Feedback:** Training and feedback must be monitored, such as effectiveness of response to the feedback, periodicity of training, satisfaction surveys from the trainees etc. **Limited Planning:** This means that, although some planning is undertaken, it does not cover all safety issues. **Periodically:** Something that occurs at regular or predictable intervals. E.g. a safety audit cycle that occurs every 6 months, or some other defined period. **Staff:** All those individual personnel, operational and technical, with a safety responsibility within their job description. **Targets:** There are targets on the periodicity of review as well as on the quality of training from the feedback received and potential external audits.

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SA6 Risk Management						
SA 6-1	**A continuing risk management process that identifies, assesses, classifies, and controls all identified safety risks within the organisation, including potential future risks.**	There is no formal risk management process in place.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ The principles of risk management are documented and understood. There is an approved plan in place to implement the risk management process.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ There is an approved and structured process in place for the assessment of current and potential safety risks, but it is not yet mature. Training in risk assessment is ongoing.	All of Implementing plus: There is clear evidence that safety risk management is embedded within the organisation and identified safety risks are managed and controlled.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: Methods are in place to predict future safety risks and to mitigate these risks. The risk management processes are reviewed and improved on a periodic basis. The organisation develops best practice guidelines that it shares with other ANSPs.
SA6-1	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation		~~Risk Management Policy in place.~~ ~~Risk Management Training Plan adopted.~~ ~~Risk Management Implementation Plan adopted.~~ The following documents (or equivalent) have been formally approved and published: • Risk management policy • Risk management definitions and theory Risk management training and	~~Risk Management process guide in place.~~ ~~Risk Management training manual & materials and training statistics (metrics) are available.~~ The following (or equivalent) are available: • Risk management process guide • Risk management training manual and materials • Training statistics (metrics)	Risk Management (RM) process reports (metrics) are available. Organisation structure shows RM process elements. RM process activities are well documented. There are lists of risks, controls & mitigations, and their status.	The following are available: • Risk prediction reports ~~are available.~~ • Periodic risk management process ~~Management~~ review by management. Including agendas, minutes, actions and their status • Risk management process improvement

			risk management implementation plans have been developed and are subject to implementation.			reports ~~is documented:~~ ~~o Agendas;~~ ~~o Minutes;~~ ~~o Actions;~~ ~~o Status of previous actions.~~ ~~RM Process Improvement Reports.~~ ~~Periodic Best Practices Reports.~~
SA6~~.1~~	~~Possible verification questions~~ Additional explanations	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~Please describe your risk management process. (Who is involved, who approves, endorses and accepts the process).~~ ~~To what extent is your regulator involved with risk management?~~ ~~What type of training is undertaken?~~ ~~What type of methods and tools are used to support the process? (I.e. How are future safety risks identified?)~~ **Future/Potential Risks:** These can be identified when planning future systems and/or making changes to existing systems. A risk assessment process needs to be in place to capture any unforeseen risks that may occur in the future. **Metrics:** There must be clear quantitative metrics identified, which are monitored on a systematic basis. These may be lagging, leading or a combination of both types of indicators. **Risk Management:** A systematic, explicit, and comprehensive analytical approach for managing safety risk at all levels and throughout the entire scope of an operation or the lifecycle of a system in ATM. **Targets:** Targets have to be defined based on the above mentioned metrics and these must be chased by the organisation.				

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SA7 Safety interfaces						
SA7-1	**Effectively managed safety-related internal interfaces (e.g. quality management system, security, and environment).**	The relationships between various different internal interfaces are defined; however, the interfaces operate in isolation.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ Internal safety-related interfaces are managed on an informal or ad-hoc basis.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ Internal safety-related interfaces are managed with a solid understanding of the boundaries and relationships between the interfaces.	All of Implementing plus: Safety-related internal interfaces are coordinated, and relationships are managed through interface agreements (e.g., Letters of Agreement (LoAs), Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), Service-Level Agreements (SLAs)).	All of Managing & Measuring plus: A process is in place to regularly identify weaknesses in agreed interface arrangements (LoAs/MoUs/SLAs etc)
SA7-1	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation	~~The description of each level of implementation could be considered self explanatory in terms of outcomes.~~ The key relationships within the organisation are understood but not documented	All safety interfaces are understood, but procedures to manage these relationships are not formalised or documented. Plans to improve interaction between the interfaces or to formalise the interaction are absent.	Sound procedures are in place to manage the interfaces and the relationships between them.		
~~SA7-1~~	~~Possible verification questions~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~Please describe what type of internal interfaces are in place? (e.g. answers such as Service Level Agreement between ATS and CNS/Engineering).~~ ~~What other management systems do you have in place and what is their relationship with the SMS? (e.g. Quality Management System, Security Management System, Environment Management System).~~				

SA7-2	**The effective management of external interfaces with a safety impact (e.g., MIL, airspace users, airports).** **Formalised processes and procedures dealing with external agreements, services, and supplies (e.g., cross-border Letters of Agreement).** **(NB: for certain organisations MET, CNS and/or AIS are internal interfaces of the Organisation).**	There are a limited number of agreements in place.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ Safety-related external interfaces are managed on an informal or ad-hoc basis. Draft contractual arrangements are being prepared and negotiated for all safety-related external interfaces. Some elements are already formalised and implemented.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ Safety requirements are specified and documented in appropriate agreements.	All of Implementing plus: Activities with safety-related external interfaces are coordinated and relationships are managed through documented agreements. Safety requirements within contractual agreements are systematically reviewed and revised as necessary.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: External services and suppliers are surveyed/audited and systematically monitored to identify deviations from the documented arrangements.
SA7-2	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation	~~The description of each level of implementation could be considered self explanatory in terms of outcomes.~~ Some agreements between external interfaces have been agreed.	All external safety interfaces are understood. Procedures/agreements to manage them are yet to be formalised but are in the process of being arranged.	All safety-related external interfaces are acknowledged, and the management of the relationship and the associated safety requirements is formally acknowledged and agreed upon.		
SA7~~-2~~	~~Possible verification questions~~ Additional explanations	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~With which other external parties do you interface with? (e.g. answers such as interface with Military, Airports, Airspace Users).~~ ~~Which of these interfaces are formal or informal?~~				

		~~How often are the interface agreements reviewed/audited for improvement purposes?~~ **Ad-Hoc:** Means that plans are only developed as and when required and there is no formal planning process. **Audit:** Testing of process, product and people to assure that standards and requirements as documented in the organisation's SMS are complied with. If externals are independently audited and the report is made available that is it acceptable. E.g. If they are ISO certified and maintain the ISO certification. **Environment:** This term is used here as an example. If your organisation does not have an environmental unit it should be ignored. **External Interfaces:** Interfaces between the ANSP and organisations, which are external to your own organisation e.g. NAA/NSA, FAB Partners, Military, Airlines, Energy Suppliers, etc., that you deal with on safety matters. Even if they are ISO certified it may be necessary to have an agreement if they have a direct effect on safety. **Internal Interfaces:** These are interfaces that exist within the ANSP between departments that work together and have some reliance upon each other for the safe execution of their responsibilities e.g. Safety, Security, operations, engineering, etc. It is accepted that internal interfaces are rarely managed through LoAs, but some form of formal agreement is required and evidence should be provided. Where Safety & Quality Departments are combined, or they are under the same leadership (e.g. a single Head of Safety and Quality), formalised agreements are not required, as it's assumed that the coordination is achieved naturally. In the case of FABs there may be instances where the FAB partner may be considered to be an internal interface. **Interfaces:** All interfaces have been positively identified and the need for formal agreements or not is documented, together with a measurement of such interfaces, such as number of required versus achieved, time between requests and solution across interfaces etc. **Informal basis:** Means that no formal agreements have been signed. Nonetheless, interfaces are managed by cooperation between the parties without an official formal agreement. **Limited Number:** Very few agreements compared to the potential number of interfaces the ANSP has. These agreements are by and large set up on an ad-hoc basis. **Periodicity:** The periodicity is clearly established and documented. An option may also be a contract renewal, provided this is clearly specified and not simply expected. For example, contracts mutually extended do not guarantee a revision at the time of renewal. **Process:** The process must ensure that weaknesses are identified and measured and targets are set to eliminate the identified weaknesses or problems. **Regularly**: An action that is scheduled at regular, predictable time intervals. **Some Elements:** Where this term is used it means that agreements are being developed for interfaces (internal & external) and, although all agreements are yet to be finalised, some elements of the agreements are already in place and operating. **Systematically**: Something that is systematic, in the sense of belonging to the system, be it as a physical part of the system or as an enshrined procedure, action etc. This may also be an action or something that happens with a certain regularity, which is established through internal procedures.

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SA8 Safety reporting, investigation and improvement						
SA8-1	**A continuing organisation-wide process to report and investigate safety occurrences and risks.**	There is an informal system in place for reporting safety occurrences and risks, but reports are not reviewed systematically. The reporting system is not organisation-wide. Investigation is done on an ad-hoc basis and with little or no feedback.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ There is a plan to formalise the existing reporting and investigation system. There is commitment from management to allocate resources to implement this system. The reporting system is wide-spread but does not yet cover the whole organisation. Feedback is given on an ad-hoc basis.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ The system in place is commensurate with the size of the organisation. The organisation has a complete and formal system that records all reported information relevant to the SMS, including incidents and accidents. Corrective and preventive actions are taken in response to event analysis.	All of Implementing plus: Identified safety-related risks and deficiencies are actively and continuously monitored and reviewed for improvement.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: Personnel who report safety occurrences, risks and problems are empowered to suggest corrective actions, and there is a feedback process in place.
SA8-1	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation	There are gaps in the organisation's knowledge of its performance. There is an incomplete investigation system, ~~regime which~~ meanings ~~that~~ some deficiencies are not rectified when they become visible. The p~~P~~otential of organisation learning is limited by the safety system inadequacies.	The organisation has committed to and resourced an organisational wide reporting and investigation system.	A reporting and investigation regime is established~~,~~; however, improvements are ~~however only~~ able to focus only on findings from investigations of incidents and accidents due to the scope of the reporting system.	The reporting and investigation system is under continual development and includes ~~embraces~~ accidents, incidents and hazardous situations. The organisation's process and system improvement cycle is embedded.	A confidential reporting system is in place with feedback processes to those who raise safety concerns
~~SA8-1~~	~~Possible verification questions~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~				

		~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~What resources have been allocated and trained to undertake reporting and investigation?~~ ~~What tools and methods are being used to support investigation process?~~ ~~Please briefly describe your safety reporting process (mandatory, voluntary, confidential, anonymous, manual or automatic).~~ ~~Please briefly describe your investigation process (including identifying recommendations and remedial actions).~~

SA8-2	**An organisation-wide means to record and disseminate lessons learned.**	Safety lessons learned are known only to those who experience them.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ There is an intention to develop a means to record and share lessons learned. This may already happen, but only on an ad-hoc basis.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ The process for sharing safety lessons learned is systematic and operational and the majority of data is shared with appropriate personnel.	All of Implementing plus: All safety lessons learned are systematically shared across the organisation at all appropriate levels. Corrective actions are taken to address lessons learned.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: There is clear evidence that the internal lessons learned dissemination process is embedded across the organisation at all levels and is periodically reviewed.
SA8-2	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation	There is no transfer of learning at either an organisational or individual level.	Sharing of lessons is driven by individual workers or managers than at an organisational level.	The organisation has identified a number of mediums through which lessons can be shared	The organisation has developed and implemented a number of mediums through which lessons can be shared.	A continual improvement cycle has been developed to further refine and develop the ways in which lessons are shared within the organisation.
~~SA8-2~~	~~Possible verification questions~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~Please give an example of how your organisation records lessons identified.~~ ~~How are they disseminated?~~ ~~Is the process systematic or ad-hoc? If systematic, please describe it.~~				

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SA8-3	**Appropriate safety information and knowledge is shared with Industry stakeholders.** **Information disclosure is compliant with agreed publication and confidentiality policies/agreements.**	Safety data and information are treated as confidential. There are no plans to release it in any way to any industry stakeholders.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ Safety data and information are shared internally, but the organisation is reluctant or unwilling to share data with industry stakeholders.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ Safety data and information is shared internally, nationally, and with international bodies when it is required by regulation.	All of Implementing plus: There is a clear and published policy that encourages the proactive sharing of safety-related information with other parties.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: Safety data and information are actively shared internally, nationally, with recognised international bodies, and with other industry stakeholders. The organisation has a process in place to receive and act on safety data and information from external stakeholders.
SA8-3	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation	Data is not accessible to those outside the information.	The organisation is accessing and using safety data internally.	The organisation meets the intent of the regulations in relation to data sharing.	Processes and protocols have been developed to assure that when data is shared with external parties this is conducted in an appropriate way. The organisation has determined with whom it believes it needs to share data ~~with,~~ and what data should be shared	Internal policy addresses the need for continued data sharing. The benefits of data sharing are recognised within the organisation, and acting on the basis of such information is a~~n~~ recognised organisational process.
SA8-~~3~~	~~Possible verification questions~~ Additional explanations	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~Describe to what level safety data (including lessons learned) is shared with the industry and the public.~~ ~~Is there any regulation in place that affects the sharing of safety data (e.g. Freedom of Information Act).~~ ~~Which international bodies do you share information with? (e.g. EC, ICAO, EUROCONTROL, CANSO, EASA).~~ ~~How and in what form is safety data and information shared?~~**Ad-Hoc:** Means that plans are only developed as and when required and there is				

		no formal planning process. **Appropriate:** In this context means providing information that meets the needs of your organisation. **Authorities:** In the context of this survey this means those posts within the ANSP who are Accountable for Safety. **Confidentiality policies/Agreements:** These are those requirements that your ANSP is bound to follow by national and international requirements. **Lessons Learned Shared:** This refers to significant information being made available. **Metrics:** The metrics defined above will have a number of relevant targets associated, such as minimum time to implementation, minimum number of people captured in the sharing exercise etc. **Monitored:** In this context monitored means to observe and check the progress of all perceived safety risks and deficiencies and that regular surveillance over these areas is maintained. This is about how the monitoring is achieved. **Monitoring:** A monitoring system of lessons learned and shared must be in place. Such metrics can be a count of the said lessons, targeted areas, units or people, effectiveness or corrective actions, time to implementation etc. **Organisation:** In this context it means all those parts of the ANSP involved in ATM Safety. Where the ANSP is a Member of a formally established FAB and if this survey is conducted at the level of the FAB, then “organisation-wide” can refer to the FAB and all other references to “organisation” must be consistent with this approach. **Other Parties:** This is a collective term for all those organisations, bodies, Industry Stakeholders, etc that an ANSP has a policy to proactively share data with. In other words it is a collective term. **Process:** The process must be measured for robustness. This objective is not about identifying the risks per se (see SA 6.1 for that). This is about having a process feeding the risk management, therefore its robustness and quality must be monitored. Measurements possible are: manual reports vs. automatic, internal vs. external, average duration of investigation, percentage of recommendations implemented and within what timescale etc. **Safety Data:** Any information associated with safety within the organisation. E.g. occurrence reports.

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SA9 Safety performance reporting						
SA9-1	**An established and active monitoring system that uses and tracks suitable safety indicators and associated targets (e.g., lagging and leading indicators).**	There are no indicators, thresholds, or formal monitoring system in place to measure safety achievements and trends.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ There is a plan to implement a monitoring system. A limited set of indicators has been implemented.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ e safety monitoring system has been implemented and documented. dicators and targets have been set: limited to meeting the safety requirements	All of Implementing plus: Additional indicators are also defined and monitored to meet both organisational and local safety objectives. All indicators are tracked against thresholds/targets on a regular basis. Trends are analysed for safety improvement purposes.	of Managing & Measuring plus: afety indicators covering all aspects of the system/operations are mature and used to measure safety improvement. here are comprehensive metrics in place to measure and monitor indicators and thresholds throughout the system.
SA9-1	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation		An a~~A~~pproved plan is in place to implement range of safety indicators; ~~Data is being collected on the first indicators to be collected, allowing for targets to be established.~~ ~~A gap analysis has been completed and a formal plan to implement a robust monitoring program has been documented and approved.~~	Business process have been developed and documented to assure that ~~all~~ data is available to support monitoring ~~Indicators, which address regulatory requirements are in place.~~	Management is making decisions on the basis of safety performance monitoring. Trend monitoring is a key component of business operations. ~~The range of indicators has been extended over time.~~	Indicators and targets are updated on a regular basis and incorporate measures which address all services. ~~Indicators and targets are updated on a regular basis and incorporate measures which address all services.~~
~~SA9-1~~	~~Possible verification questions~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~What type of indicators are you using?~~				

		~~For what purpose are they used?~~ ~~Are there targets associated with the indicators?~~ ~~What is the overall performance monitoring process?~~ ~~To what level have staff bought into the targets and indicators that have been set?~~ ~~How often are trends analysed?~~ ~~What type of metrics are used to measure and monitor indicators?~~

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SA9-2	**Methods to measure safety performance, which is compared within and between ANSPs.**	Ad-hoc safety performance data related to individual incidents is available, but there is no systematic approach for measuring safety performance.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ The implementation of some qualitative and quantitative techniques in certain parts of the organisation has started. However, there is insufficient data to analyse.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ Qualitative techniques are in place, and the implementation of quantitative techniques has started.	All of Implementing plus: Safety performance is measured using statistical and other quantitative techniques. Internal comparative analysis is done, and external comparative analysis has begun.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: The reporting, operational safety survey and SMS auditing programmes are integral parts of the management and operational processes. Results are used to drive further safety improvements across the organisation. Internal and external comparative analysis is well-established.
SA9-2	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation		Monitoring is limited by available data.	A range of techniques to monitor safety are in place.	Internal benchmarking allows units to compare their performance against other similar operations.	Safety improvements are driven by internal and external benchmarking of performance.
~~SA9-2~~	~~Possible verification questions~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~What are your leading indicators? (e.g. Safety Surveys outcome etc.)~~ ~~What are your lagging indicators? (e.g. Safety Occurrences)~~ ~~Which areas of the safety system are covered by indicators?~~				

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SA9-3	**A general public knowledgeable of the ANSP's performance through routine publication of achieved safety levels and trends.**	Safety-related performance information is not made available to the public under any circumstances.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ A limited amount of safety-related performance information is made available, but only to selected authorities.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ High-level safety-related performance information is made available according to applicable requirements.	All of Implementing plus: Safety performance information not governed by applicable requirements is also made available to the public.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: The organisation voluntarily makes available appropriate safety-related performance information to the general public. The achieved safety levels and trends are transparent to the general public.
SA9-3	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation		The organisation has recognised the value of releasing information about the levels of safety achieved.	Regulatory agencies are provided with data about levels of safety achieved, in the expectation that regulatory activities such as audit will be informed by this information.	The ANSP makes available information about its performance to the public.	A range of measures are released to the general public with the aim of increasing confidence in the performance of the ANSP.
SA9~~-3~~	~~Possible verification questions~~ Additional explanations	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?Is the information disclosed to the general public supported by the organisation?~~ ~~If no, why not? What are the impediments?~~ ~~Is there any national law or regulation that oversees the process of public disclosure?~~ ~~Does the national regulator play any role in this process?~~ **Ad-Hoc**: Means that plans are only developed as and when required and there is no formal planning process. **Applicable Requirements:** Those published requirements national and international that state that specific data must be made available. That does not mean actively shared, just 'made available'. **Appropriate:** In this context it means safety data that will demonstrate safety performance, while not disclosing any sensitive details about				

		individuals or the ANSP. **Information:** This refers to any safety information beyond that specified by international and/or national requirements. If there are no requirements, then any safety information published is acceptable**.** **Metrics:** The metrics and statistical techniques must be exemplified clearly. **Monitored:** In this context monitored means to observe and check the progress of additional indicators (along with other indicators) to ensure that they are meeting your and State objectives. **Monitoring System:** In this context means a system that observes, checks and tracks the safety indicators and associated targets and maintains regular surveillance over must be consistent with this approach. **Safety Objectives**: This can be read the same as 'targets'. **Safety Requirements:** Those requirements that are set out in national and international law (E.g. SES, ICAO) to maintain or improve ATM Safety. **Safety Survey:** A safety survey is a routine examination of the working processes of an ANSP with the objective of detecting and correcting weaknesses, thus improving the safety performance of the ANSP. A survey is wide in scope and typically encompasses either a Division or the entire ANSP. It is concerned with: • conformity to published procedures (i.e. correct working practices); • the fitness for purpose of the procedures; • the identification of new (or hitherto unidentified) potential hazards affecting operations; • any other safety weaknesses which are capable of elimination; • identifying opportunities for safety improvement even where no specific deficiencies exist; • validation that safety requirements are achieved during project execution; • verification that safety requirements continue to be achieved in operations. **SES States:** Partners in a FAB may consider each other as "external", for the purpose of this objective, provided they are not aggregated in a consortium. **SMS Survey/Audit:** An independent review of processes, products and people to assure that standards and requirements as documented in the organisation's SMS are complied with. **Transparent to the General Public:** Safety levels and trends are published and available to the General Public in an easily accessible way (i.e. not an 'on-request' system). **Organisation:** In this context it means all those parts of the ANSP involved in ATM Safety. Where the ANSP is a Member of a formally established FAB and if this survey is conducted at the level of the FAB, then "organisation-wide" can refer to the FAB and all other references to 'organisation'.

SA10 Operational safety surveys and SMS audits

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SA10-1	**Internal and independent (external) operational safety surveys and SMS audits.**	There is no plan to conduct systematic operational safety surveys and SMS audits. Operational safety surveys, SMS audits, and gap assessments are conducted on an ad-hoc basis (e.g., when deficiencies in the system or in working arrangements are found).	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ There is a plan in place to formalise the conduct of systematic operational safety surveys and SMS audits. A limited number of operational safety surveys and SMS audits have been carried out.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ Internal operational safety surveys and SMS audits are conducted on a periodic basis. Based on the output of operational safety surveys and SMS audits, a process is in place that requires the development and implementation of appropriate improvement plans.	All of Implementing plus: Internal or external operational safety surveys and SMS audits are carried out in a systematic way. There is a process in place to monitor, analyse trends, and identify areas that require follow-up operational safety surveys or SMS audits. Follow-up operational safety surveys, SMS audits, and gap assessments are conducted in all areas affecting operational safety and the SMS. Operational safety surveys and SMS audits are actively reviewed to assess opportunities for system improvement.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: Independent (external) operational safety surveys and SMS audits are periodically conducted. The outputs from operational safety surveys and SMS audits are incorporated as appropriate into operations or the SMS. There is a process in place that requires external data (e.g. pilot performance trend information) to be considered when selecting areas to be subject to operational safety surveys and SMS audits.
SA10-1	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation	Little to no evidence of surveys/audits having been performed	The following information for survey/audits can be provided: - Plans; - Reports; - ~~Set of~~ rRequirements list; - Statement of authority and independence ~~of the auditors.~~	The following survey/audit documentation exists ~~information for survey/audits can be provided:~~ - Schedules; - Resources; - Technical procedure/ process descriptions.	Trend reports, showing periodicity have been published. Records of management review: - Agendas; - Minutes; - Action item responses; - Follow-up status reporting.	~~Log of e~~External surveys/audits are documented in a log. There is e~~E~~vidence of management review and action on results An a~~A~~ction plan has been written to address external findings Records of dissemination of findings, internally and externally, are available.
SA10~~-1~~	~~Possible verification questions~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~				

	Additional explanations	~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~How often are safety surveys conducted?~~ ~~How often are SMS audits conducted?~~ ~~How do you use the outcome of safety surveys?~~ ~~How do you use the outcome of SMS audits?~~ ~~How do you benchmark the results against other ANSPs?~~ **Actively:** In this context means without any external and/or independent trigger, but simply at own initiative. **Ad-Hoc:** Means that plans are only developed as and when required and there is no formal planning process. **Independent:** This means surveys and audits are undertaken by people from outside of the ANSP. For the purpose of this question, audits performed by the national regulator (NSA, NAA or equivalent) or a qualified entity in a regulatory-auditing role, cannot be considered as independent . **Periodic:** Something that occurs at regular or predictable intervals. E.g. a safety audit cycle that occurs every 6 months, or some other defined period. **Process:** The process of monitoring and analysis must be clearly exemplified. Metrics must exist for all relevant areas surveyed. **SMS Audit:** Testing of processes, products and people to assure that standards and requirements as documented in the organisation's SMS are complied with. **Safety Survey:** A safety survey is a routine examination of the working processes of an ANSP with the objective of detecting and correcting weaknesses, thus improving the safety performance of the ANSP. A survey is wide in scope and typically encompasses either a Division or the entire ANSP. It is concerned with: • conformity to published procedures (i.e. correct working practices); • the fitness for purpose of the procedures; • the identification of new (or hitherto unidentified) potential hazards affecting operations; • any other safety weaknesses which are capable of elimination; • identifying opportunities for safety improvement even where no specific deficiencies exist; • validation that safety requirements are achieved during project execution; • verification that safety requirements continue to be achieved in operations.

SA11 Adoption and sharing best(good) **practices**						
SA11-1	**A structured approach exists to promote safety, its**	There is no structured approach to promote safety and its	~~All of Initiating plus:~~	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~	All of Implementing plus:	~~All of~~ Managing & Measuring plus:

	standing within the organisation and lessons learned through application of the SMS.	management within the organisation. The organisation has the capability to identify lessons learnt and promote them but on an ad-hoc basis.	Ad-hoc processes are in place to gather and then promote information on safety, lessons learnt and the SMS. Some initial implementation has begun. Some internal best (good) practices are spread across units within the organisation, but there is no systematic structure for internal safety promotion.	An organisational approach has been established to promote safety, lessons learned and the SMS.	Formal methods are in place to capture safety knowledge and promote it internally. The standing of safety and its management is a consistent and expected feature in internal communication.	Staff are encouraged to share lessons learned in order that the lessons can be promoted across the organisation. Strategies to promote safety and its management are developed by senior levels in the organisation and are being implemented. Other industries' initiatives in relation to internal safety promotion are periodically reviewed with the approach being modified on the basis of the information gathered.
SA11-1	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation	There is no transfer of learning at either an organisational or individual level. Lessons learning, for example, is ad-hoc.	Sharing of lessons is driven by individual workers or managers rather than at an organisational level. Lessons learnt processes are under development. ~~identified.~~ ~~Evidence of identifying Lessons Learnt.~~	The organisation has identified a number of mediums through which lessons can be shared and these have been formalised. There is some evidence that lessons learning is effective. ~~There is evidence of staff training in lessons learning.Lessons Learnt process implemented.~~ KPIs and Milestones for lessons learnt identified. ~~Evidence of staff training.~~	The organisation has developed and implemented a number of mediums through which lessons can be shared. Lessons learning process can be demonstrated ~~shown~~ to be effective. Changes to procedures, training can be traced back to lessons learning process. ~~Safety is at the heart of every decision the ANSP makes~~	A continual improvement cycle has been developed to further refine and develop the ways in which lessons are shared within the organisation. All staff are aware of the lessons learning process. Senior managers actively promote safety to all staff. There is evidence of regular benchmarking of safety best (good) practices across the industry. ~~Evidence of regular benchmarking of safety best practices~~

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						~~across the industry.~~
~~SA11-1~~	~~Possible verification questions~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~Please describe the process in place to adopt and share best practices.~~				

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SA11-2	**A structured approach to gather information on operational safety and SMS best (good) practices from the industry.**	There is no structured approach to gather best (good) practices from the industry. The organisation has the capability to identify and adopt industry best (good) practices on an ad-hoc basis.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ There is an ad-hoc structure in place to gather information on operational safety and SMS best (good) practices. Some initial implementation has begun. Some internal best(good) practices are spread across units within the organisation, but there is no systematic structure for the adoption of best (good) practices.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ A structure has been established to identify applicable operational safety and SMS best(good) practices from the industry.	All of Implementing plus: Industry best (good) practices are periodically reviewed to provide the most current information, which is then assessed for applicability, and adopted as appropriate.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: All relevant best (good) practices are readily accessible to appropriate personnel. The organisation actively participates in developing industry best (good) practices.
SA11-2	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation		Best practice process identified. There is e~~E~~vidence of identifying best practice. There is s~~S~~ome evidence of application of internal best practice.	There is an a~~A~~uditable process to identify and apply best practice from the industry. Key performance indicators ~~KPIs~~ and Milestones have been produced to show that the process is being applied and is ~~being~~ effective.	There is e~~E~~vidence of regular benchmarking of safety best (good) practice~~s~~ across the industry. Evidence shows that best (good) practices are adopted where appropriate.	Evidence shows that best (good) practices is ~~are~~ made available for all staff to learn. Evidence shows that the organisation is proactive in developing and spreading best practice in the industry.
~~SA11-2~~	~~Possible verification questions~~	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~What type of formal mechanism is in place to identify, adapt and adopt best practices?~~ ~~Are you actively implementing ICAO Global Aviation Roadmap?~~ ~~In which international fora is your organisation involved re development of industry best practices?~~ ~~How often does your organisation review industry best practices?~~				

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SA11-3	**Sharing of safety and SMS-related best** (good) **practices with industry stakeholders.**	There are no plans to release and share best (good) practices with industry stakeholders.	~~All of Initiating plus:~~ Sharing of best (good) practices is ad-hoc and takes place in response to requests for assistance from industry stakeholders.	~~All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:~~ ~~Best practices are shared with industry stakeholders as required by regulation~~. A framework or formalised process is in place to share best (good) practices with industry.	All of Implementing plus: Best (good) practices are actively shared with industry stakeholders. Sharing of safety-related best (good) practices with industry has demonstrated improved safety performance.	All of Managing & Measuring plus: SMS-related best (good) practices are pro-actively shared with industry stakeholders with the aim of improving SMS standards.
SA11-3	Outcomes of the objective fulfilment which may be considered applicable for each level of implementation		A best practice process has been identified. There is e~~E~~vidence of ad-hoc discussion on best practice with industry stakeholders. There is some evidence of application of internal best practice.	There is an auditable process to identify and apply best practice from the industry. Key performance indicators and milestones have been produced to show that the process is being applied and is effective. ~~Process to share best practice with the industry.~~ ~~Evidence that best practice is being shared with the industry~~	There is e~~E~~vidence that best practice is proactively shared within the industry. KPIs show that the best practice has been effective in reducing risk and increasing safety performance.	Evidence that the organisation is proactive in developing and spreading best practice to improve the overall; level of safety management in the industry.
SA11~~-3~~	~~Possible verification questions~~ Additional explanations	~~Why have you scored in x maturity level?~~ ~~Can you give examples of the situation?~~ ~~What were the enablers to score x maturity level?~~ ~~What needs to happen to move forward?~~ ~~What obstacles are you experiencing?~~ ~~Is there anything that can be done to help you progress in this area?~~ ~~What type of formal mechanism is in place to share your best practices with other ANSPs?~~ ~~Are you actively implementing ICAO Global Aviation Roadmap?~~ ~~In which international fora is your organisation involved re development of industry best practices?~~ ~~Has your organisation the capability to set best practices? (If yes – provide an example.)~~ **Ad-Hoc:** Means that plans are only developed as and when required and there is no formal planning process. **Appropriate:** In this context means providing information to those personnel within your ANSP that need it in order to meet the needs of the					

		organisation. **No Structured Approach:** Means that there is nothing in place to promote safety, not even an *ad hoc* process that would promote safety for a specific purpose or occasion. **Organisation:** In this context it means all those parts of the ANSP involved in ATM Safety. Where the ANSP is a Member of a formally established FAB and if this survey is conducted at the level of the FAB, then 'organisation-wide' can refer to the FAB and all other references to "organisation" must be consistent with this approach. **Other Industries' initiatives**: Means safety initiatives taken within other industries E.g. Petrochemical, Rail, etc. Gathering information from other industries is a demanding requirement as it is about "the best of the best". **Procedures:** A procedure and/or allocated task is in place to review the industry best (good) practices, which is then applied internally. Examples of such best (good) practices should be given. **Staff:** All those individual personnel, operational and technical, with a safety responsibility within their job description. A visible policy of management is required to promote this sharing across the organisation. **Structured approach**: In this context refers to actions, resources, procedures that the ANSP puts in place to share industry best-practice. While some elements may be part of a greater external structure (i.e. EUROCONTROL, CANSO etc.), there must be certain internal structures to deal with this matter and clearly allocated resources.

(H) — Appendix 1 to GM 10 SKPI – Look-up Table for Severity Classification of ATM-Specific Occurrences

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-AGC/000	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		AA
AR-AGC/001	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		AA
AR-AGC/002	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AR-AGC/010	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		AA
AR-AGC/011	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
AR-AGC/012	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AR-AGC/020	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		AA
AR-AGC/021	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		A
AR-AGC/022	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AR-AGC/030	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-AGC/031	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AR-AGC/032	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AR-AGC/100	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		AA
AR-AGC/101	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		~~AA~~A
AR-AGC/102	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		~~A~~C
AR-AGC/110	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		AA
AR-AGC/111	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
AR-AGC/112	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		~~A~~C
AR-AGC/120	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		A
AR-AGC/121	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AR-AGC/122	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		~~A~~C
AR-AGC/130	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		~~B~~C
AR-AGC/131	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		~~B~~C
AR-AGC/132	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		~~B~~C
AR-AGC/200	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-AGC/201	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-AGC/202	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-AGC/210	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-AGC/211	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-AGC/212	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-AGC/220	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-AGC/221	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-AGC/222	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-AGC/230	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-AGC/231	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-AGC/232	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AR-AGC/300	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-AGC/301	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-AGC/302	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-AGC/310	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-AGC/311	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-AGC/312	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-AGC/320	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-AGC/321	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-AGC/322	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-AGC/330	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-AGC/331	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-AGC/332	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		C
AR-AGC/400	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-AGC/401	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-AGC/402	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-AGC/410	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-AGC/411	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-AGC/412	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-AGC/420	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-AGC/421	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-AGC/422	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-AGC/430	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-AGC/431	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-AGC/432	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-AGC/500	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-AGC/501	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-AGC/502	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-AGC/510	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-AGC/511	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-AGC/512	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-AGC/520	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-AGC/521	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-AGC/522	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-AGC/530	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-AGC/531	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-AGC/532	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/000	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AR-GGC/001	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-GGC/002	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-GGC/010	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-GGC/011	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-GGC/012	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-GGC/020	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-GGC/021	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-GGC/022	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-GGC/030	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/031	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-GGC/032	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/100	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AR-GGC/101	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-GGC/102	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-GGC/110	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-GGC/111	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-GGC/112	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-GGC/120	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-GGC/121	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-GGC/122	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-GGC/130	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/131	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/132	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/200	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-GGC/201	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-GGC/202	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-GGC/210	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-GGC/211	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-GGC/212	Ground/Ground	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Communication						
AR-GGC/220	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-GGC/221	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-GGC/222	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-GGC/230	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/231	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/232	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/300	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/301	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/302	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/310	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/311	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/312	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/320	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/321	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/322	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/330	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/331	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/332	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-GGC/400	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/401	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/402	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/410	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/411	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/412	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/420	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/421	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/422	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/430	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/431	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/432	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/500	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/501	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/502	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/510	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/511	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/512	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/520	Ground/Ground	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Communication						
AR-GGC/521	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/522	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-GGC/530	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-GGC/531	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-GGC/532	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-NAV/000	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AR-NAV/001	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AR-NAV/002	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AR-NAV/010	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AR-NAV/011	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AR-NAV/012	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AR-NAV/020	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AR-NAV/021	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AR-NAV/022	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AR-NAV/030	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-NAV/031	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-NAV/032	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-NAV/100	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-NAV/101	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-NAV/102	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-NAV/110	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-NAV/111	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-NAV/112	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-NAV/120	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-NAV/121	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-NAV/122	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-NAV/130	Navigation	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-NAV/131	Navigation	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-NAV/132	Navigation	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-NAV/200	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-NAV/201	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-NAV/202	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-NAV/210	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-NAV/211	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-NAV/212	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-NAV/220	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-NAV/221	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-NAV/222	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-NAV/230	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-NAV/231	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-NAV/232	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-NAV/300	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-NAV/301	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-NAV/302	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-NAV/310	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-NAV/311	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-NAV/312	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-NAV/320	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-NAV/321	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-NAV/322	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-NAV/330	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-NAV/331	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-NAV/332	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-NAV/400	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-NAV/401	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-NAV/402	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-NAV/410	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-NAV/411	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-NAV/412	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-NAV/420	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-NAV/421	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-NAV/422	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-NAV/430	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-NAV/431	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-NAV/432	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-NAV/500	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-NAV/501	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-NAV/502	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-NAV/510	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-NAV/511	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-NAV/512	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-NAV/520	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-NAV/521	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-NAV/522	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-NAV/530	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-NAV/531	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-NAV/532	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-ASV/000	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		AA
AR-ASV/001	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		A
AR-ASV/002	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		A
AR-ASV/010	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		AA
AR-ASV/011	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
AR-ASV/012	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		A
AR-ASV/013	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some false targets	> T1		C
AR-ASV/014	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One false target	> T1		C
AR-ASV/020	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		A
AR-ASV/021	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		A
AR-ASV/022	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		A
AR-ASV/023	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some false targets	> T1		C
AR-ASV/024	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One false target	> T1		C
AR-ASV/030	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		A
AR-ASV/031	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		A
AR-ASV/032	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		A
AR-ASV/033	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some false targets	> T1		C
AR-ASV/034	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One false target	> T1		C
AR-ASV/100	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		A
AR-ASV/101	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		A
AR-ASV/102	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-ASV/110	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		A
AR-ASV/111	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
AR-ASV/112	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-ASV/120	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AR-ASV/121	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AR-ASV/122	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-ASV/130	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-ASV/131	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-ASV/132	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AR-ASV/200	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AR-ASV/201	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-ASV/202	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-ASV/210	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AR-ASV/211	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-ASV/212	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-ASV/220	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AR-ASV/221	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-ASV/222	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-ASV/230	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-ASV/231	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-ASV/232	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AR-ASV/300	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-ASV/301	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASV/302	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-ASV/310	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-ASV/311	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASV/312	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-ASV/320	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-ASV/321	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASV/322	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-ASV/330	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-ASV/331	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASV/332	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-ASV/400	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-ASV/401	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASV/402	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-ASV/410	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-ASV/411	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASV/412	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-ASV/420	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-ASV/421	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASV/422	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-ASV/430	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-ASV/431	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASV/432	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-ASV/500	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-ASV/501	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASV/502	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-ASV/510	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-ASV/511	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASV/512	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-ASV/520	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-ASV/521	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASV/522	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-ASV/530	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-ASV/531	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASV/532	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-GSV/000	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/001	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/002	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/010	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/011	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/012	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/020	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/021	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/022	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
AR-GSV/030	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/031	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/032	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/100	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/101	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/102	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/110	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/111	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/112	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/120	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/121	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/122	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/130	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/131	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/132	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/200	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/201	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/202	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/210	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/211	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/212	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/220	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/221	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/222	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/230	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/231	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/232	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/300	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/301	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/302	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-GSV/310	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/311	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/312	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/320	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/321	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/322	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/330	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/331	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/332	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/400	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/401	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/402	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/410	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/411	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/412	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/420	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/421	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/422	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/430	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/431	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/432	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/500	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/501	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/502	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/510	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/511	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/512	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/520	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/521	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/522	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-GSV/530	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-GSV/531	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-GSV/532	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-SMG/000	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/001	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/002	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/010	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/011	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/012	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/020	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/021	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/022	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/030	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/031	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/032	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/100	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/101	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/102	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/110	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/111	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/112	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/120	Surface Movement Guidance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	& Control						
AR-SMG/121	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/122	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/130	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/131	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/132	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/200	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/201	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/202	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/210	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/211	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/212	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/220	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/221	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/222	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/230	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/231	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/232	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/300	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-SMG/301	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/302	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/310	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/311	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/312	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/320	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/321	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/322	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/330	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/331	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/332	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/400	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/401	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/402	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/410	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/411	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/412	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/420	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/421	Surface Movement Guidance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	& Control						
AR-SMG/422	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/430	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/431	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/432	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/500	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/501	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/502	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/510	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/511	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/512	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/520	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/521	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/522	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-SMG/530	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-SMG/531	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-SMG/532	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-FPI/000	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AR-FPI/001	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-FPI/002	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AR-FPI/010	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AR-FPI/011	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AR-FPI/012	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AR-FPI/020	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AR-FPI/021	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AR-FPI/022	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AR-FPI/030	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AR-FPI/031	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AR-FPI/032	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AR-FPI/100	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-FPI/101	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-FPI/102	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-FPI/110	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-FPI/111	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-FPI/112	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-FPI/120	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-FPI/121	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-FPI/122	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-FPI/130	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-FPI/131	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-FPI/132	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-FPI/200	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-FPI/201	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-FPI/202	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-FPI/210	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-FPI/211	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-FPI/212	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-FPI/220	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-FPI/221	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-FPI/222	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-FPI/230	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-FPI/231	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-FPI/232	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-FPI/300	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-FPI/301	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-FPI/302	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-FPI/310	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-FPI/311	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-FPI/312	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-FPI/320	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-FPI/321	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-FPI/322	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-FPI/330	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-FPI/331	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-FPI/332	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-FPI/400	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-FPI/401	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-FPI/402	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-FPI/410	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-FPI/411	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-FPI/412	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-FPI/420	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-FPI/421	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-FPI/422	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-FPI/430	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-FPI/431	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-FPI/432	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-FPI/500	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-FPI/501	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-FPI/502	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-FPI/510	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-FPI/511	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-FPI/512	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-FPI/520	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-FPI/521	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-FPI/522	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-FPI/530	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-FPI/531	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-FPI/532	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/000	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/001	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/002	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/010	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/011	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/012	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/020	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/021	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/022	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/030	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/031	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/032	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-FIA/100	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/101	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/102	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/110	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/111	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/112	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/120	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/121	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/122	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/130	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/131	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/132	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/200	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/201	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/202	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/210	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/211	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/212	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/220	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/221	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/222	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/230	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/231	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/232	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/300	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/301	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/302	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/310	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/311	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/312	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/320	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/321	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/322	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-FIA/330	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/331	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/332	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/400	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/401	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/402	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/410	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/411	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/412	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/420	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/421	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/422	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/430	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/431	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/432	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/500	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/501	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/502	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/510	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/511	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/512	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/520	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/521	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/522	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-FIA/530	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-FIA/531	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-FIA/532	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-ORM/000	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-ORM/001	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-ORM/002	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-ORM/010	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
AR-ORM/011	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-ORM/012	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-ORM/020	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-ORM/021	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-ORM/022	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-ORM/030	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-ORM/031	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-ORM/032	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-ORM/100	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-ORM/101	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-ORM/102	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-ORM/110	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-ORM/111	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-ORM/112	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-ORM/120	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-ORM/121	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-ORM/122	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-ORM/130	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-ORM/131	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-ORM/132	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AR-ORM/200	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-ORM/201	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-ORM/202	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-ORM/210	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-ORM/211	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-ORM/212	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-ORM/220	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-ORM/221	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-ORM/222	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-ORM/230	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-ORM/231	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-ORM/232	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-ORM/300	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
AR-ORM/301	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AR-ORM/302	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
AR-ORM/310	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AR-ORM/311	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AR-ORM/312	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AR-ORM/320	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AR-ORM/321	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AR-ORM/322	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AR-ORM/330	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
AR-ORM/331	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AR-ORM/332	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
AR-ORM/400	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-ORM/401	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-ORM/402	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-ORM/410	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-ORM/411	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-ORM/412	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-ORM/420	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-ORM/421	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-ORM/422	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-ORM/430	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-ORM/431	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-ORM/432	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-ORM/500	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-ORM/501	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-ORM/502	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-ORM/510	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-ORM/511	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-ORM/512	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-ORM/520	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-ORM/521	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-ORM/522	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-ORM/530	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-ORM/531	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-ORM/532	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-DMS/000	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-DMS/001	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-DMS/002	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-DMS/010	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-DMS/011	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-DMS/012	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-DMS/020	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-DMS/021	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-DMS/022	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-DMS/030	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-DMS/031	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-DMS/032	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AR-DMS/100	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-DMS/101	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-DMS/102	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-DMS/110	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-DMS/111	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-DMS/112	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-DMS/120	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-DMS/121	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-DMS/122	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-DMS/130	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-DMS/131	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-DMS/132	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AR-DMS/200	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-DMS/201	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-DMS/202	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-DMS/210	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-DMS/211	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-DMS/212	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-DMS/220	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-DMS/221	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-DMS/222	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-DMS/230	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-DMS/231	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-DMS/232	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AR-DMS/300	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-DMS/301	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-DMS/302	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-DMS/310	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-DMS/311	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-DMS/312	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-DMS/320	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-DMS/321	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-DMS/322	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-DMS/330	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-DMS/331	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-DMS/332	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-DMS/400	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-DMS/401	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-DMS/402	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-DMS/410	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-DMS/411	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-DMS/412	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-DMS/420	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-DMS/421	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-DMS/422	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-DMS/430	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-DMS/431	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-DMS/432	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-DMS/500	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-DMS/501	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-DMS/502	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-DMS/510	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-DMS/511	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-DMS/512	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-DMS/520	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-DMS/521	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-DMS/522	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-DMS/530	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-DMS/531	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-DMS/532	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-SNT/000	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-SNT/001	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-SNT/002	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-SNT/010	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-SNT/011	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-SNT/012	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-SNT/020	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-SNT/021	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-SNT/022	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-SNT/030	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-SNT/031	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-SNT/032	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AR-SNT/033	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some false alarms	> T1		C
AR-SNT/034	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One false alarm	> T1		C
AR-SNT/100	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-SNT/101	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-SNT/102	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-SNT/110	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-SNT/111	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-SNT/112	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-SNT/120	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-SNT/121	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-SNT/122	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-SNT/130	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-SNT/131	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-SNT/132	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AR-SNT/200	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-SNT/201	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-SNT/202	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-SNT/210	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-SNT/211	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-SNT/212	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-SNT/220	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-SNT/221	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-SNT/222	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-SNT/230	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-SNT/231	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-SNT/232	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AR-SNT/300	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-SNT/301	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-SNT/302	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-SNT/310	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-SNT/311	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-SNT/312	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-SNT/320	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-SNT/321	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-SNT/322	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-SNT/330	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-SNT/331	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-SNT/332	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-SNT/400	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-SNT/401	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-SNT/402	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-SNT/410	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-SNT/411	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-SNT/412	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-SNT/420	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-SNT/421	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-SNT/422	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-SNT/430	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-SNT/431	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-SNT/432	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-SNT/500	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-SNT/501	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-SNT/502	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-SNT/510	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-SNT/511	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-SNT/512	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-SNT/520	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-SNT/521	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-SNT/522	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-SNT/530	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-SNT/531	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-SNT/532	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/000	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AR-ASE/001	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AR-ASE/002	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AR-ASE/010	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AR-ASE/011	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AR-ASE/012	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AR-ASE/020	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AR-ASE/021	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AR-ASE/022	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AR-ASE/030	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AR-ASE/031	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AR-ASE/032	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AR-ASE/100	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-ASE/101	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-ASE/102	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-ASE/110	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-ASE/111	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-ASE/112	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-ASE/120	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-ASE/121	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-ASE/122	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-ASE/130	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/131	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/132	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/200	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-ASE/201	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-ASE/202	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-ASE/210	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-ASE/211	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-ASE/212	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-ASE/220	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-ASE/221	Real Time Airspace	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Environment						
AR-ASE/222	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-ASE/230	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/231	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/232	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/300	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/301	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/302	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/310	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/311	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/312	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/320	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/321	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/322	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/330	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/331	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/332	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/400	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/401	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-ASE/402	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/410	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/411	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/412	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/420	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/421	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/422	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/430	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/431	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/432	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/500	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/501	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/502	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/510	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/511	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/512	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-ASE/520	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/521	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/522	Real Time Airspace	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Environment						
AR-ASE/530	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-ASE/531	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-ASE/532	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/000	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-TFM/001	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-TFM/002	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/010	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-TFM/011	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-TFM/012	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/020	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-TFM/021	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-TFM/022	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/030	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-TFM/031	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-TFM/032	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/100	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-TFM/101	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-TFM/102	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/110	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-TFM/111	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-TFM/112	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/120	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-TFM/121	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-TFM/122	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/130	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-TFM/131	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-TFM/132	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/200	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-TFM/201	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-TFM/202	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/210	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-TFM/211	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-TFM/212	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/220	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-TFM/221	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-TFM/222	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/230	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-TFM/231	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-TFM/232	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/300	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-TFM/301	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-TFM/302	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/310	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-TFM/311	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-TFM/312	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/320	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-TFM/321	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-TFM/322	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/330	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-TFM/331	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-TFM/332	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/400	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-TFM/401	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-TFM/402	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/410	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-TFM/411	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-TFM/412	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/420	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-TFM/421	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-TFM/422	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/430	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-TFM/431	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-TFM/432	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/500	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-TFM/501	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-TFM/502	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/510	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-TFM/511	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-TFM/512	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/520	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-TFM/521	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-TFM/522	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-TFM/530	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-TFM/531	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-TFM/532	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/000	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-AIS/001	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-AIS/002	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-AIS/010	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-AIS/011	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-AIS/012	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-AIS/020	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AR-AIS/021	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AR-AIS/022	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AR-AIS/030	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AR-AIS/031	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AR-AIS/032	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AR-AIS/100	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AR-AIS/101	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AR-AIS/102	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AR-AIS/110	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AR-AIS/111	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AR-AIS/112	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AR-AIS/120	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/121	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/122	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/130	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/131	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/132	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/200	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/201	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/202	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/210	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/211	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/212	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/220	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/221	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/222	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/230	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-AIS/231	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/232	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/300	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/301	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/302	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/310	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/311	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/312	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/320	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/321	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/322	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/330	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/331	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/332	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/400	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/401	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/402	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/410	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/411	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/412	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/420	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/421	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/422	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/430	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/431	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/432	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/500	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/501	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/502	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/510	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/511	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/512	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/520	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-AIS/521	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/522	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-AIS/530	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-AIS/531	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-AIS/532	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/000	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/001	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/002	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/010	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/011	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/012	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/020	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/021	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/022	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/030	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/031	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/032	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/100	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/101	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/102	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/110	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/111	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/112	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/120	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-MET/121	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/122	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/130	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/131	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/132	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/200	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/201	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/202	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/210	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/211	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/212	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/220	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/221	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/222	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/230	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/231	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/232	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/300	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/301	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/302	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/310	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/311	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/312	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/320	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/321	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/322	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/330	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/331	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/332	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/400	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/401	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/402	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/410	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AR-MET/411	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/412	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/420	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/421	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/422	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/430	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/431	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/432	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/500	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/501	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/502	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/510	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/511	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/512	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/520	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/521	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/522	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AR-MET/530	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AR-MET/531	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AR-MET/532	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-AGC/000	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		AA
AP-AGC/001	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		AA
AP-AGC/002	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AP-AGC/010	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		AA
AP-AGC/011	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
AP-AGC/012	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AP-AGC/020	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		AA
AP-AGC/021	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		A

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
AP-AGC/022	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AP-AGC/030	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-AGC/031	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AP-AGC/032	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AP-AGC/100	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		AA
AP-AGC/101	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		~~AA~~A
AP-AGC/102	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		~~A~~C
AP-AGC/110	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		AA
AP-AGC/111	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
AP-AGC/112	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		~~A~~C
AP-AGC/120	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		A
AP-AGC/121	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AP-AGC/122	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		~~A~~C
AP-AGC/130	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		~~B~~C
AP-AGC/131	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		~~B~~C
AP-AGC/132	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		~~B~~C
AP-AGC/200	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-AGC/201	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-AGC/202	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-AGC/210	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-AGC/211	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-AGC/212	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-AGC/220	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-AGC/221	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-AGC/222	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-AGC/230	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-AGC/231	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-AGC/232	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AP-AGC/300	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-AGC/301	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-AGC/302	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-AGC/310	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-AGC/311	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-AGC/312	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-AGC/320	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-AGC/321	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-AGC/322	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-AGC/330	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-AGC/331	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-AGC/332	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		C
AP-AGC/400	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-AGC/401	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-AGC/402	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-AGC/410	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-AGC/411	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-AGC/412	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-AGC/420	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-AGC/421	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-AGC/422	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-AGC/430	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-AGC/431	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-AGC/432	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-AGC/500	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-AGC/501	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-AGC/502	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-AGC/510	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-AGC/511	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-AGC/512	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-AGC/520	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-AGC/521	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-AGC/522	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-AGC/530	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-AGC/531	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-AGC/532	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/000	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AP-GGC/001	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-GGC/002	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-GGC/010	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-GGC/011	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-GGC/012	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-GGC/020	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-GGC/021	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-GGC/022	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-GGC/030	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/031	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/032	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/100	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AP-GGC/101	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-GGC/102	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-GGC/110	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-GGC/111	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-GGC/112	Ground/Ground	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Communication						
AP-GGC/120	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-GGC/121	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-GGC/122	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-GGC/130	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/131	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/132	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/200	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-GGC/201	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-GGC/202	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-GGC/210	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-GGC/211	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-GGC/212	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-GGC/220	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-GGC/221	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-GGC/222	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-GGC/230	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/231	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/232	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-GGC/300	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/301	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/302	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/310	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/311	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/312	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/320	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/321	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/322	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/330	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/331	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/332	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/400	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/401	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/402	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/410	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/411	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/412	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/420	Ground/Ground	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Communication						
AP-GGC/421	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/422	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/430	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/431	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/432	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/500	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/501	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/502	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/510	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/511	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/512	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/520	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/521	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/522	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-GGC/530	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-GGC/531	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-GGC/532	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-NAV/000	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-NAV/001	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AP-NAV/002	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AP-NAV/010	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AP-NAV/011	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AP-NAV/012	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AP-NAV/020	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AP-NAV/021	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AP-NAV/022	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AP-NAV/030	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-NAV/031	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-NAV/032	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-NAV/100	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-NAV/101	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-NAV/102	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-NAV/110	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-NAV/111	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-NAV/112	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-NAV/120	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-NAV/121	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-NAV/122	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-NAV/130	Navigation	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-NAV/131	Navigation	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-NAV/132	Navigation	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-NAV/200	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-NAV/201	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-NAV/202	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-NAV/210	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-NAV/211	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-NAV/212	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-NAV/220	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-NAV/221	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-NAV/222	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-NAV/230	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-NAV/231	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-NAV/232	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-NAV/300	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-NAV/301	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-NAV/302	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-NAV/310	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-NAV/311	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-NAV/312	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-NAV/320	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-NAV/321	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-NAV/322	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-NAV/330	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-NAV/331	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-NAV/332	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-NAV/400	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-NAV/401	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-NAV/402	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-NAV/410	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-NAV/411	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-NAV/412	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-NAV/420	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-NAV/421	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-NAV/422	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-NAV/430	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-NAV/431	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-NAV/432	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-NAV/500	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-NAV/501	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-NAV/502	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-NAV/510	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-NAV/511	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-NAV/512	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-NAV/520	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-NAV/521	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-NAV/522	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-NAV/530	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-NAV/531	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-NAV/532	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/000	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		A
AP-ASV/001	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		A
AP-ASV/002	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		A
AP-ASV/010	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		A
AP-ASV/011	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
AP-ASV/012	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AP-ASV/013	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some false targets	> T1		C
AP-ASV/014	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One false target	> T1		C
AP-ASV/020	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		A
AP-ASV/021	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		A
AP-ASV/022	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		A
AP-ASV/023	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of	Sector Suite	Some false	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function		targets			
AP-ASV/024	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One false target	> T1		C
AP-ASV/030	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AP-ASV/031	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AP-ASV/032	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AP-ASV/033	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some false targets	> T1		C
AP-ASV/034	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One false target	> T1		C
AP-ASV/100	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AP-ASV/101	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AP-ASV/102	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-ASV/110	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-ASV/111	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-ASV/112	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-ASV/120	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-ASV/121	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-ASV/122	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-ASV/130	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-ASV/131	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-ASV/132	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AP-ASV/200	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-ASV/201	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-ASV/202	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/210	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/211	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/212	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/220	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/221	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/222	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-ASV/230	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/231	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/232	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/300	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/301	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/302	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/310	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/311	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/312	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/320	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/321	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/322	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/330	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/331	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/332	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/400	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/401	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/402	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/410	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/411	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/412	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/420	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/421	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/422	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/430	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/431	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/432	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/500	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/501	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/502	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/510	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/511	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/512	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-ASV/520	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/521	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/522	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-ASV/530	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-ASV/531	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASV/532	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-GSV/000	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/001	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/002	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/010	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/011	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/012	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/020	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/021	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/022	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/030	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/031	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/032	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/100	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/101	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/102	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/110	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/111	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/112	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-GSV/120	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/121	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/122	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/130	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/131	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/132	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/200	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/201	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/202	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/210	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/211	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/212	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/220	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/221	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/222	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/230	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/231	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/232	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/300	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/301	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/302	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/310	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/311	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/312	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/320	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/321	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/322	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/330	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/331	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/332	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/400	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/401	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/402	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-GSV/410	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/411	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/412	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/420	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/421	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/422	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/430	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/431	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/432	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/500	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/501	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/502	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/510	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/511	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/512	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/520	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/521	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/522	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-GSV/530	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-GSV/531	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-GSV/532	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/000	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/001	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/002	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/010	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/011	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/012	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/020	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-SMG/021	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/022	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/030	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/031	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/032	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/100	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/101	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/102	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/110	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/111	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/112	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/120	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/121	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/122	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/130	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/131	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/132	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/200	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/201	Surface Movement Guidance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	& Control						
AP-SMG/202	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/210	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/211	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/212	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/220	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/221	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/222	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/230	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/231	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/232	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/300	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/301	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/302	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/310	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/311	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/312	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/320	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/321	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-SMG/322	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/330	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/331	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/332	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/400	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/401	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/402	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/410	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/411	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/412	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/420	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/421	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/422	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/430	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/431	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/432	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/500	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/501	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/502	Surface Movement Guidance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	& Control						
AP-SMG/510	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/511	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/512	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/520	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/521	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/522	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-SMG/530	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-SMG/531	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-SMG/532	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-FPI/000	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AP-FPI/001	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AP-FPI/002	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AP-FPI/010	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AP-FPI/011	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AP-FPI/012	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AP-FPI/020	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AP-FPI/021	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AP-FPI/022	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-FPI/030	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AP-FPI/031	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AP-FPI/032	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AP-FPI/100	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-FPI/101	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-FPI/102	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-FPI/110	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-FPI/111	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-FPI/112	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-FPI/120	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-FPI/121	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-FPI/122	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-FPI/130	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-FPI/131	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-FPI/132	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-FPI/200	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-FPI/201	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-FPI/202	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-FPI/210	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-FPI/211	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-FPI/212	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-FPI/220	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-FPI/221	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-FPI/222	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-FPI/230	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-FPI/231	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-FPI/232	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-FPI/300	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-FPI/301	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-FPI/302	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-FPI/310	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-FPI/311	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-FPI/312	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-FPI/320	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-FPI/321	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-FPI/322	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-FPI/330	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-FPI/331	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-FPI/332	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-FPI/400	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-FPI/401	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-FPI/402	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-FPI/410	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-FPI/411	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-FPI/412	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-FPI/420	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-FPI/421	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-FPI/422	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-FPI/430	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-FPI/431	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-FPI/432	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-FPI/500	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-FPI/501	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-FPI/502	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-FPI/510	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-FPI/511	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-FPI/512	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-FPI/520	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-FPI/521	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-FPI/522	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-FPI/530	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-FPI/531	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-FPI/532	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/000	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of	Unit	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
AP-FIA/001	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/002	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/010	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/011	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/012	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/020	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/021	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/022	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/030	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/031	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/032	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/100	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/101	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/102	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/110	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/111	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/112	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/120	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/121	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/122	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/130	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/131	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/132	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/200	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-FIA/201	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/202	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/210	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/211	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/212	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/220	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/221	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/222	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/230	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/231	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/232	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/300	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/301	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/302	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/310	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/311	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/312	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/320	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/321	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/322	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/330	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/331	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/332	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/400	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/401	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/402	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/410	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/411	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/412	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/420	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/421	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/422	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/430	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-FIA/431	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/432	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/500	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/501	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/502	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/510	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/511	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/512	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/520	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/521	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/522	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-FIA/530	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-FIA/531	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-FIA/532	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-ORM/000	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-ORM/001	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-ORM/002	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-ORM/010	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-ORM/011	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-ORM/012	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-ORM/020	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-ORM/021	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-ORM/022	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-ORM/030	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-ORM/031	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-ORM/032	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-ORM/100	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-ORM/101	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-ORM/102	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-ORM/110	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-ORM/111	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-ORM/112	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-ORM/120	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-ORM/121	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-ORM/122	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-ORM/130	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-ORM/131	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-ORM/132	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AP-ORM/200	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-ORM/201	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-ORM/202	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-ORM/210	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-ORM/211	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-ORM/212	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-ORM/220	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AP-ORM/221	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-ORM/222	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-ORM/230	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-ORM/231	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-ORM/232	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-ORM/300	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
AP-ORM/301	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AP-ORM/302	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
AP-ORM/310	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AP-ORM/311	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AP-ORM/312	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AP-ORM/320	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-ORM/321	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AP-ORM/322	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AP-ORM/330	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
AP-ORM/331	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AP-ORM/332	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
AP-ORM/400	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-ORM/401	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-ORM/402	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-ORM/410	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-ORM/411	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-ORM/412	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-ORM/420	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-ORM/421	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-ORM/422	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-ORM/430	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-ORM/431	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-ORM/432	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-ORM/500	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-ORM/501	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-ORM/502	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-ORM/510	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-ORM/511	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-ORM/512	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-ORM/520	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-ORM/521	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-ORM/522	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-ORM/530	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-ORM/531	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-ORM/532	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-DMS/000	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-DMS/001	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-DMS/002	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of	Unit	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
AP-DMS/010	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-DMS/011	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-DMS/012	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-DMS/020	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-DMS/021	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-DMS/022	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-DMS/030	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-DMS/031	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-DMS/032	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AP-DMS/100	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-DMS/101	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-DMS/102	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-DMS/110	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-DMS/111	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-DMS/112	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-DMS/120	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-DMS/121	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-DMS/122	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-DMS/130	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-DMS/131	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-DMS/132	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AP-DMS/200	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-DMS/201	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-DMS/202	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-DMS/210	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-DMS/211	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-DMS/212	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-DMS/220	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-DMS/221	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-DMS/222	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-DMS/230	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-DMS/231	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-DMS/232	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AP-DMS/300	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-DMS/301	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-DMS/302	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-DMS/310	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-DMS/311	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-DMS/312	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-DMS/320	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-DMS/321	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-DMS/322	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-DMS/330	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-DMS/331	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-DMS/332	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-DMS/400	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-DMS/401	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-DMS/402	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-DMS/410	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-DMS/411	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-DMS/412	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-DMS/420	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-DMS/421	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-DMS/422	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-DMS/430	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-DMS/431	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-DMS/432	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-DMS/500	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-DMS/501	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-DMS/502	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-DMS/510	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-DMS/511	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-DMS/512	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-DMS/520	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-DMS/521	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-DMS/522	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-DMS/530	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-DMS/531	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-DMS/532	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/000	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-SNT/001	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-SNT/002	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-SNT/010	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-SNT/011	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-SNT/012	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-SNT/020	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-SNT/021	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-SNT/022	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-SNT/030	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-SNT/031	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-SNT/032	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AP-SNT/033	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of	CWP	Some false	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function		alarms			
AP-SNT/034	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One false alarm	> T1		C
AP-SNT/100	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-SNT/101	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-SNT/102	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-SNT/110	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-SNT/111	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-SNT/112	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-SNT/120	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-SNT/121	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-SNT/122	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-SNT/130	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-SNT/131	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-SNT/132	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AP-SNT/200	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/201	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/202	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/210	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/211	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/212	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/220	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/221	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/222	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/230	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/231	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/232	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/300	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/301	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/302	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/310	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/311	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/312	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-SNT/320	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/321	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/322	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/330	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/331	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/332	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/400	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/401	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/402	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/410	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/411	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/412	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/420	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/421	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/422	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/430	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/431	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/432	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/500	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/501	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/502	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/510	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/511	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/512	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/520	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/521	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/522	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-SNT/530	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-SNT/531	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-SNT/532	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/000	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AP-ASE/001	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-ASE/002	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AP-ASE/010	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AP-ASE/011	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AP-ASE/012	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AP-ASE/020	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AP-ASE/021	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AP-ASE/022	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AP-ASE/030	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AP-ASE/031	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AP-ASE/032	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AP-ASE/100	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-ASE/101	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-ASE/102	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-ASE/110	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-ASE/111	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-ASE/112	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-ASE/120	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-ASE/121	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-ASE/122	Real Time Airspace	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Environment						
AP-ASE/130	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/131	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/132	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/200	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/201	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/202	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/210	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/211	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/212	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/220	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/221	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/222	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/230	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/231	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/232	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/300	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/301	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/302	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-ASE/310	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/311	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/312	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/320	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/321	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/322	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/330	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/331	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/332	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/400	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/401	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/402	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/410	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/411	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/412	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/420	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/421	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/422	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/430	Real Time Airspace	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Environment						
AP-ASE/431	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/432	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/500	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/501	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/502	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/510	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/511	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/512	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/520	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/521	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/522	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-ASE/530	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-ASE/531	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-ASE/532	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/000	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-TFM/001	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-TFM/002	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/010	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-TFM/011	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-TFM/012	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/020	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-TFM/021	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-TFM/022	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/030	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-TFM/031	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-TFM/032	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/100	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-TFM/101	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-TFM/102	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/110	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-TFM/111	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-TFM/112	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/120	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-TFM/121	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-TFM/122	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/130	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-TFM/131	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-TFM/132	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/200	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-TFM/201	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-TFM/202	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/210	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-TFM/211	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-TFM/212	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/220	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-TFM/221	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-TFM/222	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/230	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-TFM/231	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-TFM/232	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/300	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-TFM/301	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-TFM/302	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/310	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-TFM/311	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-TFM/312	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/320	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-TFM/321	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-TFM/322	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/330	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-TFM/331	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-TFM/332	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/400	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-TFM/401	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-TFM/402	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/410	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-TFM/411	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-TFM/412	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/420	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-TFM/421	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-TFM/422	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/430	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-TFM/431	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-TFM/432	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/500	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-TFM/501	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-TFM/502	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/510	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-TFM/511	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-TFM/512	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/520	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-TFM/521	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-TFM/522	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-TFM/530	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-TFM/531	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-TFM/532	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/000	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AP-AIS/001	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AP-AIS/002	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AP-AIS/010	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AP-AIS/011	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AP-AIS/012	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AP-AIS/020	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AP-AIS/021	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AP-AIS/022	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AP-AIS/030	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AP-AIS/031	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AP-AIS/032	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AP-AIS/100	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-AIS/101	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-AIS/102	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-AIS/110	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-AIS/111	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-AIS/112	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-AIS/120	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-AIS/121	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-AIS/122	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-AIS/130	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-AIS/131	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-AIS/132	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AP-AIS/200	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/201	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/202	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/210	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/211	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/212	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/220	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/221	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/222	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/230	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/231	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/232	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/300	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/301	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/302	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/310	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/311	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/312	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/320	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/321	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/322	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/330	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/331	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/332	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/400	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-AIS/401	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/402	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/410	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/411	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/412	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/420	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/421	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/422	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/430	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/431	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/432	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/500	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/501	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/502	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/510	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/511	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/512	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/520	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/521	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/522	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-AIS/530	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-AIS/531	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-AIS/532	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/000	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AP-MET/001	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AP-MET/002	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AP-MET/010	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AP-MET/011	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AP-MET/012	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
AP-MET/020	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AP-MET/021	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AP-MET/022	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AP-MET/030	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AP-MET/031	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AP-MET/032	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AP-MET/100	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AP-MET/101	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AP-MET/102	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AP-MET/110	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AP-MET/111	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AP-MET/112	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AP-MET/120	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AP-MET/121	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AP-MET/122	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AP-MET/130	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AP-MET/131	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AP-MET/132	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AP-MET/200	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/200-1	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/200-2	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/201	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/202	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/210	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/211	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/212	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-MET/220	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/221	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/222	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/230	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/231	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/232	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/300	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/301	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/302	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/310	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/311	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/312	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/320	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/321	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/322	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/330	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/331	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/332	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/400	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/401	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/402	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/410	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/411	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/412	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/420	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/421	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/422	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/430	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/431	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/432	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/500	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/501	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/502	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AP-MET/510	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/511	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/512	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/520	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/521	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/522	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AP-MET/530	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AP-MET/531	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AP-MET/532	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-AGC/000	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		AA
AD-AGC/001	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		AA
AD-AGC/002	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AD-AGC/010	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		AA
AD-AGC/011	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
AD-AGC/012	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AD-AGC/020	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		AA
AD-AGC/021	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		A
AD-AGC/022	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AD-AGC/030	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AD-AGC/031	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AD-AGC/032	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AD-AGC/100	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		AA
AD-AGC/101	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		~~AA~~A
AD-AGC/102	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		~~A~~C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-AGC/110	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		AA
AD-AGC/111	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
AD-AGC/112	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		AC
AD-AGC/120	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		A
AD-AGC/121	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AD-AGC/122	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		AB
AD-AGC/130	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		BC
AD-AGC/131	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		BC
AD-AGC/132	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		BC
AD-AGC/200	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-AGC/201	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-AGC/202	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-AGC/210	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-AGC/211	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-AGC/212	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-AGC/220	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-AGC/221	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-AGC/222	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-AGC/230	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-AGC/231	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-AGC/232	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AD-AGC/300	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-AGC/301	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-AGC/302	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-AGC/310	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-AGC/311	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-AGC/312	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-AGC/320	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-AGC/321	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-AGC/322	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-AGC/330	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-AGC/331	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-AGC/332	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-AGC/400	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-AGC/401	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-AGC/402	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-AGC/410	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-AGC/411	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-AGC/412	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-AGC/420	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-AGC/421	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-AGC/422	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-AGC/430	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-AGC/431	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-AGC/432	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-AGC/500	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-AGC/501	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-AGC/502	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-AGC/510	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-AGC/511	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-AGC/512	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-AGC/520	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-AGC/521	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-AGC/522	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-AGC/530	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-AGC/531	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-AGC/532	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/000	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AD-GGC/001	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-GGC/002	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-GGC/010	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-GGC/011	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-GGC/012	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-GGC/020	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-GGC/021	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-GGC/022	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-GGC/030	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/031	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/032	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/100	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AD-GGC/101	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-GGC/102	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-GGC/110	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-GGC/111	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-GGC/112	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-GGC/120	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-GGC/121	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-GGC/122	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-GGC/130	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/131	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/132	Ground/Ground	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Communication						
AD-GGC/200	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-GGC/201	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-GGC/202	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-GGC/210	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-GGC/211	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-GGC/212	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-GGC/220	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-GGC/221	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-GGC/222	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-GGC/230	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/231	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/232	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/300	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/301	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/302	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/310	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/311	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/312	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-GGC/320	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/321	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/322	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/330	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/331	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/332	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/400	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/401	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/402	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/410	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/411	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/412	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/420	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/421	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/422	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/430	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/431	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/432	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/500	Ground/Ground	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Communication						
AD-GGC/501	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/502	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/510	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/511	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/512	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/520	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/521	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/522	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-GGC/530	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-GGC/531	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-GGC/532	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-NAV/000	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Departure/Arrival	runway horizontal guidance	>T1		A
AD-NAV/003	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Departure/Arrival	taxiway horizontal guidance	>T1		A
AD-NAV/001	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Arrival	vertical guidance	> T1		A
AD-NAV/002	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Arrival	STAR	> T1		B
AD-NAV/010	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Departure	SID	> T1		B
AD-NAV/011	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Departure	Parallel take-off	> T1		B

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-NAV/100	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Departure/Arrival	runway horizontal guidance	>T1		C
AD-NAV/103	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Departure/Arrival	taxiway horizontal guidance	>T1		C
AD-NAV/101	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Arrival	vertical guidance	> T1		C
AD-NAV/102	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Arrival	STAR	> T1		C
AD-NAV/111	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Departure	SID	> T1		C
AD-NAV/112	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Departure	Parallel take-off	> T1		B
AD-NAV/200	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Departure/Arrival	runway horizontal guidance	> T1		C
AD-NAV/203	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Departure/Arrival	taxiway horizontal guidance	> T1		C
AD-NAV/201	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Arrival	vertical guidance	> T1		X
AD-NAV/202	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Arrival	STAR	> T1		X
AD-NAV/210	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Departure	SID	> T1		X
AD-NAV/211	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Departure	Parallel take-off	> T1		X
AD-NAV/300	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Departure/Arrival	runway horizontal guidance	>T1		E
AD-NAV/303	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Departure/Arrival	taxiway horizontal guidance	>T1		E
AD-NAV/301	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Arrival	vertical guidance	> T1		E
AD-NAV/302	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Arrival	STAR	> T1		E
AD-NAV/310	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Departure	SID	> T1		E
AD-NAV/311	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Departure	Parallel take-off	> T1		E
AD-NAV/400	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Departure/Arrival	runway horizontal guidance	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-NAV/403	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Departure/Arrival	taxiway horizontal guidance	> T1		E
AD-NAV/401	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Arrival	vertical guidance	> T1		C
AD-NAV/402	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Arrival	STAR	> T1		E
AD-NAV/410	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Departure	SID	> T1		E
AD-NAV/411	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Departure	Parallel take-off	> T1		E
AD-NAV/412	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-NAV/420	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-NAV/421	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-NAV/422	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-NAV/430	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-NAV/431	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-NAV/432	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-NAV/500	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Departure/Arrival	runway horizontal guidance	> T1		A
AD-NAV/503	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Departure/Arrival	taxiway horizontal guidance	> T1		A
AD-NAV/501	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Arrival	vertical guidance	> T1		A
AD-NAV/502	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Arrival	STAR	> T1		E
AD-NAV/510	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Departure	SID	> T1		E
AD-NAV/511	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Departure	Parallel take-off	> T1		E
AD-NAV/512	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-NAV/520	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-NAV/521	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-NAV/522	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-NAV/530	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-NAV/531	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-NAV/532	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-ASV/000	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		A

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-ASV/001	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		A
AD-ASV/002	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		A
AD-ASV/010	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		A
AD-ASV/011	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
AD-ASV/012	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		A
AD-ASV/013	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some false targets	> T1		C
AD-ASV/014	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One false target	> T1		C
AD-ASV/020	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		A
AD-ASV/021	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		A
AD-ASV/022	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		A
AD-ASV/023	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some false targets	> T1		C
AD-ASV/024	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One false target	> T1		C
AD-ASV/030	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		A
AD-ASV/031	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		A
AD-ASV/032	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		A
AD-ASV/033	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some false targets	> T1		C
AD-ASV/034	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One false target	> T1		C
AD-ASV/100	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AD-ASV/101	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AD-ASV/102	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		B

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-ASV/110	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AD-ASV/111	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AD-ASV/112	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AD-ASV/120	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AD-ASV/121	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AD-ASV/122	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AD-ASV/130	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AD-ASV/131	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AD-ASV/132	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AD-ASV/200	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AD-ASV/201	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AD-ASV/202	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AD-ASV/210	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AD-ASV/211	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AD-ASV/212	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AD-ASV/220	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AD-ASV/221	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AD-ASV/222	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AD-ASV/230	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AD-ASV/231	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AD-ASV/232	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AD-ASV/300	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-ASV/301	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-ASV/302	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-ASV/310	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-ASV/311	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-ASV/312	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-ASV/320	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-ASV/321	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-ASV/322	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-ASV/330	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-ASV/331	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-ASV/332	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-ASV/400	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-ASV/401	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASV/402	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-ASV/410	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-ASV/411	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASV/412	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-ASV/420	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-ASV/421	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASV/422	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-ASV/430	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-ASV/431	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASV/432	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-ASV/500	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-ASV/501	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASV/502	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-ASV/510	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-ASV/511	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASV/512	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-ASV/520	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-ASV/521	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASV/522	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-ASV/530	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-ASV/531	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASV/532	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/000	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AD-GSV/001	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AD-GSV/002	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AD-GSV/010	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AD-GSV/011	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-GSV/012	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AD-GSV/020	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AD-GSV/021	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AD-GSV/022	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AD-GSV/030	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AD-GSV/031	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AD-GSV/032	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AD-GSV/100	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-GSV/101	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-GSV/102	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-GSV/110	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-GSV/111	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-GSV/112	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-GSV/120	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-GSV/121	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-GSV/122	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-GSV/130	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-GSV/131	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-GSV/132	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AD-GSV/200	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-GSV/201	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-GSV/202	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/210	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-GSV/211	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-GSV/212	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/220	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-GSV/221	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-GSV/222	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-GSV/230	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-GSV/231	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-GSV/232	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/300	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-GSV/301	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-GSV/302	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/310	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-GSV/311	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-GSV/312	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/320	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-GSV/321	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-GSV/322	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/330	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-GSV/331	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-GSV/332	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/400	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-GSV/401	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-GSV/402	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/410	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-GSV/411	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-GSV/412	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/420	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-GSV/421	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-GSV/422	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/430	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-GSV/431	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-GSV/432	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/500	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-GSV/501	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-GSV/502	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/510	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-GSV/511	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-GSV/512	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-GSV/520	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-GSV/521	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-GSV/522	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-GSV/530	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-GSV/531	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-GSV/532	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/000	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AD-SMG/001	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AD-SMG/002	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AD-SMG/010	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AD-SMG/011	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AD-SMG/012	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AD-SMG/020	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AD-SMG/021	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AD-SMG/022	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AD-SMG/030	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AD-SMG/031	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AD-SMG/032	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AD-SMG/100	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-SMG/101	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-SMG/102	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-SMG/110	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-SMG/111	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-SMG/112	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-SMG/120	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-SMG/121	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-SMG/122	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-SMG/130	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-SMG/131	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-SMG/132	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AD-SMG/200	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-SMG/201	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-SMG/202	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/210	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-SMG/211	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-SMG/212	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/220	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-SMG/221	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-SMG/222	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/230	Surface Movement Guidance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	& Control						
AD-SMG/231	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-SMG/232	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/300	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-SMG/301	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-SMG/302	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/310	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-SMG/311	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-SMG/312	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/320	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-SMG/321	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-SMG/322	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/330	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-SMG/331	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-SMG/332	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/400	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-SMG/401	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-SMG/402	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/410	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-SMG/411	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-SMG/412	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/420	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-SMG/421	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-SMG/422	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/430	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-SMG/431	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-SMG/432	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/500	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-SMG/501	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-SMG/502	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/510	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-SMG/511	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-SMG/512	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/520	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-SMG/521	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-SMG/522	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-SMG/530	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-SMG/531	Surface Movement Guidance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	& Control						
AD-SMG/532	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-FPI/000	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-FPI/001	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AD-FPI/002	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-FPI/010	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-FPI/011	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-FPI/012	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-FPI/020	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-FPI/021	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-FPI/022	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-FPI/030	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-FPI/031	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-FPI/032	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AD-FPI/100	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-FPI/101	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-FPI/102	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-FPI/110	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-FPI/111	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-FPI/112	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-FPI/120	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-FPI/121	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-FPI/122	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-FPI/130	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AD-FPI/131	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AD-FPI/132	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AD-FPI/200	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-FPI/201	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-FPI/202	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-FPI/210	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-FPI/211	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-FPI/212	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-FPI/220	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-FPI/221	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-FPI/222	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-FPI/230	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AD-FPI/231	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AD-FPI/232	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AD-FPI/300	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-FPI/301	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AD-FPI/302	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
AD-FPI/310	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-FPI/311	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AD-FPI/312	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AD-FPI/320	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-FPI/321	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AD-FPI/322	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AD-FPI/330	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
AD-FPI/331	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AD-FPI/332	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
AD-FPI/400	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-FPI/401	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-FPI/402	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-FPI/410	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-FPI/411	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-FPI/412	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-FPI/420	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-FPI/421	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-FPI/422	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-FPI/430	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-FPI/431	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-FPI/432	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-FPI/500	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-FPI/501	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-FPI/502	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-FPI/510	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-FPI/511	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-FPI/512	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-FPI/520	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-FPI/521	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-FPI/522	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-FPI/530	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-FPI/531	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-FPI/532	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/000	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/001	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/002	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/010	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/011	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/012	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/020	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/021	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/022	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
AD-FIA/030	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/031	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/032	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/100	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/101	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/102	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/110	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/111	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/112	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/120	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/121	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/122	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/130	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/131	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/132	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/200	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/201	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/202	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/210	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/211	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/212	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/220	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/221	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/222	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/230	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/231	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/232	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/300	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/301	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/302	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-FIA/310	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/311	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/312	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/320	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/321	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/322	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/330	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/331	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/332	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/400	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/401	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/402	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/410	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/411	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/412	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/420	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/421	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/422	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/430	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/431	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/432	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/500	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/501	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/502	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/510	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/511	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/512	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/520	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/521	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/522	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-FIA/530	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-FIA/531	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-FIA/532	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-ORM/000	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AD-ORM/001	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AD-ORM/002	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AD-ORM/010	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AD-ORM/011	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AD-ORM/012	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AD-ORM/020	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AD-ORM/021	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AD-ORM/022	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AD-ORM/030	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AD-ORM/031	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AD-ORM/032	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AD-ORM/100	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-ORM/101	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-ORM/102	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-ORM/110	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-ORM/111	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-ORM/112	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-ORM/120	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-ORM/121	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-ORM/122	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-ORM/130	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-ORM/131	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-ORM/132	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-ORM/200	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
AD-ORM/201	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AD-ORM/202	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
AD-ORM/210	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AD-ORM/211	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AD-ORM/212	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AD-ORM/220	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AD-ORM/221	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AD-ORM/222	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AD-ORM/230	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
AD-ORM/231	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AD-ORM/232	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
AD-ORM/300	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
AD-ORM/301	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
AD-ORM/302	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
AD-ORM/310	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
AD-ORM/311	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
AD-ORM/312	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
AD-ORM/320	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
AD-ORM/321	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
AD-ORM/322	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
AD-ORM/330	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
AD-ORM/331	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
AD-ORM/332	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
AD-ORM/400	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-ORM/401	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-ORM/402	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-ORM/410	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-ORM/411	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-ORM/412	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-ORM/420	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-ORM/421	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-ORM/422	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-ORM/430	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-ORM/431	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-ORM/432	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-ORM/500	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-ORM/501	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-ORM/502	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-ORM/510	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-ORM/511	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-ORM/512	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-ORM/520	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-ORM/521	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-ORM/522	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-ORM/530	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-ORM/531	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-ORM/532	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-DMS/000	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-DMS/001	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-DMS/002	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-DMS/010	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-DMS/011	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-DMS/012	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-DMS/020	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-DMS/021	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-DMS/022	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-DMS/030	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-DMS/031	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-DMS/032	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AD-DMS/100	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-DMS/101	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-DMS/102	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-DMS/110	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-DMS/111	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-DMS/112	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-DMS/120	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-DMS/121	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-DMS/122	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-DMS/130	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-DMS/131	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-DMS/132	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AD-DMS/200	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-DMS/201	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-DMS/202	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-DMS/210	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-DMS/211	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-DMS/212	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-DMS/220	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-DMS/221	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-DMS/222	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-DMS/230	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-DMS/231	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-DMS/232	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AD-DMS/300	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-DMS/301	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-DMS/302	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-DMS/310	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-DMS/311	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-DMS/312	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-DMS/320	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-DMS/321	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-DMS/322	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-DMS/330	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-DMS/331	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-DMS/332	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-DMS/400	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-DMS/401	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-DMS/402	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-DMS/410	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-DMS/411	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-DMS/412	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-DMS/420	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-DMS/421	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-DMS/422	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-DMS/430	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-DMS/431	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-DMS/432	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-DMS/500	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-DMS/501	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-DMS/502	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-DMS/510	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-DMS/511	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-DMS/512	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-DMS/520	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-DMS/521	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-DMS/522	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-DMS/530	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-DMS/531	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-DMS/532	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/000	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-SNT/001	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-SNT/002	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-SNT/010	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-SNT/011	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-SNT/012	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-SNT/020	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-SNT/021	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-SNT/022	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-SNT/030	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-SNT/031	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-SNT/032	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AD-SNT/033	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some false alarms	> T1		C
AD-SNT/034	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One false alarm	> T1		C
AD-SNT/100	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-SNT/101	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-SNT/102	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-SNT/110	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-SNT/111	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-SNT/112	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-SNT/120	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-SNT/121	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-SNT/122	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-SNT/130	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-SNT/131	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-SNT/132	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-SNT/200	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/201	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/202	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/210	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/211	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/212	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/220	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/221	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/222	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/230	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/231	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/232	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/300	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/301	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/302	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/310	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/311	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/312	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/320	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/321	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/322	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/330	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/331	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/332	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/400	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/401	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/402	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/410	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/411	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/412	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/420	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/421	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/422	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-SNT/430	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/431	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/432	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/500	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/501	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/502	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/510	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/511	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/512	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/520	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/521	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/522	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-SNT/530	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-SNT/531	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-SNT/532	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/000	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AD-ASE/001	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AD-ASE/002	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AD-ASE/010	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AD-ASE/011	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AD-ASE/012	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AD-ASE/020	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AD-ASE/021	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AD-ASE/022	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AD-ASE/030	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		B

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-ASE/031	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AD-ASE/032	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AD-ASE/100	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-ASE/101	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-ASE/102	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-ASE/110	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-ASE/111	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-ASE/112	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-ASE/120	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-ASE/121	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-ASE/122	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-ASE/130	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/131	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/132	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/200	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-ASE/201	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-ASE/202	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-ASE/210	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/211	Real Time Airspace	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Environment						
AD-ASE/212	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/220	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/221	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/222	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/230	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/231	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/232	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/300	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/301	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/302	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/310	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/311	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/312	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/320	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/321	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/322	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/330	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/331	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-ASE/332	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/400	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/401	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/402	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/410	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/411	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/412	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/420	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/421	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/422	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/430	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/431	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/432	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/500	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/501	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/502	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/510	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/511	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/512	Real Time Airspace	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Environment						
AD-ASE/520	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/521	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/522	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-ASE/530	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-ASE/531	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-ASE/532	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/000	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-TFM/001	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-TFM/002	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/010	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-TFM/011	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-TFM/012	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/020	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-TFM/021	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-TFM/022	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/030	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-TFM/031	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-TFM/032	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-TFM/100	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-TFM/101	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-TFM/102	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/110	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-TFM/111	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-TFM/112	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/120	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-TFM/121	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-TFM/122	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/130	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-TFM/131	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-TFM/132	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/200	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-TFM/201	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-TFM/202	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/210	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-TFM/211	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-TFM/212	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/220	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-TFM/221	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-TFM/222	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/230	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-TFM/231	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-TFM/232	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/300	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-TFM/301	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-TFM/302	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/310	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-TFM/311	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-TFM/312	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/320	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-TFM/321	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-TFM/322	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-TFM/330	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-TFM/331	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-TFM/332	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/400	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-TFM/401	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-TFM/402	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/410	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-TFM/411	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-TFM/412	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/420	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-TFM/421	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-TFM/422	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/430	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-TFM/431	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-TFM/432	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/500	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-TFM/501	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-TFM/502	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/510	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-TFM/511	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-TFM/512	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/520	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-TFM/521	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-TFM/522	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-TFM/530	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-TFM/531	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-TFM/532	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/000	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-AIS/001	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-AIS/002	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-AIS/010	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
AD-AIS/011	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-AIS/012	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-AIS/020	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-AIS/021	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-AIS/022	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-AIS/030	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-AIS/031	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-AIS/032	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AD-AIS/100	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-AIS/101	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-AIS/102	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
AD-AIS/110	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-AIS/111	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-AIS/112	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-AIS/120	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-AIS/121	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-AIS/122	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-AIS/130	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-AIS/131	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-AIS/132	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AD-AIS/200	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/201	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/202	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/210	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/211	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/212	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-AIS/220	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/221	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/222	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/230	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/231	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/232	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/300	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/301	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/302	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/310	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/311	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/312	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/320	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/321	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/322	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/330	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/331	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/332	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/400	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/401	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/402	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/410	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/411	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/412	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/420	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/421	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/422	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/430	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/431	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/432	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/500	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/501	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/502	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-AIS/510	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/511	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/512	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/520	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/521	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/522	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-AIS/530	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-AIS/531	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-AIS/532	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/000	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
AD-MET/001	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
AD-MET/002	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
AD-MET/010	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
AD-MET/011	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
AD-MET/012	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
AD-MET/020	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
AD-MET/021	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
AD-MET/022	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
AD-MET/030	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
AD-MET/031	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
AD-MET/032	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
AD-MET/100	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
AD-MET/101	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
AD-MET/102	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-MET/110	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
AD-MET/111	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
AD-MET/112	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
AD-MET/120	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
AD-MET/121	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
AD-MET/122	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
AD-MET/130	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
AD-MET/131	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
AD-MET/132	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
AD-MET/200	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/201	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/202	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/210	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/211	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/212	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/220	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/221	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/222	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/230	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/231	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/232	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/300	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/301	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/302	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/310	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/311	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/312	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/320	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/321	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/322	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/330	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/331	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/332	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
AD-MET/400	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/401	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/402	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/410	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/411	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/412	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/420	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/421	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/422	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/430	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/431	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/432	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/500	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/501	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/502	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/510	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/511	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/512	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/520	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/521	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/522	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
AD-MET/530	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
AD-MET/531	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
AD-MET/532	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-AGC/000	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		AA
OC-AGC/001	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		A
OC-AGC/002	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		A
OC-AGC/010	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		A
OC-AGC/011	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-AGC/012	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
OC-AGC/020	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		A
OC-AGC/021	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		A
OC-AGC/022	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
OC-AGC/030	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		A
OC-AGC/031	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		A
OC-AGC/032	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
OC-AGC/100	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
OC-AGC/101	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
OC-AGC/102	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
OC-AGC/110	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-AGC/111	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
OC-AGC/112	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
OC-AGC/120	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
OC-AGC/121	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
OC-AGC/122	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
OC-AGC/130	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
OC-AGC/131	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
OC-AGC/132	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
OC-AGC/200	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-AGC/201	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
OC-AGC/202	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
OC-AGC/210	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-AGC/211	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
OC-AGC/212	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
OC-AGC/220	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
OC-AGC/221	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
OC-AGC/222	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-AGC/230	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
OC-AGC/231	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
OC-AGC/232	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
OC-AGC/300	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-AGC/301	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/302	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-AGC/310	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-AGC/311	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/312	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-AGC/320	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-AGC/321	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/322	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-AGC/330	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-AGC/331	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/332	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-AGC/400	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-AGC/401	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/402	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-AGC/410	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-AGC/411	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/412	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-AGC/420	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-AGC/421	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/422	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-AGC/430	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-AGC/431	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/432	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-AGC/500	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-AGC/501	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/502	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-AGC/510	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-AGC/511	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/512	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-AGC/520	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-AGC/521	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/522	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-AGC/530	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-AGC/531	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/532	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/000	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		A
OC-GGC/001	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		A
OC-GGC/002	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
OC-GGC/010	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		A
OC-GGC/011	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
OC-GGC/012	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
OC-GGC/020	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		A
OC-GGC/021	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		A
OC-GGC/022	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
OC-GGC/030	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		A
OC-GGC/031	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		A
OC-GGC/032	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
OC-GGC/100	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-GGC/101	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
OC-GGC/102	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-GGC/110	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-GGC/111	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
OC-GGC/112	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
OC-GGC/120	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
OC-GGC/121	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
OC-GGC/122	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
OC-GGC/130	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-GGC/131	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-GGC/132	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/200	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-GGC/201	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
OC-GGC/202	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
OC-GGC/210	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-GGC/211	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
OC-GGC/212	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
OC-GGC/220	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
OC-GGC/221	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
OC-GGC/222	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
OC-GGC/230	Ground/Ground	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Communication						
OC-GGC/231	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-GGC/232	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/300	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-GGC/301	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-GGC/302	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/310	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-GGC/311	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-GGC/312	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/320	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-GGC/321	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-GGC/322	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/330	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-GGC/331	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-GGC/332	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/400	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-GGC/401	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-GGC/402	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/410	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-GGC/411	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-GGC/412	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/420	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-GGC/421	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-GGC/422	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/430	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-GGC/431	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-GGC/432	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/500	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-GGC/501	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		C
OC-GGC/502	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		C
OC-GGC/510	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-GGC/511	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-GGC/512	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/520	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
OC-GGC/521	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-GGC/522	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-GGC/530	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		C
OC-GGC/531	Ground/Ground	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Communication						
OC-GGC/532	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-NAV/000	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/001	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/002	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/010	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/011	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/012	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/020	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/021	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/022	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/030	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/031	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/032	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/100	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/101	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/102	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/110	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/111	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/112	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/120	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/121	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/122	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-NAV/130	Navigation	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/131	Navigation	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/132	Navigation	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/200	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/201	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/202	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/210	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/211	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/212	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/220	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/221	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/222	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/230	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/231	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/232	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/300	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/301	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/302	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/310	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/311	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/312	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/320	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/321	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/322	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/330	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/331	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/332	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/400	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/401	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/402	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/410	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/411	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/412	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-NAV/420	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/421	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/422	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/430	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/431	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/432	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/500	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/501	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/502	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/510	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/511	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/512	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/520	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/521	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/522	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-NAV/530	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-NAV/531	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-NAV/532	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-ASV/000	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		AA
OC-ASV/001	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		A
OC-ASV/002	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		A
OC-ASV/010	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		A
OC-ASV/011	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		A
OC-ASV/012	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B
OC-ASV/020	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		A
OC-ASV/021	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		A
OC-ASV/022	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
OC-ASV/030	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		A
OC-ASV/031	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		A
OC-ASV/032	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
OC-ASV/100	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
OC-ASV/101	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
OC-ASV/102	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
OC-ASV/110	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-ASV/111	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
OC-ASV/112	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
OC-ASV/120	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
OC-ASV/121	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
OC-ASV/122	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
OC-ASV/130	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/131	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/132	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/200	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/201	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/202	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/210	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/211	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/212	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/220	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/221	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/222	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/230	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/231	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/232	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/300	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/301	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/302	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-ASV/310	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/311	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/312	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/320	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/321	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/322	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/330	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/331	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/332	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/400	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/401	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/402	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/410	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/411	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/412	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/420	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/421	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/422	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/430	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/431	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/432	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/500	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/501	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/502	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/510	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/511	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/512	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/520	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/521	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/522	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-ASV/530	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ASV/531	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASV/532	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-GSV/000	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/001	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/002	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/010	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/011	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/012	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/020	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/021	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/022	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/030	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/031	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/032	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/100	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/101	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/102	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/110	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/111	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/112	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/120	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/121	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/122	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/130	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/131	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/132	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-GSV/200	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/201	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/202	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/210	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/211	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/212	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/220	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/221	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/222	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/230	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/231	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/232	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/300	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/301	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/302	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/310	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/311	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/312	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/320	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/321	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/322	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/330	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/331	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/332	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/400	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/401	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/402	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/410	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/411	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/412	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/420	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/421	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/422	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-GSV/430	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/431	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/432	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/500	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/501	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/502	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/510	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/511	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/512	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/520	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/521	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/522	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-GSV/530	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-GSV/531	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-GSV/532	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/000	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/001	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/002	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/010	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/011	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/012	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/020	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/021	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/022	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/030	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-SMG/031	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/032	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/100	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/101	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/102	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/110	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/111	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/112	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/120	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/121	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/122	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/130	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/131	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/132	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/200	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/201	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/202	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/210	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/211	Surface Movement Guidance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	& Control						
OC-SMG/212	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/220	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/221	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/222	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/230	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/231	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/232	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/300	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/301	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/302	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/310	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/311	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/312	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/320	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/321	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/322	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/330	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/331	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-SMG/332	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/400	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/401	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/402	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/410	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/411	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/412	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/420	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/421	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/422	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/430	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/431	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/432	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/500	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/501	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/502	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/510	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/511	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/512	Surface Movement Guidance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	& Control						
OC-SMG/520	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/521	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/522	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-SMG/530	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-SMG/531	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-SMG/532	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-FPI/000	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-FPI/001	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
OC-FPI/002	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/010	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-FPI/011	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-FPI/012	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/020	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
OC-FPI/021	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-FPI/022	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/030	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
OC-FPI/031	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-FPI/032	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-FPI/100	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-FPI/101	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
OC-FPI/102	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
OC-FPI/110	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-FPI/111	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
OC-FPI/112	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
OC-FPI/120	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
OC-FPI/121	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
OC-FPI/122	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/130	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
OC-FPI/131	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
OC-FPI/132	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/200	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-FPI/201	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
OC-FPI/202	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/210	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-FPI/211	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
OC-FPI/212	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/220	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
OC-FPI/221	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
OC-FPI/222	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/230	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-FPI/231	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-FPI/232	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/300	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-FPI/301	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-FPI/302	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/310	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-FPI/311	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-FPI/312	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/320	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-FPI/321	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-FPI/322	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-FPI/330	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-FPI/331	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-FPI/332	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/400	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-FPI/401	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-FPI/402	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/410	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-FPI/411	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-FPI/412	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/420	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-FPI/421	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-FPI/422	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/430	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-FPI/431	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-FPI/432	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-FPI/500	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-FPI/501	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-FPI/502	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-FPI/510	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-FPI/511	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-FPI/512	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-FPI/520	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-FPI/521	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-FPI/522	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-FPI/530	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-FPI/531	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-FPI/532	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-FIA/000	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/001	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/002	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/010	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
OC-FIA/011	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/012	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/020	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/021	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/022	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/030	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/031	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/032	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/100	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/101	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/102	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/110	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/111	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/112	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/120	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/121	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/122	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/130	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/131	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/132	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/200	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/201	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/202	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/210	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/211	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/212	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-FIA/220	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/221	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/222	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/230	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/231	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/232	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/300	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/301	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/302	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/310	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/311	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/312	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/320	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/321	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/322	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/330	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/331	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/332	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/400	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/401	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/402	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/410	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/411	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/412	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/420	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/421	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/422	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/430	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/431	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/432	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/500	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/501	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/502	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-FIA/510	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/511	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/512	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/520	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/521	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/522	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-FIA/530	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-FIA/531	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-FIA/532	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/000	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-ORM/001	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/002	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/010	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/011	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/012	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/020	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/021	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/022	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/030	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/031	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/032	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/100	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
ORM/101							
OC-ORM/102	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/110	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-ORM/111	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
OC-ORM/112	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/120	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
OC-ORM/121	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-ORM/122	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-ORM/130	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/131	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-ORM/132	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-ORM/200	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-ORM/201	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/202	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/210	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/211	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/212	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/220	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/221	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-ORM/222	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-ORM/230	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/231	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-ORM/232	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-ORM/300	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/301	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/302	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/310	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/311	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/312	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/320	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/321	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/322	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/330	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/331	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/332	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/400	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/401	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
ORM/402							
OC-ORM/410	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/411	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/412	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/420	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/421	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/422	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/430	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/431	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/432	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/500	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/501	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/502	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/510	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/511	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/512	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ORM/520	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/521	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/522	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-ORM/530	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ORM/531	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-ORM/532	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/000	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/001	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/002	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/010	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/011	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/012	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/020	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/021	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/022	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/030	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/031	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/032	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/100	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/101	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/102	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/110	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/111	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/112	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-DMS/120	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/121	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/122	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/130	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/131	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/132	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/200	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/201	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/202	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/210	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/211	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/212	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/220	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/221	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/222	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/230	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/231	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/232	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/300	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/301	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/302	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/310	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/311	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/312	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/320	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/321	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/322	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/330	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/331	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/332	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/400	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/401	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/402	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-DMS/410	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/411	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/412	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/420	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/421	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/422	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/430	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/431	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/432	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/500	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/501	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/502	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/510	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/511	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/512	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/520	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/521	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/522	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-DMS/530	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-DMS/531	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-DMS/532	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-SNT/000	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-SNT/001	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
OC-SNT/002	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
OC-SNT/010	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-SNT/011	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
OC-SNT/012	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
OC-SNT/020	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-SNT/021	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
OC-SNT/022	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
OC-SNT/030	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
OC-SNT/031	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
OC-SNT/032	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
OC-SNT/100	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-SNT/101	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
OC-SNT/102	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
OC-SNT/110	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-SNT/111	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
OC-SNT/112	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
OC-SNT/120	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
OC-SNT/121	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
OC-SNT/122	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
OC-SNT/130	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
OC-SNT/131	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
OC-SNT/132	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
OC-SNT/200	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-SNT/201	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-SNT/202	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-SNT/210	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-SNT/211	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-SNT/212	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-SNT/220	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-SNT/221	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-SNT/222	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-SNT/230	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-SNT/231	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-SNT/232	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-SNT/300	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-SNT/301	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-SNT/302	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-SNT/310	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-SNT/311	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-SNT/312	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-SNT/320	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-SNT/321	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-SNT/322	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-SNT/330	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-SNT/331	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-SNT/332	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-SNT/400	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-SNT/401	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-SNT/402	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-SNT/410	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-SNT/411	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-SNT/412	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-SNT/420	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-SNT/421	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-SNT/422	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-SNT/430	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-SNT/431	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-SNT/432	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-SNT/500	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-SNT/501	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-SNT/502	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-SNT/510	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-SNT/511	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-SNT/512	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-SNT/520	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-SNT/521	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-SNT/522	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-SNT/530	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-SNT/531	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-SNT/532	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-ASE/000	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-ASE/001	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASE/002	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-ASE/010	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-ASE/011	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASE/012	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ASE/020	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-ASE/021	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASE/022	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-ASE/030	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ASE/031	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASE/032	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-ASE/100	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-ASE/101	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASE/102	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-ASE/110	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-ASE/111	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-ASE/112	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ASE/120	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-ASE/121	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASE/122	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-ASE/130	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ASE/131	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASE/132	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-ASE/200	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-ASE/201	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASE/202	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-ASE/210	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-ASE/211	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASE/212	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-ASE/220	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-ASE/221	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASE/222	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-ASE/230	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-ASE/231	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-ASE/232	Real Time Airspace	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Environment						
OC-ASE/300	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-ASE/301	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-ASE/302	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-ASE/310	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-ASE/311	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-ASE/312	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-ASE/320	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-ASE/321	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-ASE/322	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-ASE/330	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-ASE/331	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-ASE/332	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-ASE/400	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-ASE/401	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-ASE/402	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-ASE/410	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-ASE/411	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-ASE/412	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-ASE/420	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-ASE/421	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-ASE/422	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-ASE/430	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-ASE/431	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-ASE/432	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-ASE/500	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-ASE/501	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-ASE/502	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-ASE/510	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-ASE/511	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-ASE/512	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-ASE/520	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-ASE/521	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-ASE/522	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-ASE/530	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-ASE/531	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-ASE/532	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-TFM/000	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of	Unit	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
OC-TFM/001	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-TFM/002	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-TFM/010	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-TFM/011	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-TFM/012	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-TFM/020	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-TFM/021	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-TFM/022	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-TFM/030	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-TFM/031	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-TFM/032	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-TFM/100	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-TFM/101	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-TFM/102	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-TFM/110	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-TFM/111	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-TFM/112	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-TFM/120	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-TFM/121	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-TFM/122	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-TFM/130	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-TFM/131	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-TFM/132	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-TFM/200	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-TFM/201	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-TFM/202	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-TFM/210	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-TFM/211	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-TFM/212	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-TFM/220	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-TFM/221	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-TFM/222	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-TFM/230	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-TFM/231	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-TFM/232	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-TFM/300	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-TFM/301	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-TFM/302	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-TFM/310	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-TFM/311	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-TFM/312	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-TFM/320	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-TFM/321	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-TFM/322	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-TFM/330	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-TFM/331	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-TFM/332	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-TFM/400	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-TFM/401	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-TFM/402	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-TFM/410	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-TFM/411	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-TFM/412	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-TFM/420	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-TFM/421	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-TFM/422	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-TFM/430	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-TFM/431	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-TFM/432	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-TFM/500	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-TFM/501	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-TFM/502	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-TFM/510	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-TFM/511	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-TFM/512	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-TFM/520	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-TFM/521	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-TFM/522	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-TFM/530	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-TFM/531	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-TFM/532	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-AIS/000	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/001	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/002	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/010	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/011	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/012	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/020	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/021	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/022	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/030	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/031	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-AIS/032	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/100	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/101	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/102	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/110	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/111	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/112	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/120	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/121	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/122	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/130	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/131	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/132	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/200	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/201	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/202	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/210	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/211	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/212	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/220	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/221	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/222	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/230	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/231	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/232	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/300	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/301	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/302	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/310	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/311	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/312	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/320	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-AIS/321	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/322	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/330	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-AIS/331	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-AIS/332	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-AIS/400	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-AIS/401	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-AIS/402	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-AIS/410	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-AIS/411	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-AIS/412	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-AIS/420	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-AIS/421	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-AIS/422	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-AIS/430	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-AIS/431	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-AIS/432	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-AIS/500	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-AIS/501	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-AIS/502	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-AIS/510	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-AIS/511	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-AIS/512	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-AIS/520	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-AIS/521	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-AIS/522	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-AIS/530	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-AIS/531	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-AIS/532	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-MET/000	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
OC-MET/001	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
OC-MET/002	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of	Unit	One	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
OC-MET/010	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
OC-MET/011	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
OC-MET/012	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
OC-MET/020	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
OC-MET/021	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
OC-MET/022	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
OC-MET/030	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
OC-MET/031	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
OC-MET/032	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
OC-MET/100	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
OC-MET/101	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-MET/102	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-MET/110	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
OC-MET/111	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-MET/112	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-MET/120	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-MET/121	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-MET/122	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-MET/130	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-MET/131	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-MET/132	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-MET/200	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
OC-MET/201	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
OC-MET/202	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
OC-MET/210	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-MET/211	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
OC-MET/212	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
OC-MET/220	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
OC-MET/221	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
OC-MET/222	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
OC-MET/230	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
OC-MET/231	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
OC-MET/232	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
OC-MET/300	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-MET/301	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-MET/302	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-MET/310	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-MET/311	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-MET/312	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-MET/320	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-MET/321	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-MET/322	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-MET/330	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-MET/331	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-MET/332	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-MET/400	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
OC-MET/401	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-MET/402	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-MET/410	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-MET/411	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-MET/412	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-MET/420	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-MET/421	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-MET/422	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-MET/430	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-MET/431	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-MET/432	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
OC-MET/500	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
OC-MET/501	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-MET/502	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
OC-MET/510	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
OC-MET/511	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
OC-MET/512	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
OC-MET/520	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
OC-MET/521	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
OC-MET/522	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
OC-MET/530	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
OC-MET/531	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
OC-MET/532	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/000	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/001	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/002	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/010	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/011	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/012	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/020	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/021	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/022	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/030	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/031	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/032	Air/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/100	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-AGC/101	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/102	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/110	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/111	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/112	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/120	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/121	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/122	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/130	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/131	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/132	Air/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/200	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/201	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/202	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/210	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/211	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/212	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/220	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/221	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/222	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/230	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/231	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/232	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/300	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/301	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/302	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/310	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/311	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/312	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/320	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/321	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/322	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/330	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-AGC/331	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/332	Air/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/400	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/401	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/402	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/410	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/411	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/412	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/420	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/421	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/422	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/430	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/431	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/432	Air/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/500	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/501	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/502	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/510	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/511	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/512	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/520	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/521	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/522	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-AGC/530	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-AGC/531	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/532	Air/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-GGC/000	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-GGC/001	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-GGC/002	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-GGC/010	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-GGC/011	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-GGC/012	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-GGC/020	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-GGC/021	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-GGC/022	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-GGC/030	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-GGC/031	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-GGC/032	Ground/Ground Communication	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-GGC/100	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
FI-GGC/101	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
FI-GGC/102	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
FI-GGC/110	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
FI-GGC/111	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
FI-GGC/112	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
FI-GGC/120	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
FI-GGC/121	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
FI-GGC/122	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
FI-GGC/130	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
FI-GGC/131	Ground/Ground	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Communication						
FI-GGC/132	Ground/Ground Communication	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
FI-GGC/200	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
FI-GGC/201	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
FI-GGC/202	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
FI-GGC/210	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
FI-GGC/211	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
FI-GGC/212	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
FI-GGC/220	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
FI-GGC/221	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
FI-GGC/222	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
FI-GGC/230	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
FI-GGC/231	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
FI-GGC/232	Ground/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
FI-GGC/300	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-GGC/301	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-GGC/302	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-GGC/310	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-GGC/311	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-GGC/312	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-GGC/320	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-GGC/321	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-GGC/322	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-GGC/330	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-GGC/331	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-GGC/332	Ground/Ground Communication	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-GGC/400	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-GGC/401	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-GGC/402	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-GGC/410	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-GGC/411	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-GGC/412	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-GGC/420	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-GGC/421	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-GGC/422	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-GGC/430	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-GGC/431	Ground/Ground Communication	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-GGC/432	Ground/Ground	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Communication						
FI-GGC/500	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-GGC/501	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-GGC/502	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-GGC/510	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-GGC/511	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-GGC/512	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-GGC/520	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-GGC/521	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-GGC/522	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-GGC/530	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-GGC/531	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-GGC/532	Ground/Ground Communication	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-NAV/000	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		B
FI-NAV/001	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		B
FI-NAV/002	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		B
FI-NAV/010	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		B
FI-NAV/011	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		B
FI-NAV/012	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		B

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-NAV/020	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		B
FI-NAV/021	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		B
FI-NAV/022	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		B
FI-NAV/030	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		B
FI-NAV/031	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		B
FI-NAV/032	Navigation	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		B
FI-NAV/100	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
FI-NAV/101	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
FI-NAV/102	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
FI-NAV/110	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
FI-NAV/111	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
FI-NAV/112	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
FI-NAV/120	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
FI-NAV/121	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
FI-NAV/122	Navigation	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
FI-NAV/130	Navigation	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
FI-NAV/131	Navigation	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
FI-NAV/132	Navigation	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
FI-NAV/200	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-NAV/201	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-NAV/202	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-NAV/210	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-NAV/211	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-NAV/212	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-NAV/220	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-NAV/221	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-NAV/222	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-NAV/230	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-NAV/231	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-NAV/232	Navigation	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-NAV/300	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-NAV/301	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-NAV/302	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-NAV/310	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-NAV/311	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-NAV/312	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-NAV/320	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-NAV/321	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-NAV/322	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-NAV/330	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-NAV/331	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-NAV/332	Navigation	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-NAV/400	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-NAV/401	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-NAV/402	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-NAV/410	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-NAV/411	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-NAV/412	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-NAV/420	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-NAV/421	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-NAV/422	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-NAV/430	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-NAV/431	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-NAV/432	Navigation	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-NAV/500	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-NAV/501	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-NAV/502	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-NAV/510	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-NAV/511	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-NAV/512	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-NAV/520	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-NAV/521	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-NAV/522	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-NAV/530	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-NAV/531	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-NAV/532	Navigation	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/000	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/001	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/002	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/010	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/011	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/012	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/020	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/021	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/022	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/030	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/031	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/032	Air Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-ASV/100	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/101	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/102	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/110	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/111	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/112	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/120	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-ASV/121	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/122	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/130	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/131	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/132	Air Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/200	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/201	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/202	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/210	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/211	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/212	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/220	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/221	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/222	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/230	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/231	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/232	Air Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/300	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/301	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/302	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/310	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/311	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/312	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/320	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/321	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/322	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/330	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/331	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/332	Air Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/400	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/401	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/402	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/410	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-ASV/411	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/412	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/420	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/421	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/422	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/430	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/431	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/432	Air Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/500	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/501	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/502	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/510	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/511	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/512	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/520	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/521	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/522	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-ASV/530	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-ASV/531	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASV/532	Air Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-GSV/000	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/001	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/002	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/010	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/011	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/012	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/020	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/021	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
FI-GSV/022	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/030	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/031	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/032	Ground Surveillance	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/100	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/101	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/102	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/110	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/111	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/112	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/120	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/121	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/122	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/130	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/131	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/132	Ground Surveillance	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/200	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/201	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/202	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/210	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/211	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/212	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/220	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/221	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/222	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/230	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/231	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/232	Ground Surveillance	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/300	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-GSV/301	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/302	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/310	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/311	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/312	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/320	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/321	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/322	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/330	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-GSV/331	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-GSV/332	Ground Surveillance	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-GSV/400	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-GSV/401	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-GSV/402	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-GSV/410	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-GSV/411	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-GSV/412	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-GSV/420	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-GSV/421	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-GSV/422	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-GSV/430	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-GSV/431	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-GSV/432	Ground Surveillance	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-GSV/500	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-GSV/501	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-GSV/502	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-GSV/510	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-GSV/511	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-GSV/512	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-GSV/520	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-GSV/521	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-GSV/522	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-GSV/530	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-GSV/531	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-GSV/532	Ground Surveillance	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-SMG/000	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/001	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/002	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/010	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/011	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/012	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/020	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/021	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/022	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/030	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/031	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/032	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/100	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/101	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/102	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/110	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/111	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/112	Surface Movement Guidance	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	& Control						
FI-SMG/120	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/121	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/122	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/130	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/131	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/132	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/200	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/201	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/202	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/210	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/211	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/212	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/220	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/221	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/222	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/230	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/231	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/232	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-SMG/300	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/301	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/302	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/310	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/311	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/312	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/320	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/321	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/322	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/330	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-SMG/331	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-SMG/332	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-SMG/400	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-SMG/401	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-SMG/402	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-SMG/410	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-SMG/411	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-SMG/412	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-SMG/420	Surface Movement Guidance	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	& Control						
FI-SMG/421	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-SMG/422	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-SMG/430	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-SMG/431	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-SMG/432	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-SMG/500	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-SMG/501	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-SMG/502	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-SMG/510	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-SMG/511	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-SMG/512	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-SMG/520	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-SMG/521	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-SMG/522	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-SMG/530	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-SMG/531	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-SMG/532	Surface Movement Guidance & Control	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/000	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-FPI/001	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/002	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/010	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/011	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/012	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/020	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/021	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/022	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/030	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/031	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/032	Flight Plan Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/100	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/101	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/102	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/110	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/111	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/112	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/120	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/121	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/122	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/130	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/131	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/132	Flight Plan Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/200	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/201	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-FPI/202	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/210	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/211	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/212	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/220	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/221	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/222	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/230	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/231	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/232	Flight Plan Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/300	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/301	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/302	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/310	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/311	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/312	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/320	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/321	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/322	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/330	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/331	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/332	Flight Plan Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/400	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/401	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/402	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/410	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/411	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/412	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/420	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/421	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/422	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/430	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/431	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-FPI/432	Flight Plan Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/500	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/501	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/502	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/510	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/511	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/512	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/520	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/521	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/522	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-FPI/530	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-FPI/531	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-FPI/532	Flight Plan Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/000	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/001	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/002	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/010	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/011	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/012	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/020	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/021	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/022	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/030	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/031	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/032	Flight Information & Alert	Undetected Corruption of	CWP	One	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
FI-FIA/100	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/101	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/102	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/110	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/111	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/112	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/120	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/121	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/122	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/130	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/131	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/132	Flight Information & Alert	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/200	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/201	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/202	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/210	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/211	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/212	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/220	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/221	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/222	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/230	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/231	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/232	Flight Information & Alert	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/300	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/301	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/302	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/310	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/311	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/312	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/320	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/321	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-FIA/322	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/330	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/331	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/332	Flight Information & Alert	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/400	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/401	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/402	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/410	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/411	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/412	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/420	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/421	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/422	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/430	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/431	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/432	Flight Information & Alert	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/500	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/501	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/502	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/510	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/511	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/512	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/520	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/521	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/522	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-FIA/530	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-FIA/531	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-FIA/532	Flight Information & Alert	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-ORM/000	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/001	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/002	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-ORM/010	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/011	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/012	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/020	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/021	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/022	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/030	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/031	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/032	Ops Room Management	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/100	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/101	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/102	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/110	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/111	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/112	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/120	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/121	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/122	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/130	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/131	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/132	Ops Room Management	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/200	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/201	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/202	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/210	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/211	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-ORM/212	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/220	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/221	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/222	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/230	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/231	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/232	Ops Room Management	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/300	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/301	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/302	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/310	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/311	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/312	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/320	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/321	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/322	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/330	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/331	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/332	Ops Room Management	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/400	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/401	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/402	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/410	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/411	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/412	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/420	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/421	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/422	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/430	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/431	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/432	Ops Room Management	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/500	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/501	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-ORM/502	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/510	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/511	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/512	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/520	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/521	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/522	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-ORM/530	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-ORM/531	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-ORM/532	Ops Room Management	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/000	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/001	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/002	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/010	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/011	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/012	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/020	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/021	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/022	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/030	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/031	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/032	Decision Making Support	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/100	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/101	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-DMS/102	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/110	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/111	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/112	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/120	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/121	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/122	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/130	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/131	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/132	Decision Making Support	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/200	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/201	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/202	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/210	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/211	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/212	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/220	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/221	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/222	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/230	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/231	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/232	Decision Making Support	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/300	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/301	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/302	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/310	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/311	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/312	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/320	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/321	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-DMS/322	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/330	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-DMS/331	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-DMS/332	Decision Making Support	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-DMS/400	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-DMS/401	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-DMS/402	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-DMS/410	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-DMS/411	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-DMS/412	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-DMS/420	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-DMS/421	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-DMS/422	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-DMS/430	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-DMS/431	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-DMS/432	Decision Making Support	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-DMS/500	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-DMS/501	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-DMS/502	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-DMS/510	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-DMS/511	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-DMS/512	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-DMS/520	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-DMS/521	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-DMS/522	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-DMS/530	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-DMS/531	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-DMS/532	Decision Making Support	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-SNT/000	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/001	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/002	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/010	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/011	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
		function					
FI-SNT/012	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/020	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/021	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/022	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/030	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/031	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/032	Safety Nets	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/100	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/101	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/102	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/110	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/111	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/112	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/120	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/121	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/122	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/130	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/131	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/132	Safety Nets	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/200	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/201	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/202	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/210	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/211	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/212	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/220	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/221	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-SNT/222	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/230	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/231	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/232	Safety Nets	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/300	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/301	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/302	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/310	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/311	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/312	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/320	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/321	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/322	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/330	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-SNT/331	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-SNT/332	Safety Nets	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-SNT/400	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-SNT/401	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-SNT/402	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-SNT/410	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-SNT/411	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-SNT/412	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-SNT/420	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-SNT/421	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-SNT/422	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-SNT/430	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-SNT/431	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-SNT/432	Safety Nets	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-SNT/500	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-SNT/501	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-SNT/502	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-SNT/510	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-SNT/511	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-SNT/512	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-SNT/520	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-SNT/521	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-SNT/522	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-SNT/530	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-SNT/531	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-SNT/532	Safety Nets	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-ASE/000	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/001	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/002	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/010	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/011	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/012	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/020	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/021	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/022	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/030	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/031	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/032	Real Time Airspace Environment	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/100	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/101	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/102	Real Time Airspace	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Environment						
FI-ASE/110	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/111	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/112	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/120	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/121	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/122	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/130	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/131	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/132	Real Time Airspace Environment	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/200	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/201	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/202	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/210	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/211	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/212	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/220	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/221	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/222	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-ASE/230	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/231	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/232	Real Time Airspace Environment	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/300	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/301	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/302	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/310	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/311	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/312	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/320	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/321	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/322	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/330	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-ASE/331	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-ASE/332	Real Time Airspace Environment	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-ASE/400	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-ASE/401	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASE/402	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-ASE/410	Real Time Airspace	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
	Environment						
FI-ASE/411	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASE/412	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-ASE/420	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-ASE/421	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASE/422	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-ASE/430	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-ASE/431	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASE/432	Real Time Airspace Environment	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-ASE/500	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-ASE/501	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASE/502	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-ASE/510	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-ASE/511	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASE/512	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-ASE/520	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-ASE/521	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASE/522	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-ASE/530	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-ASE/531	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-ASE/532	Real Time Airspace Environment	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-TFM/000	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/001	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/002	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/010	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/011	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/012	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/020	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/021	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/022	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/030	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/031	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/032	Tactical & Real Time	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/100	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/101	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/102	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/110	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/111	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/112	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/120	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/121	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-TFM/122	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/130	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/131	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/132	Tactical & Real Time	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/200	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/201	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/202	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/210	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/211	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/212	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/220	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/221	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/222	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/230	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/231	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/232	Tactical & Real Time	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/300	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/301	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/302	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/310	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/311	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/312	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/320	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/321	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/322	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/330	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		X
FI-TFM/331	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		X
FI-TFM/332	Tactical & Real Time	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		X
FI-TFM/400	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-TFM/401	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-TFM/402	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-TFM/410	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-TFM/411	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-TFM/412	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-TFM/420	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-TFM/421	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-TFM/422	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-TFM/430	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-TFM/431	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-TFM/432	Tactical & Real Time	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-TFM/500	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-TFM/501	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-TFM/502	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-TFM/510	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-TFM/511	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-TFM/512	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-TFM/520	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-TFM/521	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-TFM/522	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-TFM/530	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-TFM/531	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-TFM/532	Tactical & Real Time	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-AIS/000	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
FI-AIS/001	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
FI-AIS/002	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
FI-AIS/010	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
FI-AIS/011	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
FI-AIS/012	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
FI-AIS/020	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
FI-AIS/021	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-AIS/022	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
FI-AIS/030	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
FI-AIS/031	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
FI-AIS/032	Aeronautical Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
FI-AIS/100	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
FI-AIS/101	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
FI-AIS/102	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
FI-AIS/110	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
FI-AIS/111	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
FI-AIS/112	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
FI-AIS/120	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
FI-AIS/121	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
FI-AIS/122	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
FI-AIS/130	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
FI-AIS/131	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
FI-AIS/132	Aeronautical Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
FI-AIS/200	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
FI-AIS/201	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
FI-AIS/202	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
FI-AIS/210	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
FI-AIS/211	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
FI-AIS/212	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
FI-AIS/220	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
FI-AIS/221	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
FI-AIS/222	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
FI-AIS/230	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
FI-AIS/231	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
FI-AIS/232	Aeronautical Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
FI-AIS/300	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-AIS/301	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-AIS/302	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-AIS/310	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-AIS/311	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-AIS/312	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-AIS/320	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-AIS/321	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-AIS/322	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-AIS/330	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-AIS/331	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-AIS/332	Aeronautical Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-AIS/400	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-AIS/401	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-AIS/402	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-AIS/410	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-AIS/411	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-AIS/412	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-AIS/420	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-AIS/421	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-AIS/422	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-AIS/430	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-AIS/431	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-AIS/432	Aeronautical Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-AIS/500	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-AIS/501	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-AIS/502	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-AIS/510	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-AIS/511	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-AIS/512	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-AIS/520	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-AIS/521	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-AIS/522	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-AIS/530	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-AIS/531	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-AIS/532	Aeronautical Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-MET/000	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
FI-MET/001	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
FI-MET/002	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
FI-MET/010	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
FI-MET/011	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
FI-MET/012	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
FI-MET/020	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
FI-MET/021	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
FI-MET/022	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
FI-MET/030	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
FI-MET/031	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
FI-MET/032	Meteorological Information	Undetected Corruption of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
FI-MET/100	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
FI-MET/101	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
FI-MET/102	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
FI-MET/110	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
FI-MET/111	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
FI-MET/112	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
FI-MET/120	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
FI-MET/121	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
FI-MET/122	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
FI-MET/130	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
FI-MET/131	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-MET/132	Meteorological Information	Total Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
FI-MET/200	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	All	> T1		C
FI-MET/201	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		C
FI-MET/202	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Unit	One	> T1		C
FI-MET/210	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		C
FI-MET/211	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		C
FI-MET/212	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		C
FI-MET/220	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	All	> T1		C
FI-MET/221	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		C
FI-MET/222	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	Sector Suite	One	> T1		C
FI-MET/230	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	All	> T1		C
FI-MET/231	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	Some	> T1		C
FI-MET/232	Meteorological Information	Partial Loss of function	CWP	One	> T1		C
FI-MET/300	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-MET/301	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-MET/302	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-MET/310	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-MET/311	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-MET/312	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-MET/320	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-MET/321	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-MET/322	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-MET/330	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-MET/331	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-MET/332	Meteorological Information	Redundancy Reduction	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-MET/400	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-MET/401	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-MET/402	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-MET/410	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-MET/411	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-MET/412	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-MET/420	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-MET/421	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E

Code	Operational functions	Type of Failure	Extension	Scope	Duration	T1 Value	Severity
FI-MET/422	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-MET/430	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-MET/431	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-MET/432	Meteorological Information	Loss of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
FI-MET/500	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	All	> T1		E
FI-MET/501	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-MET/502	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Unit	One	> T1		E
FI-MET/510	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	All	> T1		E
FI-MET/511	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	Some	> T1		E
FI-MET/512	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Multiple Suites	One	> T1		E
FI-MET/520	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	All	> T1		E
FI-MET/521	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	Some	> T1		E
FI-MET/522	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	Sector Suite	One	> T1		E
FI-MET/530	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	All	> T1		E
FI-MET/531	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	Some	> T1		E
FI-MET/532	Meteorological Information	Corruption of Supervision	CWP	One	> T1		E
AR-AGC/201B	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AP-AGC/201B	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
AD-AGC/201B	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
OC-AGC/201B	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E
FI-AGC/201B	Air/Ground Communication	Partial Loss of function	Unit	Some	> T1		E

Appendix 1 to GM ~~12~~13 SKPI — Just Culture — State level — possible justification

ID	Area	Question	Possible evidences
Policy and its implementation			
ST.P.1	Policy elements related questions	Is there a ~~n explicit~~ clearly identified Just Culture policy, ~~which is~~ endorsed by [the relevant Ministry or aviation authority~~] at appropriate State level~~ and made public?	**A law or written instrument which regulates the treatment of aviation safety related incidents as well as related regulations~~.~~ such as a written policy statement ~~in policy~~ endorsed at State level.** **It should be noted that the policy may be a separate stand-alone document but it may also be defined in different legislative instruments.** **A 'Yes' answer is understood as a positive response to all three elements of the question, namely:** - **There is a written policy,** - **which is endorsed at State level, and** - **is made available to the general public.**
ST.P.2	Policy elements related questions	Does ~~it~~ the Just Culture Policy contain a description of what is considered to be unacceptable behaviour?	**In accordance with the definition in Article 2, (k) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 'unacceptable behaviour' should be considered as gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts.** **Besides this definition, it is recognised that it ~~is~~ may be difficult to ~~implement a hard line~~ articulate a clear distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. Therefore, there is a link between this question and question ST.L.4.**
ST.P.3	Policy elements related questions	Does ~~it~~ the Just Culture Policy refer to legal provisions which guarantee no punishment for self-reported occurrences (except for the cases defined above in question ST.P.2)?	**Policy /legal reference(s).**

~~**ST.P.4**~~	~~Policy elements related questions~~	~~Does it provide for legal support (e.g. counselling, court expertise etc.) for its own staff in case of prosecution / legal action related to a reported safety event?~~	~~**communications to staff advising that legal support is available and indicating the procedure how to access such support**~~
ST.P.~~5~~ 4	Policy elements related questions	Does the State require a Just Culture policy in Air Navigation Service Providers?	**Policy /legal reference(s).**
ST.P.~~6~~ 5	Roles and Responsibilities clearly defined and implemented	Is the role of different State authorities and Air Navigation Service Providers in handling safety reports and the flow of information clearly defined in the State?	**Description of a reporting system which would include the rights of access/limitation of the rights of access by the stakeholders as well as obligations to safeguard the information.**
ST.P.~~7~~ 6	Roles and Responsibilities clearly defined and implemented	Is the safety investigation and/or analysis process within the State entirely independent from any judicial authority?	**The safety investigation referred to is the one mandated in Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation.** **Possible evidences: documentary proof (eg. organisation chart) for existence of investigation authorities/entity, which does not have a link or dependences with any judicial authorities.**
ST.P.~~8~~ 7	Roles and Responsibilities clearly defined and implemented	Does the State ~~actively strive~~ take initiatives to promote Just Culture provisions in its ~~legislative framework~~ judicial system?	**Text of ~~legal~~ initiatives taken and material evidencing that the State is actively working on such promotion ~~implementation~~, e.g. through workshops, seminars and other awareness building measures, aiming at JC improvements in the judicial system.**
ST.P.~~9~~ 8	Training	~~Is there a regulatory requirement~~ Does the State ensure that ~~to include~~ elements and/or courses on Just Culture are included in the training programmes for relevant staff working in the competent authority ~~and service providers~~ (~~ab initio~~ initial and ~~recurrent~~ continuation training)?	**Legal provisions or other evidence that Just Culture is included in the training programmes for relevant staff of the competent authority.**

ST.P.~~10~~ 9	Training	Are qualifications and training requirements as regards Just Culture for State safety investigators clearly defined?	**'Safety investigators' as per Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation.** **Possible evidences: qualification and training requirements for safety investigators indicating elements and/or courses on Just Culture.** **It is assumed that for answering this question appropriate coordination with the relevant investigation authority should be ensured, as needed.**

Legal/Judiciary

ST.L.1	Primary legislation	In case there is a Freedom of Information legislation, does it provide for exemptions applicable to safety information?	**The exemptions mentioned are intended to provide protection to the safety data and information in order to ensure its continuing availability for safety related work. The sensitive nature of safety information is such that the way to ensure its collection is by guaranteeing its confidentiality, the protection of its source and the confidence of the personnel working in civil aviation (Preamble of Directive 2003/42/EC). Examples of safety-sensitive information ~~are~~ include medical records, name of the reporter, parties to the reported incident etc.** **Possible evidences: legal provisions.**
~~**ST.L.2**~~	~~Primary legislation~~	~~If an incident falls under Just Culture policy, are general provisions referring to potential threatening the public safety of the public which can be applicable invoked by judicial authorities under penal law?~~	~~**legal provisions**~~
ST.L.~~3~~ 2	Primary legislation	Are there provisions in the law affording protection from prosecution to individuals involved in safety events, under the principles of Just Culture?	**Legal provisions**

ST.L.4 3	Judicial procedures and specific aviation legislation	Is there an entity within the State, supported by Subject Matter Experts, with clearly defined ~~rules~~ principles~~,~~ against which the Subject Matter Experts ~~which~~ decide ~~s~~ whether relevant safety events are a matter for prosecution?	**How this 'entity' will be organised, structured and functioning depends on the national situation. Important to note is that the more a State has made clear, agreed arrangements about who gets to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, the more predictable the judicial consequences of an occurrence are likely to be.** **The intent of the question is to identify if there is a process in place leading to a decision of which safety event should be brought to prosecution.** **Possible evidence: Terms of references, working arrangements etc.**
ST.L.~~5~~ 4	Judicial procedures and specific aviation legislation	Is there a judicial procedure to ensure that in the case of prosecution linked to an aviation accident/incident Subject Matter Experts will be involved?	**judicial procedures showing the involvement of Subject Matter Experts.** **The intent of the question is to make a link to question ST.L.3 with regard to experts involved in the process.**
ST.L.~~6~~ 5	Judicial procedures and specific aviation legislation	Are the provisions of Directive 2003/42/EC on occurrence reporting in civil aviation and in particular the provisions contained in its Article 8 (Protection of information) fully and effectively implemented in the national legislation?	**The spirit of Directive 2003/42/EC on occurrence reporting in civil aviation can be found in its Article 1: '*The objective of this Directive is to contribute to the improvement of air safety by ensuring that relevant information on safety is reported, collected, stored, protected and disseminated. The sole objective of occurrence reporting is the prevention of accidents and incidents and not to attribute blame or liability*.'** **Article 8 of the same Directive contains several aspects:** **- proceedings should not be instituted because the Organisation (in case of the Directive – the State) only becomes aware of an occurrence through reporting;** **- the procedures should ensure that employees who report are not subject to any prejudice by their employer.**

			Possible evidences: internal rules and procedures.
ST.L.~~7~~ 6	Formal agreement	Is there an ~~advance agreement~~ established process on exchange of information to guarantee appropriate use of safety information by police/judicial authorities?	**The aim of the question is to establish the conditions under which the exchange of sensitive information is ensured between the holder of the information/data (ANSP) and the requester of that information/data (police/judicial authority). The term 'process' should be read as encompassing different types of arrangement or process that may be in place at the national level.** **Possible evidences: agreement, working arrangements, procedures related to the use of safety information**
ST.L.~~8~~ 7	Formal agreement	Is there an agreed process to deal with interactions on aviation incident matters between the aviation authorities and judicial/police authorities?	**Article 12.3 of EU Regulation No 996/2010 provides for the establishment of advance arrangements between safety investigation authorities and other authorities likely to be involved in the activities related to the safety investigation such as the judicial authorities. Other advance arrangements addressing Just Culture principles could also be established between aviation entities (could be other than investigation authorities) and judicial authorities.** **Possible evidences: advance arrangements, working arrangements, procedures.**

Occurrence reporting and investigation

ST.O.1	Occurrence reporting and investigation	Does the State provide regular statistical feedback to the public based on safety reports received (e.g. annual reports)?	**Reports already made available to the public, containing statistical safety data.**
ST.O.2	Occurrence reporting and investigation	Are Subject Matter Experts involved in making the decision in cases where personnel licences/ratings could be affected?	**Proposed/legal provisions or list of the members of a panel/board, which have already made a decision relevant to personnel licences/ratings.** **This question is linked to the ST.L.3 and ST.L.4.**

Appendix 1 to GM ~~13~~14 SKPI — Just Culture — ANSP level — possible justification

ID	Area	Question	Possible evidences
Policy and its implementation			
ANSP.P.1	Policy elements related questions	Is there an explicit Just Culture policy, which is formally endorsed by management and staff representatives and made public.	**Written and published policy signed by management and staff representatives.** **The intent of the question is to establish if a Just Culture policy exists and is shared by the staff. The Just Culture policy may be a separate stand-alone document or elements of such policy may be defined in various internal procedures/documents, which deal with different aspects of Just Culture and are not necessarily endorsed by the staff representatives.** **In such a case all relevant references should be provided mentioning the fact that the referenced documents are not endorsed by staff representatives. Details about the consultation of staff may be provided as evidence where relevant.** **A 'Yes' answer is understood as a positive response to <u>all three</u> elements of the question, namely:** - **there is a written policy,** - **which is endorsed by management and staff representatives, and** - **that is published.**
ANSP.P.2	Policy elements related questions	Does the Just Culture policy contain a description of what is considered to be unacceptable behaviour?	**In accordance with the definition in Article 2~~,~~—(k) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 'unacceptable behaviour' should be considered as gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts. Besides this definition, it is realised that it is difficult to implement a hard line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. Therefore, there is a link between this question and question ANSP.O.8.** **Possible evidences: written statement in policy**

ANSP.P.3	Policy elements related questions	In the case of self-reported occurrences (except for the cases defined above in question ANSP.P.2), does the Just Culture policy treat the reporter justly and in accordance with the policy and principles of the service provider ~~guarantee that no disciplinary action will be taken regarding against the reporter by the service provider for self-reported occurrences~~?	**Written statement in policy**
ANSP.P.4	Policy elements related questions	Does the ANSP provide legal support for its own staff in case of prosecution / legal action related to a safety occurrence?	**Communications to staff advising that legal support is available and indicating the procedure how to access such support.**
ANSP.P.5	Policy elements related questions	Is there an established and well known stress management system in place such as Critical Incident Stress Management programme?	**Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) is the structured assistance for a normal reaction to an abnormal event. A CISM programme can help the controllers see that incidents are 'normal', that they can help the organisation improve and that they can happen to everybody. Use of CISM is considered as an indication that the organisation is not intending to 'punish' staff but to provide support to those involved in occurrences and thus is aiming to implement a 'just culture'. More information can for example be found in the 'Critical incident Stress Management: User Implementation Guide' published by EUROCONTROL in 2008 (Ref. nr. 08/11/03-27).** **Possible evidences: details of a CISM programme, communications to staff advising that CISM is available and indicating procedure how to access such support, procedures indicating when 'CISM is provided. Nothing prevents the CISM programme to be subcontracted out to an independent organisation.**

ANSP.P.6	Policy elements related questions	Does the ANSP ensure that ~~Are safety~~ actions taken in respect to staff after an occurrence preserve in full ~~without impact on~~ the pay and benefits of the staff member concerned until the end of the investigation?	**No financial penalties on pay until the occurrence investigation has been completed. In some cases safety actions may be taken with regard to the persons involved in an incident, ~~taken~~ (additional training, mandatory rest periods, psychological/medical check-ups etc.) ~~could need some additional training~~ which could have an impact on hours and wages. Such a 'training' for example, would be the result of the investigation and would not be required or mandated before the investigation is completed. Typically, the investigation should be considered completed once the report has been finalized. It may, as a side effect, encourage those carrying out the investigation to complete the report in a timely fashion. Possible evidences: an overview of safety actions taken after an occurrence and their implications to the pay of the persons involved in the occurrence.**
ANSP.P.7	Roles and Responsibilities clearly defined and implemented	Are the service provider's ~~s~~ safety investigators completely ~~independent and~~ separate from any line, competency or ops management?	**Organisational structure indicating reporting lines, procedures for investigation of occurrences**. **It is acknowledged that in the case of small providers or small units, the number of staff is reduced and the provider/unit cannot afford to have independent staff to deal exclusively with safety management tasks. However, when people perform several jobs with different reporting lines e.g. in the case of safety investigations, today's best practice may be summed up as follows: experts in charge of investigations will report to the accountable post holder for safety; if they perform other operational tasks part-time they will report on the latter to their operational line manager.** **When providing the answer to the questionnaire in addition to answers 'Yes/No', the relevant details (e.g. why complete independence cannot be ensured) should be provided in the Justification and Evidence section.**

ANSP.P.8	Roles and Responsibilities clearly defined and implemented	Do the service provider's safety investigators have full, unimpeded access to all relevant data for investigations?	**Rules and procedures at ANSP level for occurrence investigation**.
ANSP.P.9	Roles and Responsibilities clearly defined and implemented	Is access to safety data clearly defined and confidentiality ensured?	**Rules and procedures at ANSP level for occurrences investigation**
ANSP.P.10	Roles and Responsibilities clearly defined and implemented	Does the ANSP ensure that~~Are~~ the ~~staff~~ persons providing Critical Incident Stress Management clearly nominated and adequately trained?	**Nomination and ~~staff,~~ training requirements for ~~staff~~ persons providing CISM, including recurrent training.**
ANSP.P.11	Training	Is there regular training and/or briefings on relevant legislation for safety in the context of Just Culture?	**Training schedule, planning for briefings, evidence that training and/or briefings on Just Culture have taken place.** **Training may include statistics supporting the increase of safety as consequence of an efficient reporting system.**
ANSP.P.12	Training	Are the principles of Just Culture included in all relevant training curricula (~~ab initio~~ initial and ~~recurrent~~ continuation training)?	**Training syllabus for personnel involved in safety related activities includes a module addressing the principles of Just Culture. Evidences that training courses are being delivered to the appropriate personnel**. **Knowledge and understanding of Just Culture should be satisfactory and it has to be built through training courses of appropriate and proportioned duration. It is essential that Just Culture details are included in the training of all relevant personnel from the very beginning (i.e. initial training) and that it continues to be updated constantly in order to maintain it fresh in people's minds as well as to bring in new elements, developments and/or principles. In fact, training of operators or personnel is fundamental to the performance and organisation of any system.**
ANSP.P.13	Training	Are qualifications and training requirements as regards Just Culture for the ANSP's safety investigators clearly defined?	**Professional qualification requirements for ANSP safety investigators+D26** **The role of ANSPs safety investigators is essential in applying Just Culture inside the organisation on day-to-day**

			investigations. The way they conduct the investigation, collect data, make analyses and identify contributing factors, or write conclusions and recommendations, can influence or are influenced by the Just Culture Policies of the ANSP. **Furthermore, Just Culture is more than a number of policies or principles written down, extending into the beliefs and behaviour of people, including safety investigators. Thus, in order to properly apply by these principles, the experts becoming safety investigators need appropriate qualifications and training to adequately perform the sensitive job of safety investigation.** **Formalisation of the qualifications and training as regards Just Culture is needed for safety investigators to avoid that their knowledge and expertise in the subject is left to chance, therefore applying the Just Culture principles in a suboptimal way**.
ANSP.L.1	Judicial procedures and specific aviation legislation	Is the spirit of Directive 2003/42/EC on occurrence reporting in civil aviation and in particular the provisions of its Article 8 (Protection of information) fully transposed into internal procedures	**The spirit of Directive 2003/42/EC on occurrence reporting in civil aviation can be found in its Article 1: 'The objective of this Directive is to contribute to the improvement of air safety by ensuring that relevant information on safety is reported, collected, stored, protected and disseminated. The sole objective of occurrence reporting is the prevention of accidents and incidents and not to attribute blame or liability.' Article 8 of the same Directive contains several aspects:** **- proceedings should not be instituted because the Organisation (in case of the Directive – the State) only become aware of an occurrence through reporting;** **- the procedures should ensure that employees who report are not subject to any prejudice by their employer.** **Both aspects should be relevant to ASNP's as well as the State.** **Possible evidences: internal rules and procedures.**

ANSP.L.2	Formal agreement	Notwithstanding the judicial independence, is there any agreement between ANSPs and judicial/police authorities to ensure protection of reported incident data and involved individuals?	**The question comes from the need to have arrangements in place before a major incident occurs and is in line with the approach outlined for accident investigations in Regulation 996/2010, Article 12, paragraph 3. In particular arrangements should be made beforehand on the exchange of information, the appropriate use as well as the resolution of conflicts between the stakeholders (3d, 3e 3f). Possible evidences: agreement, working arrangement, procedure.**
ANSP.L.3	Formal agreement	Is there an agreed process to deal with incident matters between the ANSP and its national aviation authorities?	**The question is intended to identify the existence of a process that sorts out what incidents are handled at the level of the service provider only and what incidents would be addressed by other aviation authorities (civil aviation safety investigation authorities (~~SIA~~ AIB), Competent Authorities/NSA). In this respect, there should be clarity about who'll do what, for how long and with what possible consequences. Otherwise the openness and trust (i.e. JC) could be influenced.** **In addition, the aim of the question is to establish whether the conditions under which the exchange of sensitive information is ensured between the holder of the information/data (ANSP) and the requester of that information/data are in line with the provisions for protection of data and/or individuals as laid out in the Annex 13, the EU Directive 2003/42 and/or the EU Regulation 996/2010. The term 'agreement' should be read as encompassing different types of arrangement or process that may be in place at the national level.** **Possible evidences: agreement, working arrangement, procedure.** **If such agreement or working arrangements or procedures cannot be concluded, then the answer 'No' should be selected and the reasons why should be described.**

(J) — Appendix 1 to GM ~~13~~14 SKPI — Just Culture — ANSP level — possible justification

ANSP.O.1	Occurrence reporting and investigation	Is the identity of personnel involved in occurrences protected by staff regulations?	**The protection refers to all personal details pertaining to individual persons.Possible evidences: statements in the staff regulations.**
ANSP.O.2	Occurrence reporting and investigation	Does staff subject to investigations based on occurrence reports have access to related information?	**Written statements regarding data access, internal procedures, case examples**
ANSP.O.3	Occurrence reporting and investigation	Is there a procedure in place to ensure that the ~~requirement for~~ staff subject to investigation can record his/her ~~to sign their~~ comments ~~agreement / disagreement with~~ as regards the findings of investigations?	**Internal rules and ~~procedures~~ processes.** **If the selected answer is 'No' a rationale why such a procedure is not available or possible should be provided.**
ANSP.O.4	Occurrence reporting and investigation	Is there a formal ~~procedure~~ process to inform staff having reported an occurrence of the progress of the investigation?	**Internal rules and procedures**
ANSP.O.5	Occurrence reporting and investigation	Does the ANSP provide regular feedback to staff based on occurrence reports?	**Safety messages distributed to staff, newsletters or monthly/annual reports**
ANSP.O.6	Occurrence reporting and investigation	Does the public annual report of the service provider provide statistical feedback on occurrence reports?	**Annual report made publicly available indicating feedback on occurrence reports.** **The public annual report is formally defined in the Commission implementing Regulation (EU) 1035/2011, Annex I, point 9, entitled 'Reporting requirements'. It states that the results of the ANSPs activities (including safety) shall be included in the annual report that they have to provide to the public under the conditions set by the competent authority. The question refers to the Annual Report (i.e. the report defined above, if applicable) but if the ANSP provides safety statistics in any other public report, that would include safety information (e.g. bulletins, safety newsletters etc.), it also a valid and acceptable way of making safety performance public, and in-line with the spirit of this question.**

(J) — Appendix 1 to GM ~~13~~14 SKPI — Just Culture — ANSP level — possible justification

ANSP.O.7	Occurrence reporting and investigation	Has automated reporting been accepted by staff and implemented by the service provider?	**Automated reporting refers to the use of system information and operational data for detecting and reporting an occurrence. Examples are the use of ACAS or STCA data or the EUROCONTROL Automatic Safety Monitoring Tool (ASMT).** **Possible evidences: written statements, provisions in staff regulations, or contractual elements, agreed by staff or staff representatives.**
ANSP.O.8	Occurrence reporting and investigation	~~Is there a separate body, involving nominated~~ Are Subject Matter Experts involved in making the decision on whether a case is an 'honest' mistake or it falls under the 'unacceptable behaviour' category?	**An honest mistake can be considered as a mistake that is in line with people's experience and training, or the undesirable outcome inadvertently caused during a conduct respecting the applicable rules, or an event caused not having awareness of taking a substantial and unjustifiable risk ~~and~~, particularly in the case of Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs), can stem from working under pressure or even from periods of under-stimulation when traffic is light. Gross negligence, wilful violations, or destructive acts are not honest mistakes.** **Clear arrangements are required to define a separate body that gets to draw the line between honest mistakes and unacceptable behaviour. This body is to consist of more than one person. It deals primarily with the internal disciplinary actions Whether the action may be considered a crime under criminal law is entirely up to the judicial authorities, although the said body's activity may be extended to judicial actions under certain conditions. Possible evidences: Terms of references, working arrangements, staff nominations.**